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Abstract 
 
 
 
This work investigates the characteristics of masculinity that are at the symbolic heart of 
China’s economic success, and of which the figure of the white-collar man is emblematic. 
Based on fieldwork observations, interview and media publications, it examines the gendered 
practices, aspirations and attitudes of men who identify with or aspire to white-collar status 
alongside discursive representations of the Chinese white-collar man, interrogating the links 
between practice and discourse. Drawing on various approaches to theorizing subjectivity, it 
argues that white-collar masculinity is performed in ways that suggest both radical shifts and 
continuities in understandings of gender, which challenge the prevalent teleological narrative 
of China’s modernization. 
The first chapter sets the scene for white-collar masculinity in the reform era and 
discusses fieldwork methodologies. Chapter two sets out the theoretical framework adopted to 
analyse the gendered white-collar subject, and examines academic literature on masculinities 
in China. Chapter three examines the ‘body culture’ of informants, and how they ‘bring 
themselves’ to white-collar discourse through attention to their bodies in areas of daily life 
such as dress, movement and hygiene. Chapters four and five look respectively at the 
production of corporate masculinity both inside and outside the office, through an exploration 
of business and leisure practices, and their overlap. Chapter six takes a close look at the young 
white-collar man as (heterosexual) boyfriend and husband and the final chapter investigates 
sexualisations of young urban middle-class males, and comments on their transformative 
possibilities.
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
 
The sleek and smartly-suited young man is an omnipresent figure in twenty-first century 
China. In magazines, television adverts, on billboards, walking in the streets of business 
districts, and seen through the windows of the plush coffee shops which have mushroomed in 
the upmarket retail and business areas in recent years,1 his sophisticated, prosperous and 
charming looks are emblematic of the global success of the economic reforms of the last three 
decades. His cool, metropolitan, appearance is associated with the location and look of the 
outlets he frequents, and the cost and conspicuous brand label foreignness of his clothes and 
accessories give him the symbolic, spatial and material attributes of fashionable, urban status. 
His clothing, hairstyle, bodily mannerisms, displays of knowledge (when ordering a latte, for 
example) and relative wealth (using his laptop) – give him a globally recognisable urbane 
‘look’, which, in China, is synonymous with a ‘bailing’ (white-collar) identity. Unmistakably, 
the Chinese ‘white-collar man’ (bailing nanren) has arrived, and is stepping on to the global 
corporate stage with confidence as the model of middle class status to which young urbanites 
aspire. Men want to identify with and possess his attributes, parents urge their sons to attain 
the values and opportunities his image suggests, and women want to marry someone who 
exemplifies his achievements. Reflecting this popularity, numerous magazines catering to 
white-collar men – particularly as consumers intent on constructing a particular image of 
masculinity – have sprung up since the turn of the millennium.2 The contemporary prominence 
                                                 
1 This is such a popular activity for the urban middle-class that Starbucks has become one of the most well-
known brands among 25 to 40-year-old white-collar workers, spawning many look-alike competitors. It opened 
its first outlet in China in 2000 and now has over 200 branches in 21 cities. The affluent young men who can 
afford to patronize Starbucks enjoy an exclusive atmosphere: the price of a coffee in Starbucks China is beyond 
the reach of most urbanites. See ‘Starbucks Soars in China’, Asia Times, June 15, 2006, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/HF15Cb06.html (accessed June 30, 2008).  
2 These magazines include the Chinese editions of foreign titles, which I discuss in more detail in my 
methodologies section below. I briefly summarise them here: Nanren zhuang (For Him Magazine), claimed print 
run 556,000: ‘Nanren Zhuang’ (For Him Magazine), Liulan wang (gotoread.com), 
http://www.gotoread.com/mag/12286/ (accessed October 7, 2008); Shishang jiankang (Men’s health), claimed 
print run 450,320: ‘Shishang jiankang’ (Men's Health), Mediasearch.cn, 
http://www.mediasearch.cn/mediumPage.aspx?mediumID=501ef552-0e52-42d2-8f48-5dda05097f12&login=no 
(accessed October 7, 2008); Shishang xiansheng (Esquire), claimed print run 625,000 copies: ‘Shishang 
xiansheng (Esquire)’, Liulanwang (gotoread.com), http://www.gotoread.com/mag/594/ (accessed October 7, 
2008); and home-grown titles such as Mingpai (Mangazine), claimed print run 215,000: ‘Mingpai’ (Mangazine), 
Liulanwang (gotoread.com), http://www.gotoread.com/mag/12089/ (accessed October 7, 2008); and Meili 
xiansheng (Men’s style), claimed print run 334,500: ‘Meili xiansheng (Men's Style)’, Liulan wang 
(gotoread.com), http://www.gotoread.com/mag/12822/ (accessed October 7, 2008). 
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of the ‘white-collar man’ thus plays a highly significant part in shaping not only contemporary 
ideas of status and ‘class’, but also of conceptions of the ‘modern man’.3 
Based on interview data and a wide range of popular media materials, this thesis offers 
an analysis of the white-collar man as a gendered subject. At first glance, this figure suggests a 
radical re-formation of the masculine subject driving China’s social and economic 
transformation, far removed from the drab political correctness of the ideal man of the Mao 
era.4 It inflects the assumptions, processes and practices of China’s global modernity with a 
range of gendered characteristics which derive largely from global circulations of meaning. 
Yet, as my interview data reveals, individual identification with the global attributes of the 
‘white-collar’ image is not inconsistent with simultaneous identification with other locally and 
culturally embedded notions of gender that interrupt the neat outlines of the global image. This 
thesis therefore interrogates the possibilities of masculinity – the multiple masculinities – 
represented by the discursive figure and subjectivity of the white-collar man as a lens on to the 
contemporary ideals of masculinity associated with China’s economic success. 
Fundamentally, therefore, my aim is to analyse the understandings of gender – specifically of 
masculinity – that underpin both subjective and discursive commitment to the ideological 
trajectory of China’s global success. 
This project is particularly significant now, at a time when gender inequities in China 
are increasing, most notably in employment, and yet when the government and popular 
discourse give little more than rhetorical attention to issues of hierarchy and injustice in 
gendered practices and social relations.5 My analysis of contemporary urban masculinities 
therefore contributes new perspectives to the debate about the discursive and subjective 
production of gender difference and hierarchy in China. While, as I summarise in following 
sections, there are a number of works that cover, to varying extents, the reform era gendering 
of Chinese society in general, and the gendering of women, there have been no significant 
                                                 
3 I am aware of the debates about modernity and postmodernity in China in such works as Zhang Xudong’s 
Postsocialism and Cultural Politics: China in the Last Decade of the Twentieth Century (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2008) Many dimensions of these debates remain to be explored, such as their implications for 
queer perspectives. However, my focus in this work is predominantly ethnographic and discursive, and I will 
leave discussion of these implications for another occasion. 
4 As Dorothy Hodgson has pointed out: ‘the assumptions, component processes, and consequences of Modernity 
are inherently gendered.’ See her ‘Of Modernity/Modernities, Gender and Ethnography’, in Gendered 
Modernities: Ethnographic Perspectives, ed. Dorothy L. Hodgson (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 8. Hodgson’s 
comment is based on the ethnographic evidence from various global sites presented in the book’s chapters. 
5 For comments on rising gender inequalities see: Liu Jieyu, ‘Gender Dynamics and Redundancy in Urban 
China’, Feminist Economics 13, no. 3 (2007): 128; Harriet Evans, ‘Sexed Bodies, Sexualized Identities, and the 
Limits of Gender’, China Information 22, no. 2 (2008): 364-5; and Zhong Xueping, ‘Hou funü jiefang yu ziwo 
xiangxiang’ (Post-women’s liberation and self-reflections), Dushu (Reading) no. 11 (2005): 16-17. For comments 
about resistance to critical gender analysis see Evans, ibid., 365; and Zhong, ibid., 16. 
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academic works that focus on the masculine gendering of the emerging middle class.6 Through 
analysis of diverse sources, including texts, images, and practices, I elucidate the disjunctures 
and similarities between discursive and popular depictions – or ‘subject positions’ - of white-
collar men, and the complex, lived realities of masculinities experienced by men who identify 
themselves as ‘white-collar’.  
In so doing, I argue that mainstream media discourses posit the white-collar man 
within a narrative of progress, emblematic of China’s ‘joining tracks’7 with the (imagined) 
developed world, depicting him variously as the consummate consumer, hard-working 
corporate employee, sports and leisure enthusiast, ideal, emotionally literate husband, and 
even metrosexual icon, although  careful consideration of these media discourses reveals many 
implicit assumptions about a naturalised gender hierarchy.  This chapter goes beyond media 
discourses and through fieldwork-based accounts of white-collar men’s lived experiences 
uncovers how media images interact with  day-to-day practices , and argues that the mostly 
sanitised, globally-inflected depictions of white-collar men in mainstream media encapsulate 
only a limited range of the subjective positions with which white-collar men like my 
informants identify. The disjunctures between discourse and lived experiences reveal not an 
apparently ‘seamless’ to-ing and fro-ing between written discourse and subject formation, but 
rather white-collar male subjects’ simultaneous insertion in other discourses and practices of 
masculinities, deeply embedded in cultural and social custom, such as networks of guanxi 
(relationships) and yingchou (business socialising) activities which construct white-collar 
masculinities through the exclusion of the feminine ‘Other’.   
Based on this fieldwork, I argue that white-collar men’s subjectivities are a messy 
composite of jostling positions, belying the glossy mainstream modernization narrative of 
                                                 
6 Works covering gender and women include: Harriet Evans, The Subject of Gender: Daughters and Mothers in 
Urban China (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008); Lisa Rofel, Desiring China: Experiments in 
Neoliberalism, Sexuality, and Public Culture, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007); Liu Jieyu, 
Gender and Work in Urban China: Women Workers of the Unlucky Generation (London: Routledge, 2007); 
Wang Zheng, ‘Gender, Employment and Women’s Resistance,’ in Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and 
Resistance, ed. Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 158-182; Susan Brownell 
and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, eds, Chinese Femininities/Chinese Masculinities: A Reader (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002); Lisa Rofel, Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China After Socialism (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999); Li Xiaojiang, ‘With What Discourse Do We Reflect on 
Chinese Women? Thoughts on Transnational Feminism in China’, in Spaces of their Own: Women's Public 
Sphere in Transnational China, trans. Zhang Yajie with editorial assistance by Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, ed. 
Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 261–77; Harriet Evans, 
Women and Sexuality in China: Dominant Discourses of Female Sexuality and Gender since 1949 (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1997); and Tani Barlow, ‘Theorizing Woman: Funü, Guojia, Jiating’, in Body, Subject & Power in 
China, ed. Angela Zito and Tani Barlow (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 253-289.  
7 I borrow this phrase from Rebecca Karl’s discussion on the narrative of modernisation in China: Rebecca E. 
Karl, ‘‘Joining Tracks with the World’: The Impossibility of Politics in China’, Radical Philosophy no. 131 
(May/June, 2005): 20-27. 
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them as standard bearers of a progressive, post-millennial society, that the change represented 
by the figure of the white-collar man does not necessarily equate to progress in lived realities.  
In the competitive and fast-changing social climate of today’s China white-collar men fall 
back on tried and tested models of masculinities when they feel under pressure, or for 
example, in their homosocial activities, yet this goes largely unremarked in media narratives 
oriented to hailing the benefits of consumer society rather than pointing to its gender 
inequities. 
  
Setting the Scene: Fieldwork 
The conceptual categories and ideas around which I structure this dissertation are based first of 
all on the key themes that emerged from my interview subjects’ accounts, and that give shape 
to my chapters. My research interests, the issues I addressed and the encounters I had during 
my fieldwork in Beijing established the boundaries and limits to the aspects of white-collar 
men’s lives that I discuss. For now, therefore, I want to set the scene by describing my 
fieldwork and the methods I used.  
I spent eleven months in Beijing, where I used three main methods to build up a 
picture of white-collar men’s sense of themselves as men: participant observation, conducting 
informal conversations and more formal interviews, and collecting relevant media publications 
and articles. As my approach was primarily ethnographically-framed, I undertook my 
interviews and participant observation interviews before turning to analyse the media articles I 
gathered during my time in Beijing. In adopting this approach, I drew on Everett Zhang’s 
instructive ethnographic study of entrepreneurial activity, in which he contends that ‘the gap 
between law in texts and law in practice with regard to people’s everyday lives is considerably 
larger in China than in the West’, and, quoting Paul Rabinow, that ‘more attention needs to be 
given to “minor practices,” which escape the dominant discursive trends.’8 Such an approach 
requires analysis both of ‘discursive trends’ and ‘real life’ experiences which do not feature 
prominently in the mainstream media. Both these inform my understanding of the production 
of masculine subjectivities, but I approach them in different ways. I treat the interviews as 
‘texts’ which reveal how my informants make sense of themselves as gendered subjects, and 
use the main themes that emerged from my analysis of the interview material to structure the 
thesis. As for the media materials, I have taken them as discursive expressions of regimes of 
white-collar masculinity that produce the possibility of white-collar male subjects. They 
                                                 
8 Zhang, ibid., 237; quoting Paul Rabinow, Essays on the Anthropology of Reason (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 7. 
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clearly show a large overlap with the self-understandings of my informants, but I do not take 
the media materials in any way as ‘representative’ of white-collar ‘realities’, as I explain in 
more detail in the theoretical section of chapter two.  
My day-to-day activities during the months I lived in Beijing gave me ample chance to 
talk to people, and their views, as recorded in my notes, form the substantive data for this 
thesis. I held countless conversations and observed a multitude of everyday practices in many 
diverse environments, from gleaming corporate offices, classrooms of enthusiastic young 
white-collar workers, staffrooms of middle-class teachers, shopping malls teeming with 
fashionable urban consumers, street corners in the business and IT districts, foreign and local 
fast food restaurants, upmarket hairdressing salons, to the living rooms and kitchens in the 
condominium apartments of the new middle class. Most of my participant observation and 
conversations with informants came from two major and very rich sources: working with 
colleagues and students in schools, and spending leisure time with friends and occasionally 
colleagues and students. I worked at three schools as a teacher of English: the Beijing branch 
of a large Taiwanese-owned chain catering for mainly kindergarten and some primary school 
age children in the suburb of Wangjing; a small school cum consultancy in Sanyuanqiao that 
focussed on one-to-one tuition with business people – usually in their late twenties or thirties – 
on and off site; and the Haidian branch of a medium-sized Chinese chain that taught mostly 
white-collar employees in their twenties, in small group classes. These schools offered plenty 
of rich opportunities for observing and participating in the lives of the middle class, and in 
particular white-collar men, such as the corporate marketing men in their twenties and thirties 
at the Taiwanese-owned school, the affluent private-sector executives in their thirties who 
were my one-on-one students at Sanyuanqiao, and the smartly turned out young office workers 
in the media and IT industries who were the mainstay of the Haidian student body.  
I spent much of my out-of-school time with white-collar male friends in their twenties 
and thirties, shopping in the glitzy malls of Wangfujing, eating out in the increasing number of 
fashionable and not inexpensive ‘ethnic’ or themed (Yunnanese, Tibetan, Buddhist vegetarian) 
restaurants in the business districts, having haircuts in upmarket hair salons in Sanlitun. 
Sometimes we went to superior quality foot massages in spas catering to corporate customers, 
or to work out in a well-appointed ‘white-collar’ gym in Zhongguancun. I also spent quite a 
lot of time in the homes and parental homes of my informants, watching widescreen TV from 
IKEA sofas (rosewood in their parents’ apartments).  
Altogether, I spoke with around thirty-five Chinese people directly about my research 
topic, two thirds of whom were men. I had many general conversations with several others, 
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and I noted down their comments that interested me. I met my informants mainly through 
work or socialising: they were colleagues, students, friends, colleagues of friends and friends 
of friends. Not all could be described as white collar, but most were; and they could all be 
described as middle class. Almost all were in their twenties and thirties. Out of this group of 
informants with whom I had informal, unscripted and often spontaneous conversations about 
my research, I further conducted eleven rather more formal and loosely-planned interviews of 
ten individual sessions with eight men and two women, and one group session with three 
women. I found this number of more formal interviews sufficient, since  I accumulated so 
much material from my day-to-day chats. These interviews were ‘semi-structured’, in that I 
had in mind some issues around masculinity that I wanted to raise.9 I found that both formal 
and informal discussions provided fruitful data. The more formal interviews yielded detailed 
verbatim accounts, most of which I recorded, and yet the causal chats yielded perhaps more 
unguarded and spontaneous comments and opinions.  
 In addition to observing the social manifestations of white-collar masculinity, and 
finding ways to talk about it with my informants, I devoted huge energy to gathering primary 
textual and internet-based material on the topic. The emergence in recent years of lifestyle 
magazines targeted specifically at white-collar men provided me with ready sources of 
relevant material. These sources include Nanren zhuang (For Him Magazine), the Chinese 
edition of a well-known UK-founded men’s magazine, which with a print run of 556,000,10 
carries discussions about sex, and highly sexualized images of women, as well as being a 
clothing and consumer item guide for young urban men. Nanren zhuang’s relatively high price 
of 20 yuan, its adverts for upmarket cars, imported spirits and foreign brand-name office wear, 
casual clothing, and watches, and its substantial attention to Western and youth cultures, 
indicate its main target audience as aspiring and already achieving young white-collar men. 
Another Chinese edition of a foreign title aimed at young men is Shishang xiansheng 
(Esquire), which concentrates particularly on sophisticated brands of clothing, accessories and 
electronic gadgets. Its pages contain a large number of male models demonstrating a very 
sophisticated look and lifestyle taste, as well as carries articles on men thought to be style 
                                                 
9 I used Jennifer Mason’s step-by-step guide to assembling interview questions. I listed several ‘big’ research 
questions relating to my topic then selected one: ‘What choices might a man make in how he conducts his daily 
life that mark him as a man?’ which I then broke down into mini-questions. See Jennifer Mason, Qualitative 
Researching (London: Sage, 2002), 69-70. In formulating ideas for these interviews, I also drew from my 
experience and knowledge gained on a qualitative research training course which provided practice in applying 
qualitative research theory to practical situations. 
10 Nanren zhuang (For Him Magazine), Liulan wang (gotoread.com). http://www.gotoread.com/mag/12286/ 
(accessed October 7, 2008). 
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leaders. It also retails at 20 yuan, and at 625,000 copies per issue, has an even higher print run 
than Nanren zhuang.11 Shishang jiankang (Men’s Health), yet another Chinese edition of a 
well-known foreign title, is a health and lifestyle magazine aimed at affluent young white-
collar men, with an emphasis on fitness, sports, the outdoor life, travel, food, and general 
physical and mental well-being. It retails at 20 yuan, which suggests it is targeted at the same 
group of affluent urban men as the two previous magazines. According to the gotoread.com 
introduction, it emphasises the healthy development of the individual:  ‘Men’s Health guides 
readers to care deeply about the health of their own body and mind (ziwo shenxin jiankang), 
and comprehensively raises the self-improvement of individuals in society (geren zai shehui 
zhong ziwo wanshan) and self-development ability (ziwo fazhan de nengli).’12  
 There are also homegrown men’s magazines, like Mingpai (Mangazine), which caters to 
a slightly older bracket of managers in their thirties and early forties. It carries adverts and 
features about more big-ticket items such as cars and property, and articles which celebrate the 
lifestyle of a global elite. Its relatively high cover price of 28 yuan indicates the affluence of it 
target audience, and its smaller print run of 215,000 speaks of its exclusiveness.13 Meili 
xiansheng (Men’s style) is a local magazine which mixes a style guide for young men with 
articles on topical foreign news stories, health and fitness and popular youth culture. Priced at 
20 yuan, it has a print run of 334,500.14 Shishang junzi (Menbox) is a ground-breaking gay (in 
all but name) magazine, widely available from magazine vendors in Beijing, Shanghai and 
other major cities. In common with many other men’s magazines, it carries articles on fashion, 
skincare and other aspects of a young, relatively affluent, urban male consumer lifestyle. 
Unlike most other men’s magazines, however, it also carries lots of highly sexualised pictures 
of young men, as well as some articles on gay topics. It has been described as ‘China’s first 
real gay magazine’, although it does not advertise itself as such.15  
 Alongside men’s magazines, the Internet is an extremely influential medium 
circulating the image of the white-collar man. I used the Internet as a follow-up source of 
                                                 
11 ‘Shishang Xiansheng’ (Esquire), Liulanwang (gotoread.com), http://www.gotoread.com/mag/594/ (accessed 
October 7, 2008). 
12 ‘Shishang nanshi jiankang: kanwu jieshao’ (Fashionable Men's Health: publication introduction), Liulanwang 
(gotoread.com), http://3355.gotoread.com/mag/12040/ (accessed August 18, 2008). There is no print run figure 
given. 
13 Mingpai (Mangazine), Liulanwang (gotoread.com). http://www.gotoread.com/mag/12089/ (accessed October 
7, 2008). 
14 Meili xiansheng (Men's Style), Liulan wang (gotoread.com). http://www.gotoread.com/mag/12822/ (accessed 
October 7, 2008). 
15 Jeremy Goldkorn, ‘Menbox: China's First Real Gay Magazine’, Danwei, 
http://www.danwei.org/magazines/menbox_chinas_first_real_gay_m.php (accessed September 16, 2008). 
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further information and views on issues that I first encountered in discussions, in magazines or 
on television; this was try to ensure that my Internet sources as much as possible were relevant 
to mainstream social debates. Almost all of them were from large, well-known websites, such 
as Xinlang (Sina), the largest and most used Chinese web portal; Guoji zaixian (China Radio 
International Online), the website of the state-owned external radio broadcaster; and 
CCTV.com, the website of the domestic television giant CCTV. The articles in the magazines, 
foreign and local, and on the websites, often encapsulated the themes that run through this 
thesis. They offered advice and instruction on how to dress and act as a white-collar man, 
promoting consumerism and the fulfillment of individual desire, not least through pervasive 
advertising of luxury brands. Perhaps most noticeably, these magazines converged in 
positioning white-collar masculinities as the most desirable ‘models’ of masculinities in China 
today.  
Any methodology necessarily has its own limitations, and my choice of fieldwork 
methods limited the themes I discuss, restricting them by factors such as what I discussed with 
whom, the kind of questions I thought were relevant, and the nature of the answers I received 
in return. I generally chose to interview the kind of young, urban, affluent men and women I 
spent most time with, at work or at leisure, since it was their lives I was observing on a daily 
basis. The themes which I drew out of the interview material prompted me to look for textual 
material – in magazines and online – which displayed images of and discussed white-collar 
masculinities within these themes. I could then begin to get a clearer picture of how my 
informants took up certain subject positions in various places and at various times, or resisted 
them, or were complicit with them, or all of these. Inevitably, though, these themes were not 
and could not offer encyclopaedic coverage of all the subject positions that white-collar men 
may take up in multiple and diverse ways. Two such obvious areas would be how notions of 
masculinities are interwoven with notions about being fathers and sons, but because most of 
my informants were unmarried and, not being Beijingers, lived far from their parents, these 
issues did not come up much in conversation, and I made a decision not to pursue inquiries in 
these areas. Some of my informants have now married, subsequent to my fieldwork period, 
and others, though not all, are facing increasing pressure to get married from their parents, so 
these would undoubtedly be fruitful topics for future research.  
I now give a brief outline of the themes around which I have structured the chapters 
before discussing the key theoretical and analytical perspectives I adopt. 
The Chapters 
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Chapter two sets out the theoretical concepts which I bring to bear on my ethnographic data 
under three main themes: the formation of white-collar subjects in discourse in non-discursive 
fields the practices through which white-collar men habituate themselves to performing white-
collar masculinity; and the hegemonic dominance of a particular model of white-collar 
masculinity amongst the multiple masculinities of contemporary Chinese society. Following 
this theoretical discussion, I turn my attention to academic studies of Chinese masculinities, 
which reveal a variety of analytical approaches to the study of this field in terms of the types 
of concepts and materials utilised. Chapter three examines the constitution of a white-collar 
body culture of informants through practices of consumption, and how my informants attempt 
to habituate themselves to discursive white-collar subject positions through attention to their 
bodies in areas of their daily lives such as dress, movement and hygiene. It looks at popular 
media images of white-collar men and discusses the kinds of bodies and lifestyles on display. 
In chapter four, I bring a particular focus to the places, sites and assemblages in which 
corporate masculinities are formed, taking an in-depth look at white-collar male practices in a 
private language school for the children of middle-class professionals. I investigate the 
intersections between these and the discursive formation of figures of corporate men in media 
depictions examining key popular formulations of the advantages and disadvantages of their 
hard-working lifestyles. Throughout the chapter, I highlight the intricate intermingling of local 
and global notions and practices of masculinity in corporate contexts. Chapter five examines 
the non-workplace activities of white-collar men, including the key practices of business 
entertainment, showing clearly that depictions of ‘honest’ and above-board white-collar men 
are complicated, if not dispelled, through their everyday involvement with political and 
economic realities, and the construction of their masculinity through the subjection of the 
feminine ‘Other’. It further investigates the consumerised leisure pursuits undertaken for 
individual pleasure for which white-collar men are well known. In all these areas, a key 
conceptual focus is on the newly-emerged ‘desiring subject’, and its inscription as the 
hegemonic model of the white-collar man. In chapter six, I take a close look at young white-
collar men as (heterosexual) boyfriends and husbands, through the experiences and opinions 
of informants and through an analysis of the spousal ideal in the popular media, investigating 
in particular how breadwinning pressures on corporate men play are constituted in and 
constitute widening gender inequalities in Chinese society. Chapter seven investigates 
mainstream discourses about young urban middle class males as sexual subjects, showing how 
new possibilities for remaking sexual male bodies – as desiring and desired – have come to the 
fore in recent years, which both challenge and retain conventional notions of masculine 
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identity. It examines the emergence of heteronormative middle-class romantic ideals, and 
explores how gay white-collar men manage the tensions of maintaining ‘regular’ white-collar 
lives while discreetly fulfilling individual sexual desires.  
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Chapter Two 
Terms of analysis: concepts and themes 
 
 
 
The theoretical terms I have chosen to analyse my field data can be grouped under three main 
themes: the formation of the white-collar subject in mainstream discourses; the lessons in 
performing white-collar masculinity that my informants learnt from this discourse; and the 
question of the hegemony, or apparent dominance of a particular version of white-collar 
masculinity amongst multiple types of masculinities in contemporary Chinese society. I set out 
the way in which I approach these issues in the first part of this chapter.  
In the second part, I examine academic writings about Chinese masculinities in 
recognition of the contribution they make to the constitution of ideas about masculinities and 
gender in China, and particularly for their elucidation of historical notions and ideals. I finish 
this section with a brief discussion about, the ‘rise’ of the middle class and its attributes, for, 
above all else, the figure of the white-collar man is currently seen as the standard bearer of the 
middle classes and China’s ‘joining tracks’ with the developed world.   
 
Theorising the subject of white-collar masculinities 
The conceptual themes around which I have structured this narrative derive in the first place 
from the key themes that arose in my fieldwork, and that came to form core elements of my 
analysis as I was formulating my initial responses to my fieldwork data. These are subject and 
subjectivity, concerning principally the formation of the masculine white-collar subject and 
how these subjects make sense of themselves; assemblages, the interwoven combinations of 
discourses, bodies, objects, practices and places through which subjectivities are produced; 
habituation – the synthesis of performativity and habitus through which the white-collar man 
ingrains certain routines and performances into his bodily practices; and the hegemonic model 
of white-collar masculinity which currently prevails amongst multiple white-collar 
masculinities, all of which draw in varying extents from global, regional and local influences 
and practices. 
But first a brief word to explain my selection of themes and theorists below. All these 
topics are now covered in an extensive and sophisticated literature, and involve ongoing, often 
heated debates in academic and other circles. In the choices I have made, there is one notable 
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exclusion, made on the grounds of the disciplinary and empirical parameters of this work, and 
my training: the psychoanalytic concepts and theories deriving from Freud and Lacan.16 I draw 
on these very indirectly, in so far as they inform the views of the theorists whose work I use 
more explicitly. But beyond the limitations in my knowledge and training which dissuade me 
from employing such concepts, I also believe that there is a danger in ascribing ‘foundational’ 
status to psychoanalytic theories of subject formation, taking these theories as undisputed 
categories (such as Lacan’s ‘mirror-stage’). If we follow Foucault, then the ‘psy disciplines’ 
(to borrow Nikolas Rose’s term) are discursive practices, and we can ‘decentre’ them from 
their often taken-for-granted status as foundational truths of subject formation. In my opinion, 
rigorous academic work must adopt the same kind of critical stance towards psychoanalytic 
concepts and related ideas as it does with religious and other ‘truth’-producing discursive 
formations. In other words, I do not accept at face value the Freudian and Lacanian accounts 
of subjectivity formation, but take them as possibilities amongst many others, which need 
rigorous examination before being employed. Furthermore, as I stated above, I am not 
qualified, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis, to do so. Nonetheless, this is not to deny 
their usefulness, insightfulness, and the strong contribution they have made to many areas of 
knowledge, not least in notions of the fragmented subject; it is simply not to privilege them. 
My conceptual and theoretical approach hinges on a view of the masculine subject 
which is neither unitary nor easily readable from discursive texts and images. In line both with 
the evidence from my fieldwork, as well as a wide range of well known theoretical positions, 
the subject of the chapters that follow is not the universal, stable coherent and founding 
subject of Enlightenment philosophy, but the decentred, inconsistent, fluid, historically and 
culturally specific entity theorised by a wide range of scholars spanning the disciplines of the 
social sciences and humanities. It is to this that I now turn.  
 
The subject and discourse  
In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault discusses the ‘different positions’ that the subject 
occupies and the ‘various enunciative modalities’ through which the subject emerges not as a 
unified entity but as a dispersal of effects of discourse and discursive formations, groupings of 
                                                 
16 I have also decided not to employ Michel De Certeau’s conceptual framework for understanding the 
constitution of subjectivity, presented in works such as The Practice of Everyday Life, since I feel that its 
emphasis on the subversive practices of the ‘ordinary man’ and the ‘wanderer’ renders it less useful than the ones 
I have chosen for examining the more nuanced and ambiguous relationship white-collar men have with 
hegemonic discourses. 
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discourses with common characteristics.17 In his subsequent work, he examined how subject 
positions play out in the practices of institutions and individual lives.18 For Foucault, 
discursive practices set out the boundaries of norms, although these are always historically and 
geographically contingent: one definition he gives is that they are ‘a body of anonymous, 
historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined a given period, and 
for a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the conditions of operation of the 
enunciative function’;19 on another occasion he writes they are a ‘delimitation of a field of 
objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the age of knowledge, and the fixing of 
norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories’.20 Foucault understands ‘a discourse [as] 
always embedded within non-discursive practices’;21 and stresses that the ‘play of 
dependencies’ between discursive and non-discursive practices is crucial:22 ‘Discursive 
practices are not purely and simply ways of producing discourse. They are embodied in 
technical processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behaviour, in forms of transmission 
and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and maintain them.’23 It is 
important to make clear at this point that although I am referring to discursive and non-
discursive realms here as two distinct conceptual categories for the purposes of this discussion, 
in the very material processes of everyday life they come together to produce subjects and 
                                                 
17 Margaret A. McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2002), 57; citing Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, tr. Alan Sheridan (New York, 
Pantheon, 1972), 73 and 54. 
18 R. Keith Sawyer, ‘A Discourse on Discourse: An Archeological History of an Intellectual Concept’, Cultural 
Studies 16, no. 3 (2002): 447. 
19 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, tr. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock, 1986), 117. 
20 Michel Foucault, ‘History of Systems of Thought’, in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, ed. Donald F. 
Bouchard (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), 199. 
21 Sawyer, ibid., 441. 
22 Barry Smart outlines three levels of relations that intersect: ‘(i)‘real’ relations independent of all discourse, e.g. 
between ‘institutions, techniques, social forms, etc’, (ii) ‘reflexive’ relations formulated in discourse itself, e.g. 
what may be said about ‘relations between the family and criminality’, (iii) ‘discursive’ relations that make 
possible and sustain the objects of discourse.’ For Foucault, ‘the interplay between these discursive relations with 
the other two kinds’ establishes the conditions for the production of the subject. Barry Smart, Michel Foucault 
(Chichester: Ellis Horwood Limited, 1985), 41; citing Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: 
Tavistock, 1977), 46. Mark Olssen also discusses these three levels, in the reverse order: firstly, ‘the 
intradiscursive, which concerns relations between objects, operations and concepts within the discursive 
formation; secondly, the interdiscursive, which concerns relations between different discursive formations; and, 
thirdly, the extradiscursive, concerning the relations between a discourse and the whole play of economic, 
political and social practices.’ Mark Olssen, ‘Foucault and Marxism: Rewriting the Theory of Historical 
Materialism’, Policy Futures in Education 2, no. 3 & 4 (2004): 461-2; referring to Michel Foucault, ‘Politics and 
the Study of Discourse’, Ideology and Consciousness 3, (Spring, 1978): 13. 
23 Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, tr. Donald F. 
Bouchard and Sherry Simon, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 200; cited in 
Carl G. Herndl, ‘Writing Ethnography: Representation, Rhetoric, and Institutional Practices’, College English 53, 
no. 3 (March, 1991): 328. For a discussion of Foucault’s preference of the concept of a ‘play of dependencies’ to 
linear causality, see Mark Olssen, ‘Foucault and Marxism: Rewriting the Theory of Historical Materialism’, 
Policy Futures in Education 2, no. 3 & 4 (2004): 461-2. 
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their subjectivities in intricate, complicated and often not clear cut nor analytically distinct 
ways. As is evident from the phrase ‘play of dependencies’, the interrelationship between the 
discursive and non-discursive realms in Foucault’s is complex, fluid and difficult to 
conceptualise in exact terms.24 Steven Brown elaborates: 
The discursive depends upon the non-discursive, without which it cannot form a 
complete whole. Yet this non-discursive on which discourse depends is not raw 
material that is simply ‘just there’, but is instead a series of elements that have been 
arranged and composed in a manner no less rigorous than discursive statements. In this 
way Foucault breaks up the assumption that it is language that predominantly 
expresses human agency and powers. Discourse is not applied to a pre-formed world, 
like paint daubed across a canvas, but is rather one aspect of an active process of 
composition where discursive and non-discursive elements are arranged together.25  
 
Although the exact workings of this interrelationship are still keenly debated, and certainly 
beyond the scope of this thesis, in the view of Mark Cousins and Athar Hussain, Foucault’s 
refusal to allow the primacy of either realm is perhaps his major contribution. In their view, he 
analyses discursive/non-discursive relations ‘without a recourse to a general schema of 
causation where the non-discursive always holds the power of determination over the 
discursive, as in materialist or sociological analyses of knowledge. Nor does he resort to the 
general categories of signification or representation in which the discursive has a logical 
primacy over the non-discursive.’26  
 The intersections, interactions and ‘plays of dependency’ of the discursive/non-
discursive practices which produce the white-collar subject are manifested in, as I show in 
subsequent chapters, the complex and formative interaction between individual subjects and 
institutions and social practices, such as the school, the workplace, leisure sites and the home; 
the ways in which white-collar men talk about themselves and are talked about in relation to 
topics such as social ethics, emotions, economic modernization and body aesthetics; and the 
emergence of discourses concerned with the formation of the figure of the white-collar man 
himself. Another way of framing this is that the discursive realm refers to the texts and their 
institutional and social articulation which I examine in media sources and through informant 
interviews, whereas non-discursive practices refer to the disjunctures between these and 
                                                 
24 Deleuze has attempted a general theory of the discursive/nondiscursive through his concept of 
territorialization. For a discussion of the concept in relation to Foucault’s work and its application to an empirical 
example, see Steven D. Brown, ‘Psychology and the Art of Living.’ Theory & Psychology 11, no. 2 (2001): 184-
8. 
25 Brown, ibid., 179-80. 
26 Mark Cousins and Athar Hussain, Michel Foucault (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984), 258. The former 
hypothesis is famously expressed in Marx’s base/superstructure relationship, which Foucault was keen to move 
beyond, but he also criticized the latter, seen notably in the exclusively textual focus of Derrida and Saussure. 
 22
individual performance and attitude in relation to places, objects, bodies and the relations 
between them. Subjectivities are formed through the mutual interplay between all these 
factors.  
 Another way of conceptualizing the distinction and relationship between the discursive 
and non-discursive is through Deleuze’s work on Foucault.  
According to Deleuze, what Foucault does with the distinction is to show how 
knowledge can be cracked open into two distinct components. One of these is a field of 
discursive relations that defines what is articulable at a given historical moment. That 
is, the conditions that reasonable speech draws upon to formulate its truthful 
statements. The other is a space of visibility, where relationships between persons and 
objects are arranged in such a way as to make them the formal object of a particular 
kind of knowledge. Visibility is something of a misnomer, though. Deleuze has in 
mind not only seeing, but also hearing, touching. This is a space of perception in its 
broadest sense. Foucault’s genius, for Deleuze, is showing by means of empirical 
examples just how the discursive and the non-discursive are brought together […].27 
This distinction emphasizes, in my view, the linguistic and spoken on the one hand, in other 
words the use of language in texts and speech to articulate statements productive of knowledge 
and ‘truth statements’, and the field of perceptual meaning and  sensual practices and feelings 
on the other.  
The discursive domain was very important in the lives of my white-collar informants, 
particularly through vehicles such as men’s magazines as I detail throughout this work, and 
my informants incorporated the ideas expressed through these discursive texts and images into 
their habits and daily routines in varying ways. It is in that process that the discursive and the 
non-discursive come together to construct stylized subjectivities, a process which Foucault 
conceived of as an aesthetic composition. Steven Brown’s research shows how this process 
takes place with the example of the appearance of symptoms in a sufferer, Jack, of a medical 
condition called MCS [Multiple Chemical Sensitivity]: 
MCS is a discursive phenomenon, to be sure. It involves an awful lot of words, long 
descriptions of sensations and experiences. Such discourse is trafficked amongst large 
numbers of fellow sufferers organized in support networks. The statements that make 
up MCS take shape in innumerable conversations between patients, doctors, insurance 
companies and, indeed, academics […]. But that is not all there is. Jack’s illness is 
given form by a series of practical activities. He puts a cover on the TV screen. Lets 
certain things into his house, and excludes others. Adopts a regimen for washing and 
keeping healthy. He follows a highly stylized routine for meeting and relating to other 
people. In other words, Jack is engaged in a work of composition. He is making the 
illness real by selecting and moving around materials. He is stylizing his illness into 
being. There are, then, two distinct sets of activities being accomplished 
                                                 
27 Brown, ibid., 184. 
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simultaneously – the discursive and the non-discursive – that together make up the 
whole that is multiple chemical sensitivity.28 
Space does not permit me to do justice to the various aspects of the debate about the 
distinction between the discursive and non-discursive, but it is worth pointing out some of the 
major lines of criticism, formulated most notably by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. 
They assert that ‘any distinction between what are usually called the linguistic and behavioural 
aspects of a social practice, is either an incorrect distinction or ought to find its place as a 
differentiation within the social production of meaning, which is structured under the form of 
discursive totalities.’29 In their view, what Foucault identified as non-discursive practices can 
be shown to possess the features of discursive practices; if  ‘the so-called non-discursive 
practices – institutions, techniques, productive organization, and so on – are analysed, we will 
only find more or less complex forms of differential positions among objects, which do not 
arise from a necessity external to the system structuring them and which can only therefore be 
conceived as discursive articulations.’30 For Laclau and Mouffe, discourse therefore has a 
deeply material, relational as well as linguistic and cognitive character,31 the subject is the 
effect not therefore of the interplay between discursive and non-discursive forces but of the 
dispersion of ‘diverse subject positions’ that run through ‘the entire material density of the 
multifarious institutions, rituals and practices through which a discursive formation is 
structured.’32 However, there is no ‘fixity of meaning’ in these subject positions, only a partial 
fixation, which allows for the subversion of meaning through a flow of differences in what 
Laclau and Mouffe term the ‘field of discursivity’.33 This is an important point, sinceit renders 
all subject positions unstable, fragmented, and provisional, limiting any attempt to pin down a 
definition of an ‘identity’, such as the ‘Chinese white-collar man’. For Laclau and Mouffe, 
since every subject position is an effect of discourse, the subject ‘cannot […] be the origin of 
social relations’.34 However, these positions are not separate entities of equal legitimacy, but 
are articulated in contingent ways necessitating the ‘overdetermination of some positions by 
others’.35  
                                                 
28 Brown, ibid., 179-80.  
29 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics (London: Verso, 2001), 107.  
30 Laclau and Mouffe, ibid., 107. 
31 Laclau and Mouffe, ibid., 108. 
32 Laclau and Mouffe, ibid., 109. 
33 Laclau and Mouffe, ibid., 111. 
34 Laclau and Mouffe, ibid., 115. 
35 Laclau and Mouffe, ibid., 116. 
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 Although Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive totality is helpful in pushing understandings 
of the workings of discourse, I agree with Purvis and Hunt that ultimately their use of 
Althusser’s concept of overdetermination is unsatisfactory in explaining the conditions that 
limit  the formation of discourses.36 To argue for the non-discursive does not mean an 
acknowledgment of an originary subject. Based on my fieldwork analyses and observations I 
would suggest that a much more fruitful line of inquiry, as has been pursued by most theorists, 
is to observe how non-discursive practices operate to shape, condition and limit the discursive 
realm, at the same time as discursive practices similarly operate on the non-discursive realm; 
in short, how the two realms constitute each other. Deleuze and others call the combination of 
discursive and non-discursive elements an ‘assemblage’, a notion which Nicholas Rose utilises 
together with the Deleuzian ‘fold’, to put forward his theory of self-formation, important and 
useful as a means of theorising how maintaining the distinction between the discursive and the 
non-discursive does not, in itself, necessarily lead to an a priori existence of the pre-existing 
self or identity, which I now examine. 
 Assemblages, for Rose, are ‘the localization and connecting together of routines, habits 
and techniques within specific domains of actions and value’, hybrid entities of ‘knowledges, 
instruments, vocabularies, systems of judgment and technical devices’.37 As I understand them 
in this thesis, they are open, fluid combinations (not fixed, enclosed systems) of many 
differing elements, which come together contingently at specific temporal moments and 
spatial coordinates, encompass discursive and non-discursive elements; in short, they are 
productive of subjectivities yet also transformed by the action of subjects. Using this schema, I 
examine discursive formations of techniques and practices across domains such as bedrooms, 
schools, offices, gyms, and saunas, using data from media sources, interviews and participant 
observation. It is the practices, techniques, forces, connections, and relations in these 
assemblages that produce, amongst other capacities, the effect of the ‘inner psychological 
world’ by means of which many contemporary humans understand themselves; these ‘various 
relations and linkages […] give rise to all the phenomena through which, in our own times, 
human beings relate to themselves in terms of a psychological interior: as desiring selves, 
sexed selves, labouring selves, thinking selves, intending selves capable of acting as subjects 
[…].’38  
                                                 
36 Trevor Purvis and Alan Hunt, ‘Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology...’, British 
Journal of Sociology 44, no. 3 (September, 1993): 493 
37 Nikolas Rose, Inventing Ourselves: Psychology, Power and Personhood (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 38. 
38 Rose, ibid., 172. 
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Rose proposes the ‘fold’ as a metaphor in conceptualising how within subjects – 
produced through assemblages – multiple and diverse practices come together, break away, 
have gaps, flow, mix, transform, and so on in what can seem surprising ways. ‘Folds 
incorporate without totalizing, internalize without unifying, collect together discontinuously in 
the form of pleats making surfaces, spaces, flows and relations’; and ‘that which would be 
infolded would be anything that can acquire authority: injunctions, advice, techniques, little 
habits of thought and emotion, an array of routines and norms of being human – the 
instruments through which being constitutes itself in different practices and relations.’39 Rose 
posits his model of the fold as an alternative to psychological theories:  
The concept of the fold or the pleat suggests a way in which we might think of an 
internality being brought into existence in the human being without postulating any 
prior interiority, and thus without binding ourselves to a particular version of the law 
of this interiority whose history we are seeking to diagnose and disturb. The fold 
indicates a relation without an essential interior, one in which what is ‘inside’ is merely 
an infolding of an exterior.40 
 
In this thesis, I show the multiplicity of diverse and sometimes conflicting practices 
constituting various subject positions – linked to the figure of the white-collar man – that 
individual men take up differently and are thus ‘infolded’ in different ways. In the context of 
my analysis, such subject positions including, among others, fashionable, consumer-driven 
urbanites (chapter three), honest, hard-working office-workers and business strategists 
(chapter four), entertainers of clients in karaoke bars and saunas (chapter five), tender 
boyfriends and nervous husbands (chapter six), and androgynous metrosexuals (chapter 
seven). Each subjectivity is the result of unique infoldings of multiple and non-enduring 
subject positions: but through certain techniques of memory, and particular vocabularies, the 
individual constructs an imagined persona or ‘biography’ through which he understands 
himself.41 
 The interlinking of elements in assemblages entail that the lines of the fold do not end 
at the ‘fleshy bounds’ of the body but are produced amongst other things through ‘regimes of 
bureaucracy [that] are not merely ethical procedures infolded into the soul, but occupy a 
matrix of offices, files, typewriters, habits of timekeeping, conversational repertoires, 
                                                 
39 Rose, ibid., Inventing Ourselves: Psychology, Power and Personhood (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 37. I follow Rose’s spelling of infold with an ‘i’ (not an ‘e’) throughout the thesis. 
40 Rose, ibid., 37; referring to Elspeth Probyn’s discussion in her book Sexing the Self: Gendered Positions in 
Cultural Studies (London: Routledge, 1993), 128-34; and to three works by Gilles Deleuze: The Fold: Leibniz 
and the Baroque (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992); Pourparlers (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 
1990); and Foucault, tr. Sean Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).  
41 Rose, ibid., 37-8. 
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techniques of notation’,42 as I document in the figure of the disciplined, time-keeping, hard-
pressed young white-collar man in chapter four. Affective and emotional folds are played out 
in time and space, through material equipment such as beds, routines of dressing, sensory 
stimulae: ‘regimes of passion are not merely affective folds in the soul, but are enacted in 
certain secluded or valorized spaces, through sensualized equipment of beds, drapes and silks, 
routines of dressing and undressing, aestheticized devices for providing music and light, 
regimes of partitioning of time, and so forth’,43 as one might reasonably imagine the ‘tender 
boyfriend’ of chapter six engaging in. Regimes of seduction of women are practiced through 
bodily postures in meetings, manners of moving, ways of dressing and displaying the male 
body, displays of knowledge, in offices, in the streets, in coffee shops (as I discuss in chapter 
three), shows of tenderness in the marital bedroom (chapter six) and romantic performances in 
restaurants (chapter seven); and regimes demanding women’s subjection to and service of 
white-collar men are performed through women nursing sick male bodies in offices and in 
hospitals (chapter three), commercially offering their bodies in business entertainment rituals 
in karaoke bars, massage parlours (chapter five), and giving up of their careers to raise 
children and carry out domestic duties in the family home (chapter six). It is clear from these 
examples that  ‘[f]olding being is not a matter of bodies’, but of what Rose calls ‘assembled 
locales’:44 in other words, assemblages. It is assemblages that render human being ‘a hybrid of 
flesh, artifact, knowledge, passion and technique.’45 It is the practices, techniques, forces, 
connections, and relations in these assemblages—in domains such as bedrooms, schools, 
offices, gyms, and saunas—that produce, amongst other capacities, ‘the phenomena through 
which, in our own times, human beings relate to themselves, as desiring sexed selves, 
labouring selves, thinking selves, intending selves capable of acting as subjects […].’46  
It is important to underline a fundamental point about the notion of subjectification 
through assemblages. As should be very clear by now, it is not purely a linguistic process, but 
involves the interrelationship of discursive and non-discursive practices: assemblages locate 
discursive practices ‘in particular sites and procedures’, and structure them through relations 
of power, which privilege some and limit others;47 although these relations are themselves 
                                                 
42 They are also produced through memories organised ‘through rituals of storytelling, supported by artifacts 
such as photograph albums and so forth’. Rose, ibid.,38. 
43 Rose, ibid., 37-8. 
44 Rose, ibid., 38. 
45 Rose, ibid., 38. 
46 Rose, ibid., 172. 
47 Rose, ibid., 175. 
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always shifting and contested. Indeed, the very constitutions of masculinities, through hybrids 
of techniques of text, speech, acts, devices, bodies, locales, and so on, are part of a large-scale, 
ongoing, power struggle among different ways of being men and women, manifested on 
planes such as the nation, society, the family and the individual, and in multiples sites across 
these planes. 
Individuals move between the regimes of these various often conflicting and 
inconsistent assemblages with differing techniques, producing differently imagined white-
collar ‘bodies’. For example, the body of the soberly but expensively besuited office worker 
who moves smartly through the offices and spaces of the central business district, checking his 
emails on his 3G mobile phone, whom I describe as ‘Jianguomen man’ in chapter four, is a 
very different body in a very different site from that of the androgynously dressed, 
metrosexual, alluring body of young talent show hopefuls, who sing, cry, plead and profess 
filial piety to win votes from studio and viewing audiences, whom I describe in chapter seven. 
These bodily identities are variously performed, adapted, altered and rejected by individuals in 
conjunction with and contingent on their inscription in different discursive practices and 
through different bodily appropriate to both transnational business offices and the dark, noisy 
and sexually-charged atmospheres of Beijing’s gays bars. Questions about how individual men 
acquire the techniques through cultivation of the self in performances that become routines, 
are addressed in the section that follows. 
 
From performance to habituation 
One of the most intriguing aspects of my fieldwork was attempting to discover how men lived 
across these different worlds, spaces and practices. How, for example, men who dressed and 
appeared to behave in very ‘modern’, sophisticated ways, could hold some views about 
women and gays which seemed astonishingly prejudiced to me. As my fieldwork progressed, 
it became clear that they were drawing these opinions – and indeed their behaviours, which 
were not as ‘pure’ as I naïvely first thought – from many different discourses and practices. 
They exhibited fragmentary and non-cohesive subjectivities, which were not recognisable as 
the coherent, modern subjects depicted in the glossy men’s magazines. I could only conceive 
of their contradictory enactments of different masculinities as culturally produced 
performances, not expressions of essential identities, and so I turned to Judith Butler’s theory 
of performativity to further analyse my observations. 
In his influential book on ‘discerning the subject’, Paul Smith has contended that ‘[a] 
praxis of resistance […] demands a theory of the ‘subject’ which allows for gaps and fissures 
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in the agent’s experience of interpellative messages.’48 In other words that permits us to 
theorise the co-existence of the inconsistence subject positions, of the above. This, I believe, is 
exactly what Judith Butler has done in her theory of performativity, which, drawing from 
Austin and Derrida, emphasises the reiterative, citational and therefore unstable character of 
the subject, particularly the gendered subject through gender performance, and the attendant 
possibilities for contestation: ‘the fact that [the norms producing gender] must be repeated, 
[…] creates the space for them to be repeated differently and thus is also the condition of 
possibility for action.’49 
Butler’s concept of performativity brings attention to the fluidity of gender identities, 
challenging the notion that they are fixed and unchanging, by collapsing the distinction 
between a biologically determined ‘sex’ and a culturally determined ‘gender’.50 Butler 
cautions that ‘performativity must be understood not as a singular or deliberate 'act', 
but, rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the 
effects that it names’, arguing that the ‘regulatory norms of ‘sex’ work in a 
performative fashion to constitute the materiality of bodies and, more specifically, to 
materialize the body’s sex, to materialize sexual difference in the service of the 
consolidation of the heterosexual imperative.’51 Butler emphasizes that gender identity 
is constituted through discourse, and not individual will: ‘For a performative to work, 
it must draw upon and recite a set of linguistic conventions which have traditionally 
worked to bind or engage certain kinds of effects. […] This power of recitation is not a 
function of an individual’s intention, but is an effect of historically sedimented 
linguistic conventions.’52  
The performative construction of gender offers the possibility of change, Butler contends: 
‘[t]hat this is a repeated process, an iterable process, is precisely the condition of agency 
within discourse. If a subject were constituted once and for all, there would be no possibility 
of a reiteration of those constituting conventions or norms. That the subject is that which must 
be constituted again and again implies that it is open to formations that are not fully 
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constrained in advance.’53 As with gender identity in general, white-collar masculinities are 
likewise formed through a performative process, constituted within a regime of 
heteronormativity, which means that they too are open to reformation. 
 How, though, does the individual acquire the techniques, skills and bodily practices 
that enable him to perform a particular identity? And to what extent might, for example, the 
performance of white-collar identity in China be conceptualised as a conscious process, 
moulded by discourse? Through what processes are certain subject positions rejected while 
others are taken up? 
When I talked with my white-collar informants, I quickly realised that, unlike many of 
their peers in Britain, most of them did not come from white-collar backgrounds: their mothers 
and fathers did not and had not held white-collar jobs. One would not expect otherwise, given 
that white-collar discourses only emerged in the reform period. It raised the question, 
however, that if these young white-collar men were not learning a white-collar subjectivity 
through emulating their parents, then how did they acquire the skills and aptitudes necessary 
for performing it? Where were they acquiring it from? Clearly there was some sort of 
habituation process at work, and I found a lively culture of ‘how to’ self-help information 
(through magazines, books and websites) to be a rich source of guidance, amongst others, for 
young white-collar men, including my informants, who took up discursive ideas in their own 
daily practices and made them habitual.  
Bringing together Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and Butler’s theory of performativity, the 
process of ‘habituation’ is a useful way of conceptualizing how young men take up the subject 
positions of white-collar masculinities in daily life,54 since it throws a particular spotlight on 
bodily techniques which, do not just end at the skin, but stylise the body with clothing, 
connect the body with devices and implements, and alter the posture and movements of the 
body in different places and sites in habitual routines. In other words, it permits an 
understanding of the ‘body’ as fluidly linked into diverse assemblages. I adopt Bourdieu’s 
focus on material subjectivity to ‘embody’ Butler’s linguisticly-led performativity, specifically 
through the Noble and Watkins’ conceptualisation of habituation, which I examine now. 
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Noble and Watkins work from the perspective that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and 
Butler’s concept of performativity are both powerful tools for understanding the formation of 
subjectivities, although they have different foci: Bourdieu on bodily dispositions and somatic 
reproduction and Butler on linguistic discourse and agentic possibilities.  
The strength of [Bourdieu’s] approach is its insistence on the materiality of 
subjectivity. […] Bourdieu’s analysis of cognition and symbolism is not one that floats 
free from the conditions under which people actually live. This emphasis on the 
materiality of subjectivity allows Bourdieu to transcend, to a degree, the antimony 
between the subjective and the objective, between the individual and the world. His 
subject is one born of a world of objects, where schemes of perception and thought are 
inculcated through the activities performed in symbolically structured space and time 
(1990c: 76). The subject is never separated from the material conditions of its 
existence, and the world is never free of the representations that construct it […]. 
Bourdieu sees social structures and cognitive structures as recursively linked, and it is 
the correspondence between them that provides the foundation for social domination.55 
In this insightful summary, Moore outlines a material theory of the subject in Bourdieu’s work 
that is not so far from the materiality of assemblages in Rose’s schema, and that could be 
integrated into Laclau and Mouffe’s insistence on the physicality of discursive formations. 
Butler has criticized habitus, Noble and Watkins point out, for overemphasizing ‘the spatial 
dimensions of social practice, such that temporality – and with it change – disappears.’56 For 
his part, Bourdieu has been critical of those who hold that solely linguistic discourse 
constitutes gender. Nevertheless, Noble and Watkins have fashioned a notion of habitus which 
encompasses temporality and performativity, and which attempts to explain how consciously 
learned actions – over time – become unconscious habits embedded in the body, and are 
therefore seen as ‘natural’. For them, the ‘dispositions that internalize our social location and 
which orient our actions’.57 become second nature  through habituation, a performative 
process ‘based on iteration; to be able to do something reliably and ‘naturally’, one has had to 
do it again and again.’58 Habituation, in their words, ‘allows us to account for how conscious 
behaviour can become unconscious’:59 in what appear as naturalized processes learned 
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through ‘mimetic suggestion’ ‘mimicry, repetition, experimentation, appropriation and so on 
in the formation of habituated capacities’,60 and unvocalised bodily performances.  
This approach, moreover, allows us to combine Rose’s assemblages of discursive and 
non-discursive practices which I discussed above. On the one hand, the process involves a 
degree of ‘agentic reflection’, in other words, ‘that discursive practice in which we consider 
our behaviour and its principles, which involves the monitoring of conduct which can be 
brought to discourse’.61 Echoing elements of Foucault’s techniques of the self, moreover, 
‘[s]uch acts of reflection are not to be judged in terms of veracity or social awareness; rather, 
they are about putting daily conduct into discourse’,62 just as my informants experimented 
with and appropriated discourse, images in fashion and lifestyle magazines, into their day-to-
day practice as white collar men. On the other hand, the performative processes of 
‘[i]nculcation, emulation, mimesis, performance, habituation and other rituals of self-
formation’ are key techniques in the self-reflexive constitution of the subject that incorporate 
non-discursive as well as discursive practices.63 It is also worth noting in this context that Rose 
endorses Michael Taussig’s view of mimesis as infolding ‘ways of being’ as a material and 
cognitive as well as inner and psychological process that works through ‘such devices as 
manuals of advice on self-improvement, self-esteem, and self-advancement […]; the models 
and simulacra of desirable selves […]; the pictures of normal selfhood […]; the connections 
established with oneself through cultural technologies of photography, film and advertising: a 
multiplicity of mimetic machines.’64 
Rose also makes another point, in relation to mimesis, that ‘[t]o be the self one is one 
must be the self one is not – not that depised, rejected, or abjected soul. Thus becoming 
oneself is a recurrent copying that both emulates and differs from other selves.’65 To become 
habituated in a white-collar subject position, then, is as much about rejecting and resisting 
identities and practices associated with blue-collar workers, entrepreneurs, government 
officials, peasants, soldiers, backwardness, the provinces, coarseness, dishonesty, laziness, 
poverty, which are the inverse of some of the values prominently associated with white-collar 
masculinities, as this thesis shows. The concept of ‘body culture’ is also useful here, which the 
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anthropologist Susan Brownell formulates as ‘a broad term that includes daily practices of 
health, hygiene, fitness, beauty, dress, and decoration as well as gestures, postures, manners, 
ways of speaking and eating, and so on. It also describes the way these practices are trained 
into the body, the way the body is publicly displayed, and the lifestyle that is expressed in that 
display.’66 Thinking of a particular culture of white-collar men’s bodies is useful analytically, 
because it encompasses social manifestations as well as individual cultivations of white-collar 
masculinity, both of which encompass the assemblages which constitute the practices, 
attributes and other elements acquired through habituation.  
In this section I have analysed how young men learn to perform white-collar 
masculinities, but I still have not examined why a particular model of white-collar masculinity 
has become most prominent amongst multiple white-collar masculinities, and it is through the 
concept of hegemony that I wish to explore this question. 
 
Hegemony and multiple masculinities 
My discussion in the last two sections has set out the main theoretical concepts I use to 
analyse the formation of multiple, contradictory white-collar subjectivities through a process 
of habituation, integrating discursive and non-discursive practices in multi-element 
assemblages linking bodies, objects and sites. But why do some subjectivities become more 
powerful than others, more prominent in popular media and men’s discussions? Is white-collar 
masculinity a particularly dominating masculinity amongst the many masculinities enacted in 
contemporary China? And what particular model of white-collar masculinity is most 
prominent? For instance, why is it that my informants described white-collar men in terms of 
the well-groomed, well-spoken, romantic young urban man, and not the fat-bellied, 
misogynistic, massage-parlour frequenting manager? To put it another way, if we accept that 
the subject is not unitary, how do we explain the repeated reproduction of dominant forms and 
expectations? Does the notion of white-collar masculinity itself obscure other intersecting 
discursive and non-discursive notions of other masculine subjectivities? To answer these 
questions, we can turn to the concept of hegemony, which has become commonly used in 
cultural studies and beyond in recent years. My concern here is not to address the broad 
question of the hegemonic domination of what Butler calls the system of heteronormativity in 
                                                 
66 Susan Brownell, ‘Making Dream Bodies in Beijing: Athletes, Fashion Models, and Urban Mystique in China’, 
in China Urban: Ethnographies of Contemporary Culture, ed. Nancy N. Chen, Constance D. Clark, Suzanne Z. 
Gottschang and Lyn Jeffery (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2001), 124. 
 33
the historically and cultural shaped forms in which it is articulated in contemporary China.67 It 
is not to interrogate how individual subjectivities are, despite their ambiguity, incompleteness 
and polysemy, overdetermined by historically and cultural associations attached to the 
masculine and the feminine (as Laclau and Mouffe outline). My interest, rather, is to think 
about how to conceptualise the processes involved in producing certain versions of 
masculinity in the more socially and culturally delimited field of discursivity of the white-
collar masculine subject. 
Stuart Hall’s ‘post-Gramscian’ use of the concept of hegemony has had widespread 
influence in cultural studies approaches to the analysis of particularly race and class identities 
in post-war Britain. Writing about youth subcultures in Britain, Hall, with co-author Tony 
Jefferson, explain Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony as involving the winning and 
shaping of consent, ‘so that the granting of legitimacy to the dominant classes appears not only 
‘spontaneous’ but natural and normal.’68 The hegemonic order does this by restricting the 
range of definitions available with which to debate ideas, and obscuring/concealing those 
which compete with it: ‘[i]t provides the horizon of thought and action’.69 It does this not by 
the ‘unending and unproblematic exercise of class power’ by the ruling class, through its 
‘permanent incorporation of the subordinate class’,70 but through ‘insert[ing] the subordinate 
class into the key institutions and structures which support the power and social authority of 
the dominant order’, ensuring that the ‘subordinate class lives its subordination’. The 
importance of Hall and Jefferson’s formulation lies in its understanding of hegemony not as 
something imposed from above in a static, unchanging relationship, but rather something 
which insinuates itself amongst those which it continues to dominate.  
 Bringing an understanding of hegemony to gender, Raewyn Connell’s notion of 
hegemonic masculinity has been one of the most influential attempts – if not the most 
influential attempt – to conceptualise masculine subjectivity in recent years. Borrowing the 
term from Gramsci, she describes it as ‘a social ascendancy achieved in a play of social forces 
that extends beyond contests of brute power into the organization of private life and cultural 
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processes.’71 One of its key aspects, developed in the 1980s, is its recognition of an ‘interplay 
between different forms of masculinity’ and the construction of the hegemonic masculinity of 
the ‘patriarchal social order’ in relation to various subordinated masculinities as well as in 
relation to women’.72 At that time, she argued that ‘models of masculinity’ sustained the 
‘public face of hegemonic masculinity’ in, for example, fantasy figures depicted in films, even 
though she noted that many men’s behaviour in practice is at odds with the role models.73 In 
these terms, Connell’s understanding of hegemony is not as clearly articulated as Hall and 
Jefferson’s. Connell recognises that force need not be, but often is, part of the hegemonic 
order; and she attests that ‘[o]ther [i.e. non-hegemonic] patterns and groups are subordinated 
rather than eliminated’, which allows for ‘everyday contestation’ and ‘historical changes’, but 
this is not as insightful as Hall and Jefferson’s formulation that subordinated groups are 
inserted into the hegemonic formation, itself made of up clashing and shifting relationships 
and collations, nor Laclau and Mouffe’s articulation of the discursive formation of multiple 
subject positions of the hegemonic formation; although in Connell’s defence, she does stress 
that many men are complicit (such as through their support of role models, as mentioned 
above) in the reproduction of hegemonic masculinity.74 Again, however, on this point, 
Wetherell and Edley argue that Connell’s distinction between complicit and resistant 
masculinities is too discrete, suggesting that ‘[i]t is probably more useful to reposition 
complicity or resistance as labels to describe the effects of discursive strategies mobilized in 
contexts as opposed to labels for types of individual men’.75 They reject the idea that 
‘hegemonic masculinity is just one style or there is just one set of ruling ideas’76 even though 
they accept the notion in hegemonic masculinity that ‘men’s conduct is regulated by shared 
forms of sense making which are consensual although contested, which maintain male 
privilege, which are largely taken for granted, and which are highly invested’. They make the 
important point that hegemonic masculinity interacts with other hegemonic cultural notions, 
such as ‘demonstrating individuality and autonomy from social forces’, and cannot be ‘sealed 
off’ from them,77 and call for a recognition that discursive formations of masculinities produce 
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‘multiple and inconsistent’ resources ‘for constructing hegemonic gender identities’. Finally, 
reminiscent of Butler’s performativity, they stress the reiterative, contested, fragmented 
characteristics of any form of hegemony, and implicitly the importance of this concept for 
highlighting the possibilities of change and contestation in the gaps between the iterations. 
Hegemony is a version of the world which is reality defining. Such versions are plural, 
inconsistent, achieved through discursive work, constantly needing to be brought into 
being over and over again. That is the chief character of hegemony rather than its 
definition as an already known and fixed set of ruling ideas. It is a relative position in a 
struggle for taken-for-grantedness.’78 
On this important point of the multiplicity of masculinities, I conclude this section on 
the theoretical concepts and themes which I bring to bear on the ethnographic data presented 
throughout this thesis. Before moving on to discussions of my fieldwork material, which I 
begin in the next chapter, I first examine, in the following section, the ways in which multiple 
masculinities have been written about, and shaped, in academic writing on Chinese men and 
masculinities, which reveal the ways and means by which notions of masculinities – past and 
present – circulate in contemporary debates. 
 
Modelling Chinese masculinities in academic writing  
Contemporary uses of ‘traditional’ masculinities  
Discussions in popular magazines targeted at the affluent middle class frequently allude to 
imagined models of ‘traditional’ Chinese masculinity to legitimize contemporary practices that 
may not bear much resemblance to historical practice. In chapter seven, for example, I 
examine how the recently invented and potentially transgressive ‘metrosexual’ has been linked 
with the firmly established tradition of the xiaobailian (little white face). In this, there are both 
similarities and departures from the main features of Chinese masculinity identified by 
scholars writing on the topic. In this section, therefore, I outline the main themes that have 
emerged in recent scholarly writing on the multiple and diverse masculinities in Chinese 
tradition, as a basis for discussing the contemporary appropriations of history that appear in 
renderings of the gender characteristics of ‘white-collar man.’ I finish the section with an 
examination of recent Chinese language academic writing on the attributes of the middle class, 
within which the white-collar man is positioned as a vanguard figure. 
 Prominent in recent writings on the theme is the ‘the dyad wen-wu (cultural 
attainment–martial valour),’ discussed by Kam Louie as a defining feature of Chinese 
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masculinity, which he describes as ‘one of the single most important Chinese paradigms 
explaining the performance of gendered identities – in particular masculinity’.79 Louie argues 
the relevance of wen-wu to famous Chinese historical figures like Confucius and Guan Yu, 
fictional creations such as Wu Song and the protagonists of novels by Lao She and Zhang 
Xianliang, as well as the modern movie characters portrayed by Bruce Lee, Jackie Chan and 
Chow Yun Fat. In ‘Chinese masculinity’, Louie asserts, ‘a scholar is considered to be no less 
masculine than a soldier’, and ‘at certain points in history, the ideal man would be expected to 
embody a balance of wen and wu.’80  
Undoubtedly, Louie’s highlighting of the wen-wu dyad sheds light on a particular 
conceptualization of masculinity current in literary genres across time. Echoes of it are also 
present in contemporary renderings as I discuss below. However, any attempt to define a 
particular ‘Chinese masculinity’ through a single framework and in contrast to ‘Western 
masculinity’ runs the risk of creating a culturalist, essentialising model that, even if it is not 
intended, would better be repositioned as one possible theoretical ’take’ on a range of possible 
masculinities. Constructions of gender are necessarily composites, particularly in today's 
globalised world. Louie himself shies away from using wen-wu to explain contemporary 
consumer masculinity: 
With the advent of the consumer society in the late twentieth century, the traditional 
predominance of the wen over wu within the wen-wu model is further destabilized. 
Capitalism is concerned with production and profits. Male ideals are increasingly 
imbued with buying power. The result is that images of masculinity are moving away 
from their traditional core attributes of literary and cultural learning and martial 
expertise.81 
 
It is tempting to enter further into the debate about how much influence wen-wu had or has on 
conceptions of masculinity. However, the more important point is that Louie’s analysis helps 
explain the conceptions of masculinities circulating in contemporary popular culture that draw 
on particular historical notions, including the yin-yang formulations, and specific models of 
masculinities such as the hao han (‘brave man’ or ‘real man’) and the caizi (‘Confucian 
scholar’). They can be understood as discursive masculine identities that white-collar men 
may take up in specific places and at specific times, as part of their understanding of 
themselves as Chinese white-collar men.  
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The hao han, clearly linked to wu values, depicts a historical model of masculinity still 
adulated in contemporary discourse, and not infrequently used in conversation. To call 
someone a hao han calls up the image of a heroic, brave, blunt, tough, even patriotic epitome 
of manhood. In his study of masculine images in late imperial literature, Song Geng argues 
that the hao han resembles what he terms the ‘dominant notion of masculinity in the West’, 
because hao han for the most part ‘are physically strong and powerful and display masculine 
qualities such as courage, fortitude, endurance, and stoicism’, yet they are also ‘often 
uneducated, brutal and straightforward.’82 Song highlights the well-known hao han 
characterizations in Water Margin (Shuihu zhuan), which demonstrate ‘a man’s dedication to 
the code of brotherhood, ability and interest in gymnastic arts, generosity to friends, and 
appetite for food and wine.’83 Generosity is a key component of hao han masculinity (and I 
found it to be still a much admired ‘manly’ virtue amongst contemporary men), according to 
Martin Huang, also writing about late imperial masculine images: ‘[t]he ultimate paragons of 
yi [personal honour] unanimously admired by haohan heroes are apparently those who have 
demonstrated their virtue by constantly helping others with money and other material 
goods.’84  
Yet they have a suspicion of women and try to avoid sexual desire, Song contends, 
unlike knights in the West.85 Film scholar Chen Shan, in his history of Chinese ‘chivalrous 
swordsmen’ (wuxia) has also articulated this view, as Kam Louie points out: ‘Chen Shan 
contrasts the wuxia with the European knights and the Japanese samurai. He believes that the 
adherents of wu fight for righteousness (yi) and are loyal to men in their group and eschew 
women.’86 Martin Huang similarly argues that the hao han in Water Margin are often cheery 
and heavy drinkers, but they are mostly wary of women, adding that women are depicted very 
negatively as adulteresses and troublemakers.87 Yan Qing, a character in Water Margin, in 
Song Geng’s view, ‘is praised as a real man because of his self-mastery of sexual desire and 
immunity to the temptation of female charms.’88 This repudiation of women by fictional 
heroes corresponded with a social and cultural world characterized by a high degree of gender 
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segregation, in which men spent most of their social time with other men.89 The primacy of the 
Confucian model of manhood, which emphasised publically fulfilling social obligations to 
family and state, Song argues, explains why sexuality did not feature historically in the heroic 
construction of masculinity: 
In the Chinese cultural tradition […] masculinity or gender refers mainly to a position 
in the political structure. The Confucian prescriptions for a real man include filial piety 
to his parents, obligations to family (among them the most important one is the ability 
to carry on the family line), and above all, loyalty and contribution to the sovereign 
and state. In other words, masculinity is not defined by a man’s relations with his 
woman, but by his relations with the political mechanism. For Chinese men, manhood 
is the ability to honor their family name and achieve fame in serving the state. This is 
to be accomplished in the public world. It is therefore not difficult to understand why 
sexuality was absent in the construction of masculinity in the heroic discourse.90 
 
Although sexuality is clearly very much part of the construction of contemporary masculinity, 
as I discuss in chapter seven, the characteristics of the hao han are undoubtedly part of the 
jumble of historical ideas (wen-wu, yin-yang and so on) informing contemporary popular 
conceptions of masculinity.  For example, in terms of gender segregation often associated with 
the hao han, the judging of men’s valiance and skills separately from women’s can be seen in 
the TV talent shows on ideal husbands and ‘good men’ which I analyse in chapters five and 
six respectively. 
The caizi (Confucian scholar) plays another part in contemporary discussions. Echoing 
Kam Louie’s ranking of the caizi/wenren above the yingxiong/haohan, Song Geng contends 
that the masculinity of the Confucian scholar was historically portrayed as superior to that of 
the martial hero, whose ‘role is to assist the ruler or scholar’.91 The Song dynasty marked the 
emergence of a clear preference for a scholarly masculinity.92 In the Yuan Dynasty drama The 
Story of the Western Wing (Xixiang ji), the character of Student Zhang epitomises the caizi: 
‘physically he is frail, delicate and handsome with feminine beauty. Although he is dedicated 
to love emotionally, he can also be vulnerable and easily frustrated.’93 However, by the late 
Ming and early Qing period, there were concerns among the literati that ‘all men have turned 
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into women.’94 Kam Louie also refers to this narrative of emasculation, with reference to R. H. 
Van Gulik’s claims that ideals of masculine beauty changed from the virile, martial look of the 
Tang and Song dynasties to the delicate dreamer of the Qing dynasty.95 However, Huang has 
pointed out that there is a text documenting the desire of young women for soft, feminine 
youths astheir husbands as early as the 4th century BC, although the text comments that most 
men looked on these girlish youths with shame.96 Due to a process of syncretism, perhaps 
begun in the late Ming, wen and wu models of masculinities were increasingly brought 
together in the figure of the caizi.97 By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
Huang argues, there was a ‘new focus on military achievement’, a ‘shift in emphasis in 
military talent as a defining quality of caizi’, in a trend toward the ‘fiction of chivalry [xiayi 
xiaoshuo].’98 The Neo-Confucian hero in Qing dynasty fiction was also a creation of 
synthesis, according to Huang, combining the attributes of a romantic caizi, a chivalrous hao 
han, and a Confucian sage.99  
The effeminate caizi was not directly associated with homosexuality, Song argues, 
unlike ‘the representation of effeminacy in Western homoerotic literature’.100 Song argues that 
it was ‘the relatively tolerant atmosphere for homosexuality and the remarkable lack of 
homophobic discourse in traditional China’101 that made this kind of representation possible. 
This tolerant atmosphere permitted ‘male-male intimacy’ to be ‘a fashion among the upper-
class men’ at different times in Chinese history, according to Song, and indirectly contributed 
to ‘the shaping of the cliché aesthetics of the male body characterized by […] ‘rosy lips, 
sparkling white teeth, jasper-like face’ in the caizi-jiaren [scholar-beauty] romances.’102 These 
ideas continue to be replicated in contemporary images, accounts and practices, such as in the 
depictions and performances of the young male beauties who star in TV talent shows, as I 
explore in chapter seven.  
 
Gendering the modern man: twentieth century perspectives 
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All in all, the caizi is a well-known model of romantic hero to contemporary Chinese 
audiences, and the level of recent academic attention it has received alone denotes its 
relevance to contemporary debates. However, conceptions of masculinities which emerged in 
the Republican period exert a much stronger and more defined influence in contemporary 
China, particularly with regard to images of urban middle-class men. As Susan Glosser points 
out in her study of male identity in the early Republican period, the ‘young, educated, urban 
man was deeply concerned about his own economic future and passionately involved in 
redefining himself as a member of an industrializing economy and a modernizing state.’103 
This is very similar to how young middle-class men are publicly viewed today. From the late 
Qing on, due to reformists’ attempts to ‘remasculinise’ the so-called sick man of Asia, 
masculinity became part of the rhetoric of modernization and nationalism.104 The arrival of a 
new ‘scientific’ discourse of gender originating in the West, which espoused ‘male/female 
binary categories’ contributed to radical reevaluations of the caizi and other historical models 
of masculinities.105 Discourses on sex were transformed, as Frank Dikötter points out: 
‘[h]uman biology replaced Confucian philosophy as the epistemological foundation for social 
order.’106 Dikötter describes the shift from a conception of gender as a social function to a 
scientific biological perspective: 
Cut adrift from analogies with a metaphysical order, characteristic of discussions about 
gender hierarchy in imperial China, social roles of women and men were now thought 
to be grounded in nature […]. Biological distinctions between male and female, which 
rarely assumed a primary function in imperial China, became essential.107  
 
These biological distinctions have remained strongly influential in mainstream conceptions of 
gender in contemporary China throughout the Mao and post-Mao eras.108 
This new focus on the physical attributes of gender foregrounded the male body in 
what one might call a new kind of Chinese national manliness. Anthropologist Tiantian Zheng 
argues that ‘the experiences of Dalian-Chinese men under Japanese colonialism from 1905 to 
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1945 established a model of masculine identity based on bodily resistance.’109 She contends 
that whereas ‘military callisthenics [in Japanese run schools] impressed Chinese schoolboys 
with a sense of subjugation focused on the body […], [o]n the other hand, street soccer 
emerged as a popular and potentially creative activity among Chinese schoolboys.’110 Zheng 
maintains that because of the challenges from the West and Japan, ‘[b]y the beginning of the 
20th century it had become clear to many in China that its survival depended upon a changed 
cultural identity, one that gave precedence to masculine violence.’ Zheng goes so far as to 
claim that ‘Dalian’s adoption and transformation of soccer is the primary basis for a new 
masculinity’.111 At the very least, it is a manifestation of how the new discourses of gender, 
with their emphasis on the physicality of the male body, became intertwined with discourses 
of nation-building, and how they imbued everyday practices with particular meanings.112  
Meanwhile, leading reformers of the time condemned the Confucian model of 
masculinity as too feminine and too soft, and hence as part of the problem of China’s decline. 
Huang recounts that in Hu Shi’s essay ‘Shuo ru’ (On Ru), Hu ‘cited the Shuowen jiezi 
definition of ru to support his argument that people identified as ru were usually considered 
soft and feminine. In that dictionary, ru is glossed as ‘being soft’ (rou). Hu Shi argued that the 
graph xu had the connotation of being mild and soft.’113 The attack on Confucianism 
accelerated after the Communists took power in 1949, and government policy aimed to 
develop both strong male and female bodies for nation-building, based on the existing 
‘scientific’ understanding of gender. Many unequal assumptions about masculinity and 
femininity underlay this biological discourse, which, coupled with the persistence of gender-
discriminatory ideas and practices, meant that the male body remained privileged over the 
female body in the Mao years, despite government rhetoric that women could do anything 
men could.114 These ideas are inscribed in contemporary discourses emphasising strong, 
healthy male bodies, such as the fit and toned white-collar male body image in media features 
and advertising about upmarket gyms, which I discuss in chapters two and five. 
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Propaganda posters from the Cultural Revolution period depicted idealized males as 
politicized, muscular workers and peasants in images so far removed from today’s white-
collar figure that they are now mostly parodied and derided.115 The archetypal model man of 
that era was the heroic peasant Lei Feng, who epitomized obedient devotion to the revolution: 
Lei ‘compared a person’s role in society to that of one screw in a large machine.’116 As Stefan 
Landsberger points out, Lei’s image is still used for propaganda purposes, but re-styled and re-
interpreted to fit in with contemporary aspirations, such as extolling a private entrepreneur for 
his Lei-like ‘lofty spirit’.117 Contemporary corporate men are unlikely to spend much time 
‘learning from Lei Feng’: their preferred model men fill the pages of magazines in which 
Cultural Revolution images are only likely to appear very occasionally as designer chic 
parodies, reappropriated with humorous slogans and thoroughly commoditised.118       
The essentialist biologising discourse never disappeared in the Mao era, as Harriet 
Evans has shown,119 but it was obscured by policies promoting ‘equality between men and 
women’ (nan nü pingdeng), encapsulated in Mao’s well-known slogan ‘the times have 
changed, men and women are all the same’ (shidai butongle, nan nü dou yiyang).120 However, 
early on in the reform era such apparently homogenizing policies were roundly repudiated, 
and an essentialist discourse came to the fore as the basis upon which women could recover 
their ‘natural’ femininity.121 As Emily Honig and Gail Hershatter put it: ‘[i]n contrast to the 
message their older sisters had received from the Iron Girls [groups of young women who 
carried out tough tasks in the 1960s and70s], young women in the 1980’s were told, in both 
direct and indirect ways, that biology is destiny. Their gender, the message ran, would place 
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certain limitations on their development. […] certain crucial limitations were assumed to be 
biologically determined’.122  
In the twenty-first century, women and men, including white-collar men, are 
commonly associated with the naturalized characteristics noted above and attributed to gender 
difference since the early Republican era. However, while this biologist discourse has gained a 
new lease of life since the end of the Mao era, images of men and women have at the same 
time become increasingly diverse.123 Sha Yexin’s 1986 play, Searching for a real man 
(Xunzhao nanzihan), explored a range of masculinities in 1980s urban China through the story 
of a young woman’s unsuccessful search for her ideal man. The protagonist believes her ideal 
man ‘should be one of paramount virtues of manhood, one of virility and manly physiques. He 
should not only be an ideal man but most importantly the backbone of the nation, a role model 
for others to follow. He should by implication be an embodiment of accepted social values.’124 
However, she fails to find a man like this. Instead, she comes across an array of masculinities, 
none of which meet her requirements, such as ‘men of unmanly temperament, men of [the] 
‘Woody Allen syndrome’, who are likable losers in life, or men of sissy stuff and the stigma of 
anything vaguely feminine, or men of the lost generation, engaged in a blind pursuit of 
Western crazes.’125 The philosopher and writer Ding Zijiang colourfully describes the various 
men the protagonist meets as: ‘rich playboys’ (yangzun-chuyou de gongzige); ‘effeminate 
pretty boys’ (niangniang qiang de naiyou xiaosheng); ‘slippery rascals’ (guitou-guinao de 
xiao hunhun); ‘mediocre officials’ (yongyong-lulu de gongwuyuan); ‘pompous prattlers’ 
(ziming-bufan de kongtan ke); ‘effete, pendantic scholars’ (yuchou-suanfu de ruo shusheng), 
and ‘opportunistic businessmen seeking personal gain’ (touji-zuanying de shengyiren).126 The 
proliferation of images of masculinities in the reform era indicates a key contrast with the 
much more uniform representation of men during the radical socialism of the Maoist period. 
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Sha Yexin’s play was just one manifestation in the 1980s of the search for a tough, 
‘genuine’ (zhenzheng) Chinese cultural masculinity.127 Seekers of tough masculinity derided 
the soft, ‘feminisation’ (nüxinghua) of the pop stars, who were emerging in the increasingly 
market-driven entertainment world, as naiyou xiaosheng (‘creamy boys’).128 In the mid to late 
1980s the ‘root-seeking movement’ (xungen yundong), a cultural movement manifested in 
various artistic forms, sought to capture the mythological Chinese characteristics that could be 
used as the building blocks of an imagined ‘Chinese modernity’. According to Nimrod 
Baranovitch, ‘[t]he Root-Seeking cultural movement was closely tied to China’s opening to 
the world, especially to the West, and the disappointing realization that China was not the 
strong, rich nation that people had been made to believe it was during the revolutionary 
period.’129 The sense of backwardness and characterisation as ‘metaphorically feminine’ to the 
West, contends Baranovitch, pushed the quest for a new masculinity.130  
The root-seeking movement contributed to the growing diversity of images of 
masculinities in the reform era. It clearly reflected, too, the influence of the biologising 
discourse’s idea of a naturally occurring masculinity, which the root-seekers believed had 
been perverted in modern times. Zhang Yimou’s 1987 film Red Sorghum (Hong gaoliang), 
based on Mo Yan’s ‘root-seeking’ novel of the same name, ‘shocked the public with its bold 
expression of unrestrained sexuality and outrageous description of tough masculinity.’131 The 
film was apparently very influential, and soon after the film was screened, the country 
witnessed a so-called ‘Red Sorghum Phenomenon’ praising the film for reimposing an ideal of 
a raw, physical, masculinity: ‘with provocative visual images of uninhibited manners of 
masculinity extolled in drinking, brawl, banditry, and other masculine activities, the film 
seem[ed] to be pandering to male fantasies of domination and potency.’132 The age-old natural 
masculine qualities constructed in Red Sorghum were purportedly found in the harsh 
environment of the northeast of China, the area which, along with the northwest, is popularly 
considered to produce the most manly men in China. It is not surprising that a musical 
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manifestation of the ‘root-seeking’ movement’s quest for masculinity, according to 
Baranovitch, was the very ‘manly’ ‘northwest wind’ (xibeifeng) music craze of 1986-1989.133  
 As market reforms gathered speed after Deng Xiaoping’s tour of southern China in 
1992 and the expanding urban middle class concentrated on consumption, economic 
influences on ideals of masculinity became more pronounced and the explicit ‘root-seeking’ 
search to recover an ancient Chinese masculinity faded from prominence. But even as Chinese 
middle-class men are mostly now engaged with the serious business of making money, stories 
of heroes from the Chinese past are still a significant source of idealized models of Chinese 
masculinity, such as the ‘chivalrous swordsman’ (wuxia) novels of Jin Yong (the pen name of 
writer Louis Cha). Jin Yong is credited with evolving a new style of fiction, which combines 
core elements of Chinese traditions with compelling storytelling to create a kind of ‘cultural 
euphoria’.134 His heroes manifest a model of masculinity fêted in Chinese history for 
upholding ‘justice’ (zhengyi), ‘boldness’ (haoshuang), and ‘personal loyalty’ (yiqi). This same 
masculinity is also protective of lovers, families, friends and subordinates, and seems to appeal 
to the imagination of many Chinese men today. The Nobel prize-winning novelist Gao 
Xingjian, for example, has described the strength of this sort of ‘myth of masculinity’ as a 
defining feature of modernity in China. Indicating the pervasiveness of the biologising 
discourse of gender, he argues that this myth is founded on ‘a human nature that takes the 
male sex as its given’.135 
One of the features of contemporary debates about masculinity is an emphasis on the 
decline of male authority and even the outright emasculation of men. A prominent early 
example is Zhang Xianliang’s novel Half of Man is Woman (Nanren de yiban shi nüren), 
published in 1985, which dealt with concerns about Chinese men’s masculinity through the 
experiences of its sexually dysfunctional protagonist, a male intellectual, during the Cultural 
Revolution. According to the novel’s English translator Martha Avery, ‘[o]ne of [Zhang’s] 
main themes is that China's political system has desexed its population.  It has not only 
instilled in its people profound distrust, which ranges from distrust of the Government to 
distrust of one's own relatives, it has castrated the will of people to stand up for themselves.  
They have been made both mentally and physically impotent.  In Half of Man is Woman, 
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Zhang wonders if China's entire intellectual community has not been emasculated.’136 Song 
Geng has similarly noted that ‘[p]ost-Mao Chinese society has been marked by the prosperity 
of the feminine and the decline of the masculine (yinsheng yang shuai).’137 Geng points out 
that ‘Chinese men have been disappointingly described as weak, immature, selfish and 
impotent, while the real masculinity is embodied by ‘Rambo, Takakura Ken [a ‘tough guy’ 
Japanese actor] and the rural men from China’s northwest’.’138  
Adding his voice to the narrative of emasculation, Nimrod Baranovitch argues that the 
quashing of the Tiananmen Square protests in June 1989 was ‘an act of castration whose 
purpose was to place China’s intellectuals back in their traditional position of women-like 
state subjects.’139 And the 1990s play, The Wife from America, by Shanghai playwright Zhang 
Xian, shows that men are still considered emasculated in the consumer society which 
developed rapidly post-Tiananmen. The play’s theme, as sociologist James Farrer explains, is 
that ‘[w]hile men have ‘become useless’ through their political failure, women find power and 
possibilities in the global consumer economy represented by America.’140 In Farrer’s view, the 
play amounts to ‘a gendered allegory of an emasculated civil society and a prostituted 
consumer society.’141  
And yet, countering the narrative of emasculation to an extent, the image of the 
corporate, globalised male has been re-sexualised in recent years. This can be seen in Chinese 
soap operas in the 1990s, according to Sheldon Lu, which contributed to a ‘transnational male 
imaginary’ in which the figure of the white woman emerges as an object of sexual fantasy for 
Chinese male viewers.142 In this new imaginary, Chinese men themselves are sexualized and 
made desirable to white women. For example, in her discussion of the 1995 TV movie Sunset 
at Long Chao Li, Lisa Rofel quoted Kathleen Erwin’s argument about the ‘reimagining’ of the 
Chinese nation ‘as masculine and (sexually) desirable’.143 Rofel contends that this reimagining 
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‘entails representing white women rather than Chinese women as the object of Chinese male 
desire’, which, in Erwin’s words, ‘eclipses Chinese women’.144 Through this bypassing of 
Chinese women and possession of white women, Chinese white-collar masculinities attempt to 
demonstrate their desirability on a global scale, and to quash the doubts about virility so fully 
aired in the emasculation narrative, and I examine how this all plays out in the setting of an 
upscale nightclub in chapter five.  
 
Middle-class masculinities 
The aspirational image of today’s white-collar man owes its popularity to the rise of the 
middle class in the post-Mao era, and to the associations of the middle class with prosperity 
and success.145 Many academics and popular commentators assume the automatic result of 
modernization is a more educated and more equal society. Official analyses and popular 
opinion alike see the emergence of the middle class and white-collar stratum as a natural 
consequence of the opening up of the economy in a formulation of the classic modernization 
argument. It has been summarized thus by two of its proponents, the political scientist Ronald 
Inglehart and the economic sociologist Wayne E. Baker: 
The central claim of modernization theory is that economic development is linked with 
coherent and, to some extent, predictable changes in culture and social and political 
life. Evidence from around the world indicates that economic development tends to 
propel societies in a roughly predictable direction: industrialization leads to 
occupational specialization, rising educational levels, rising income levels, and 
eventually brings unforeseen changes—changes in gender roles, attitudes toward 
authority and sexual norms; declining fertility rates; broader political participation; and 
less easily led publics. Determined elites in control of the state and the military can 
resist these changes, but in the long run, it becomes increasingly costly to do so and the 
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probability of change rises.146  
 
While, as I argue in throughout this work, there is no teleology to this story, it is worth noting 
its main points since it underlies the values associated with white-collar masculinity and its 
success. The current middle class, in its growth and characteristics, is associated with a 
number of key features including cultural pluralism, foreign travel, honesty, social stability 
and strong consumerism. The combination of these factors produces repeated generalisations 
in relevant academic literature, such as the argument that the middle class’s economic interests 
promote an interest in social stability, cooperative relationships with officials, and the pursuit 
of success through an ethic of hard work rather than family connections. In other words, the 
interests of China’s middle class are defined in ways that correspond to many of the key 
features in Deng Xiaoping’s rhetoric of allowing a segment of society to get rich first, a key 
element in his reform process.147 The defining features of middle-class man encapsulate many 
official policies and policy orientations concerning the Chinese government’s engagement 
with global capital. 
Supporters of these strategies cite increasing cultural pluralism and the expansion of 
higher education as two key processes fuelling middle-class growth. Zhou points out that 
China has become increasingly culturally pluralistic under the more relaxed political 
environment since 1978, allowing the development of taste as a middle-class phenomenon.148 
Before then art and culture were entirely used for political purposes and everyone participated 
in the same orthodox culture, preventing the formation of a middle class with its own tastes. 
The expansion of higher education has contributed to increasing cultural pluralism, and has 
also enabled its beneficiaries to command higher salaries. Zhou notes that those ‘few people 
who have received elite educations’ (wei shubuduo de nengguo jieshou jingying jiaoyu de ren) 
since 1978 have been able to get ‘respectable and relatively well-paid white-collar jobs’ 
(timian er shouru jiao gao de bailing gongzuo).149 Reinforcing this viewpoint, sociologist 
Shen Hui argues that an extra year’s education adds six to seven percent to salaries, helping 
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top professionals, especially those in IT, surpass expected white-collar income.150 And white-
collar language skills also boost their earning capacity. Xu Rong points out that white-collar 
jobs ‘require relatively high foreign language proficiency, which itself requires a relatively 
high level of education.’151 The rewards of white-collar work are high, according to Xu, in 
terms of salary and status: ‘[t]his kind of work’s high salary brings them both comparatively 
high economic standing and professional prestige. In just a few short years, ‘white collar’ has 
rapidly become an admired professional appellation.’152 
With regard to the middle class’s association with social stability, academics such as 
Zhou contend that its economic interests cause them to favour gradual democratisation over 
sudden upheaval; and he agrees with the widespread consensus that they are not particularly 
interested in politics.153 Researchers have concluded that the middle class cultivates close 
connections with officials for economic benefit: research conducted by the political scientist 
David Goodman claims that managers of private and state enterprises all have good 
relationships with local party and state officials.154 The potential for conflict between the 
middle class and the state is low, Zhou argues, because these links made to support economic 
interests contribute to a desire from both parties for stability between them and in wider 
society.155 The middle class’s desire to continuously improve their living and working 
conditions, raising their income and social status, is another often cited contributory factor to 
their privileging of stability and comfort over political interests.156  
There is a tendency amongst academic commentators to portray the middle class as 
honest, hard-working and not reliant on corrupt practices. Emphasising this, Zhou argues that 
its success does not depend on ‘family status’ (mendi), ‘nepotism’ (qundai), ‘shady 
transactions’ (touji quqiao) or other illegal means; rather, it depends on ‘individual hard work’ 
(geren de qinfen nuli), a ‘good education’ (lianghao jiaoyu) and ‘accumulated cultural capital’ 
(jilei de wenhua ziben).157 Zhou claims that if everyone were to aspire to this hard-working, 
honest, middle-class model, then society would become more ‘healthy’ (jiankang) and 
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‘harmonious’ (hexie).158 Citing the middle class as the example that Deng Xiaoping wanted 
when he said that development depends on letting ‘some people get rich first’ (yi bufen ren 
xian fuqilai), Zhou believes they generally encourage more civilised behaviour through their 
example, especially amongst lower income classes, in such areas as ‘enthusiasm for work’ 
(jingye jingshen), ‘occupational morals’ (zhiye daode), ‘commercial honesty and good faith’ 
(shangye chengxin), ‘motivation for success’ (chengjiu dongji), ‘family ethics’ (jiating lunli), 
‘raising standards’ (suzhi tisheng), ‘cultural taste’ (wenhua pinwei), and their ‘children’s 
education’ (zinü jiaoyu).159 Additionally, the middle class focus on developing exemplary 
social capital, in sociologist Hu Yiqing’s opinion, referring to C. Wright Mills’ argument that 
‘social connections’ (shejiao) serve to raise the ‘prestige’ (mingwang) of white-collar 
workers.160 Reinforcing his argument, Hu also cites U.S.-based sociologist Yanjie Bian’s 
comment that ‘social networks’ (shehui wangluo) are ‘just like a person’s diplomas and 
certificates, a kind of ‘capital’ (ziben)’.161 
 While the middle classes may be at the ‘rear’ (houwei) of the political world, they are 
at the ‘vanguard’ (qianwei) of consumerism.162 When the first issue of the consumer magazine 
Shishang (Fashion) was published in 1990, most people still had lingering suspicions that 
excessive consumption was ‘wrong’, but now tens of magazines encourage white-collar 
workers to ‘consume, consume, and consume some more’ (xiaofei, xiaofei, zai xiaofei), and to 
‘spend tomorrow’s money on today’s things’ (hua mingtian de qian, ban jintian de shi).163 
Middle-class consumption started with domestic appliances and now extends to spacious 
houses and cars; consequently, demand for property in Shanghai, for example, has put average 
prices up from 3026 yuan per square metre in 1998 to 8124 yuan per square metre in 2004, 
and the number of cars in China had already reached 206 million in 2003, 70% owned by 
individual consumers.164  
The media and advertising industries have been an integral part of the construction of 
the middle-class consumer image. ‘The high consumption ability of this high-income group 
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attracted the gaze of business people’165 and ‘starting in the 1990s, ‘white-collar magazines’ 
(‘bailing zazhi’) targeting white-collar workers appeared one after another’, with periodicals 
such as the Shen jiang fuwu daobao [known in English as the Shanghai Times] running regular 
columns on ‘white-collar preoccupations’ (‘bailing xinshi’).’166 Adverts for Guangzhou’s 
high-level consumer goods (gao xiaofei pin) (especially residential apartment buildings  
(zhuzhai loupan)), also constantly use white-collar identities, images and lifestyle (bailing 
shenfen, xingxiang ji shenghuo fangshi) to solicit sales.’167  
However, of course the middle-class man in China is not a new phenomenon. My 
discussion focuses on the reconstruction of China’s middle class in the post-Mao era.168 
Current academic analyses of today’s middle class phenomenon constantly refer back to the 
Republican period, when the middle class grew particularly rapidly in Shanghai, where the 
development of all sectors (finance, commerce, transport, education, banking, legal services, 
customs, telecommunications, post office, rail network, etc) was shaped by semi-colonial 
capitalism.169 During the revolutionary socialist period from 1949 to 1978, the capitalist 
conditions that had nurtured the growth of the middle class and white-collar workers 
disappeared, yet, Zhou argues, it is possible to identify their equivalents. He believes that 
during this period the ‘middle stratum’ (zhongjian jieceng) of Chinese society was composed 
of ‘ordinary cadres and intellectuals who were analogous to white-collar workers’ (leisi 
bailing de putong ganbu he zhishifenzi); and he adds that according to sociologist Li Qiang it 
also included ‘staff in state-run enterprises’ (guoying qiye de zhigong).170 However, Zhou 
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cautions, this was more a ‘mid-level income class or stratum’ (zhongdeng shouru de jieji huo 
zhongdeng shouru jieceng) than a middle class, because in the Mao era everything produced 
from the land and all personal property was either nationalised or collectivised, and the 
political status and social prestige of this mid-level income group was uneven.171  
 Despite the references of these accounts to historical roots, the concept of the white-
collar worker (bailing) started to achieve more widespread recognition in China only from 
1987, in sociologist Xu Rong’s opinion, when a Chinese language edition of American 
sociologist C. Wright Mills’ classic 1951 work, White collar: The American Middle Classes, 
was published.172 However, the initial entry of the term bailing into reform era discourse was 
as early as 1980, according to Chen Guanren and Yi Yang in their survey of ‘middle class 
people’ (zhongchanzhe), which was ‘the second year of the reform and opening up (gaige 
kaifang) process, when there was more of an atmosphere of a commodity economy (shangpin 
jingji qifen jiaowei nongzhong), and foreign enterprises (waiqi) started setting up offices in 
China.’173 The white-collar label ‘provided a ready-made status reference point’ (xiancheng de 
shenfen zuobiao) for some of the new social groups emerging in the reform period, according 
to Xu, but ‘it differed significantly from Mills’ original meaning’: 
for Mills, the ‘white-collar’ class (‘bailing’ jieceng) has a very broad range: white-
collar professionals in modern American society, from high to low, are almost 
ubiquitous (wuchu buzai), and most of them have average or below-average incomes. 
School teachers, sales staff and every kind of office employee constitute the three 
biggest professional groupings in the American white-collar class.’174  
 
For Xu, there was initially a much narrower understanding of the white-collar class in China, 
where it was understood as a stratum of relatively well-paid positions in foreign enterprises: 
‘in mainland China, with the rapid development of various kinds of foreign investment 
ventures, the term ‘white collar’ has been bestowed on those people who undertake 
administrative, management and technological work in these enterprises.’175 Here again we 
can see the emphasis on the foreign connections of white-collar workers. However, as the 
numbers of white-collar workers have proliferated in the twenty-first century, working for a 
                                                                                                                                                         
of Social Change and Economic Growth in China’, in Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China, ed. 
Stuart R. Schram, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 109-57.   
171 Zhou, ibid., 4-5. 
172 Xu Rong, op. cit., 261; C. Wright Mills, Bailing: Meiguo de Zhongchan jieji (White collar: The American 
middle classes) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1987).  
173 Chen Guanren and Yi Yang, Zhongguo zhongchanzhe diaocha (Survey of Chinese middle-class people) 
(Beijing: Tuanjie chubanshe, 2004), 62. 
174 Xu Rong, op. cit., 261. 
175 Xu ibid., 261. 
 53
foreign firm is no longer a prerequisite for white-collar status, and the application of the term 
is broadening to cover a greater range of workers.  
Although there may be debates about who is or is not white-collar, the hegemonic 
model of white-collar masculinity of media discourse and public discussion emphasises a 
particular look, a particular embodiment: the sleek, smart, besuited, well-groomed, manicured, 
soft-skinned, gleaming-teethed, fashionable young man. And so to start my analysis of the 
interrelations between white-collar male discursive identities and everyday practices, in the 
following chapter I set out a thorough, theoretically informed understanding of the formative 
processes of white-collar male body culture. 
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Chapter Three 
Looking the part: fashioning white-collar masculinities 
 
 
 
The Chinese media depiction of the well-dressed, cosmopolitan young white-collar man 
signals the emergence of an arguably ‘hegemonic’ masculinity overlapping with Connell’s 
‘transnational business masculinity’, shaped by the market economic policies and global 
consumer culture embraced by Deng Xiaoping and his successors.176 In its immediate 
appearance, this masculinity bears little resemblance to the robust macho lines of the ‘model 
man’—the worker or the peasant— of the Mao era. It derives as much from global images of 
the corporate man as from more locally recognizable versions of ‘Chinese men’. Moreover, 
the gender attributes of the image’s appearance defy simple binary boundaries, bringing a 
range of potential meanings and subject positions to the notion of gender that had no place in 
Maoist discourse. However, most of the textual narrative accompanying such images is 
relentlessly conventional in its heteronormative principles, suggesting a continuing attachment 
to deeply engrained assumptions about ‘natural’ masculine behaviour and desire. 
The consumer practices of white-collar men suggest attempts to become outwardly 
identified with the dominant lifestyle images promoted in the media through what Chen 
Guanren and Yi Yang in their survey of the middle class call ‘fashionable consumption’ 
(shishang xiaofei).177 This consists of certain ‘external group characteristics’, such as a desire 
for credit cards, VIP cards, membership cards, even ordinary department store discount cards, 
which help purchase the objects that confer white-collar status.178 Recognising the interaction 
of local and global influences in the growth of consumer culture in China, Chen and Yi call 
this process the ‘sinicisation of white-collar connotations’ (bailing neihan de zhongguohua). 
Providing more evidence of the close association of white-collar workers with consumerism, 
                                                 
176 Raewyn Connell has proposed the concept of a ‘transnational business masculinity’ as ‘a new pattern of 
hegemonic masculinity, found particularly among globally mobile managers’ in the ‘global corporate economy’, 
but qualifies it by pointing out that ‘a spectrum of gender patterns must be recognized in an increasingly complex 
business environment.’ R.W. Connell and Julian Wood, ‘Globalization and Business Masculinities’, Men and 
Masculinities 7, no. 4 (2005): 347.  
177 Chen Guanren and Yi Yang, op. cit., 64. 
178 These objects include ‘mobile phone pouches’ (shouji bao), ‘backpacks with chain straps’ (dailian beibao), 
‘multimedia mobile phones’ (caixin shouji), and ‘digital cameras’ (shuma xiangji), ‘expensive clothing 
magazines’ (jiage bufei de shizhuang zazhi), ‘fashion publications’ (shishang kanwu), ‘notebook computers’ 
(diannao jishibu), and ‘portable computers’ (bianxieshi diannao). See Chen Guanren and Yi Yang, Zhongguo 
zhongchanzhe diaocha (Survey of Chinese middle-class people) (Beijing: Tuanjie chubanshe, 2004), 65. 
 55
the 2007 MSN online survey’s section on ‘fashionable consumer goods’ (shishang xiaofei pin) 
showed that white-collar ‘netizens’ (wangmin) consume more ‘luxury goods’ than other online 
users; more notebook computers, more ‘famous brands of cosmetics’ (mingpai huazhuang pin) 
and more ‘famous brands of perfume’ (mingpai xiangshui).179 Highlighting the appeal of 
global brands, the survey also noted that white-collar netizens’ favourite mobile phone brands 
were all global names.180 Furthermore, pervasive print advertising and broadcast and online 
media181 encourage white-collar men to indulge in fashionable consumption. On CCTV 
Channel Five, the national broadcaster’s sports channel, cars, clothes, and alcohol adverts 
aimed at men are particularly numerous. Glossy men’s magazines are full of adverts for 
foreign as well as local clothing brands; and for those who cannot afford foreign brands, there 
is a huge market in affordable fake foreign designer wear, much of which is indistinguishable 
to the genuine article in appearance. Many of my informants wore well-made fakes (and 
occasionally the real thing), which enabled them to perform a globally-styled white-collar 
masculinity at a price they could afford.182  
It is in these practices that the discursive meets the non-discursive to produce white-
collar subjectivities. Based on my fieldwork interviews and observations as well as media 
texts, this chapter investigates how young men mold themselves as subjects of media 
discourses of ‘fashionable consumption’ through the acquisition and display of particular 
objects. It looks at how these objects are worn, applied or are otherwise linked with young 
white-collar male bodies, in what kinds of settings, and for what purposes. It is through this 
‘assemblage’ of discursive and non-discursive elements that the process of habituation takes 
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place, and in which the conscious performance of a white-collar masculinity becomes 
routinised, even ingrained into the body as ‘second nature’.  
 This chapter paints a composite picture of the white-collar man’s key characteristics, 
the core of which is a particular application of body work to habituate himself to the style and 
movements of a particular image. A focus on the bodily meanings and activities that 
individual men habitually engage in to acquire this image gives us, as Susan Brownell put it, 
‘insight into how an orientation toward the world becomes habitual because the body as a 
mnemonic device reinforces it.’183 Grooming and fashioning the body in a particular look, the 
possibility of which depends on consumer capacity, also displays acquisition of the material 
culture of the global consumer market. In sum, white-collar status is a habituated performance 
of certain attributes, the value of which resides not in any explicit political qualities, but in the 
social and cultural status/capital acquired through the capacity to buy objects deemed to be 
commensurate with that status. 
 In sketching an impression of the white-collar man that emerges from these kinds of 
images and narratives, this chapter examines the gender dimensions of meaning that emerge 
from the intersection between personal and discursive accounts of white-collar subjectivity. In 
the first section, titled ‘Three Portraits’, I present the views of three white-collar men I knew 
in Beijing, examining how they brought themselves to white-collar discourse in their daily 
activities. Their accounts are not uniform, but converge in certain values that are epitomised, 
perhaps, by the shirt, suit and tie, a theme I return to further on. I then examine textual 
descriptions in men’s magazines of what has been called the ‘new century man’ (xin shiji de 
nanren). Partially echoed in the lives of my informants, this slim and smartly-dressed figure 
uses creams, colognes, haircuts and suchlike to construct an image that contrasts with other 
more conventional models of masculinity. Following this, I return to the main sartorial marker 
of corporate masculinity, the suit. Asking, ‘what’s in a suit’, I take a closer look at the moral 
connotations – primarily of dependability and purity – encapsulated in the corporate suit. Also 
covering suit ‘demeanor’ (and much more besides), are a men’s magazine’s lessons in self-
help concerning behaviour and deportment in and out of the office. The extraordinary attention 
to the details of movements, postures and clothing of white-collar masculinity in this article 
are indicative that young urban men are looking to such sources for significant guidance on 
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how they should look and act as white-collar men, perhaps because of uncertainty about 
‘appropriate’ white-collar dress and behaviour. Further, this feature unequivocally orients 
white-collar masculine behaviour towards impressing women, and confirms the heterosexist 
character of this version of ‘new century man’. Finally, moving beyond body work, suits and 
perfumes, I examine the material capital of white-collar man displayed through large-scale 
purchases such as cars, apartments and holidays abroad, all of which are key components of 
the successful white-collar life. 
 
Three portraits 
Shortly after I first arrived in Beijing to conduct my fieldwork in 2004, an acquaintance I had 
already known for some time introduced me to Johnny, a single man in his late twenties who 
was working as a website developer for a global information technology company, 
headquartered in North America. Johnny was born and brought up in a small city in the south 
of China, famous for Buddhist statues. His father had been a foreman in a factory, before 
setting up a small manufacturing business. I first met Johnny near his office in Sanlitun, an 
area famous for its bars and restaurants catering to foreigners and young Chinese white-collar 
workers. Johnny deliberated over a choice of restaurant before selecting a self-styled ‘ethnic’ 
Tibetan restaurant in a quiet, more exclusive corner of the area, away from the rowdiness of 
the main bar-lined street. It was furnished and decorated in Tibetan style and dancers in local 
costume performed between the tables. The customers were all Chinese, mostly male, and 
looked mostly like office workers. Dressed smartly in suit and tie, and possessing impeccable 
manners, Johnny had an urbane air of sophistication that seemed straight out of the pages of 
the men’s magazine Shishang xiansheng. He seemed to epitomize the well-dressed, stylish 
male models in the features on office workers. As I got to know him better over the following 
year, through numerous shared meals and evenings out, I had many opportunities to observe 
the ’body work’ he did to bring his body into line with the discursive models of white-collar 
masculinity found in the glossy men’s fashion and lifestyle magazines—the in-house bibles of 
many white-collar men I met—that ran the length of the IKEA bookshelf in his apartment’s 
living room. These magazines were his guide to office wear, colognes and skincare products, 
among other items. He patronised an expensive hairdressing salon near his office, whose 
barbers claimed to have been trained at a Toni and Guy salon in Shanghai. He applied many 
Western and Japanese brand-name skin care products, especially on his face, as he was 
convinced he had bad skin. But all this effort was for the office: he dressed casually when not 
at work, and was certainly not a fashion victim. His priorities lay elsewhere, such as home 
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furnishings. His ‘body work’ also extended to his teeth, which he regularly had professionally 
cleaned, and even to attempting to eradicate his snoring through an operation to drill tiny holes 
in his nose, which he claimed had been a success.184 Here, in very clear terms, we can see the 
habituated performance of Johnny as ‘white-collar man as consumer’ produced through the 
interpellation of his body into an assemblage of discursive and non-discursive elements. His 
purpose was to enhance his performance of the slick, fashionable metropolitan masculinity 
that he admired in his magazines through acquiring and applying its products and practices 
(creams, suits,), body-changing tools (drills), and globally-recognised appliances 
(furnishings). Such is the production of Johnny as a white-collar consumer, in an assemblage 
of practices and habits, through strategies and techniques of subjectification, promulgated 
through magazines, hospitals, hair salons, furniture shops and restaurants. The more Johnny 
works on himself, on changing his body (he was an avid gym-goer, as I discuss in chapter 
five), on bringing himself to the ‘subject position’ of the consummate, consuming, urban male, 
and the better he emulates those around him and already ahead of him, the easier it is for him 
to claim that he really is this subjectivity that he has constructed; that, in fact, to use Rose’s 
terms, it is his ‘inner reality’. But Johnny could not always ‘hold’ the performance of this 
subject position, since it jostled with the multiple infoldings of habits and techniques 
signifying other subject positions, as we shall see in subsequent chapters.    
While Johnny fitted the classic Chinese white-collar criterion of working for a foreign 
company, many young white-collar men work for Chinese companies. This was the case for 
Colin, a graphic designer for a local travel firm, single and in his mid-twenties when I met 
him. I got to know him fairly well over the eleven months I lived in Beijing, eating out with 
him regularly or simply hanging out in coffee shops. He was introduced to me through a 
mutual friend, an English expatriate. Colin did not earn as much as Johnny, but, coming from 
Chongqing, he was much more of a big city boy, born and bred. We first met in Wudaokou, a 
thriving business, retail, entertainment and student area on the fringes of Zhongguancun, 
Beijing’s ‘Silicon Valley’, which has a large expatriate presence. Wudaokou contains 
Tsinghua University’s recently built hi-tech business park of gleaming tower blocks, which 
hosts offices of Google, Microsoft and other big transnational IT companies. Colin had chosen 
to live in this area because he liked its cosmopolitan atmosphere, although his work was in 
another part of Beijing. He chose a moderately priced Chinese restaurant for our meal on the 
evening we first met. He dressed more casually than Johnny for work, since he did not need to 
                                                 
184 Apparently as one of the first people in Beijing to improve his nocturnal nasal airflow in this way, he was 
even interviewed on TV about it. 
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wear a suit to work, but he wore trendier clothes out of the office. His stylish hair and attention 
to his skin showed an attentive care of the body. He sometimes wore t-shirts bearing slogans 
in English, which signalled his most salient characteristic, namely a knowledgeable love of 
Western popular culture, acquired from watching countless Western movies, listening to 
Western music, and hanging out with his American and European friends in cafes, bars and 
clubs. Colin worked at projecting a sophisticated, ‘Westernised’ persona, not just in 
appearance but also in attitude. He took delight in assuming the political views of Western 
rather than Chinese youth, voicing support for Taiwan’s continued independence and for 
Tibetans to regain theirs. Colin, therefore, adopted a slightly different ‘consuming 
masculinity’ to Johnny, and a more overtly politicized stance which may have been influenced 
by connections with American and European men. As a Chinese man, this seemed a radical, 
more rebellious position to take, which Colin seemed to enjoy; he grinned broadly when he 
told me his views, almost challenging me to comment on his daring and difference—on how 
he marked himself off from the crowd.  
In a semi-structured interview in a café one evening, I asked Colin to describe his idea 
of the typical masculine man. The picture he painted was of a hard-drinking, chain-smoking, 
rugged, bearded, and aggressively heterosexual man, who could have stepped out of some of 
the Western movies that he enjoyed watching.185 However, Colin’s own body culture seemed 
to contrast with this ‘macho’ image. Indeed, he admitted he did not regard himself as 
masculine, because he did not measure up to this imagined ideal of rugged masculinity. 
Colin’s interpretation of masculinity, although different from Johnny’s, also reflected the 
complex mix of the global and local, and the past and the present, which informs notions of 
masculinities – including white-collar masculinities – in contemporary Chinese society. 
Colin’s rejection of a certain image of masculinity reflected the standards of the exaggerated, 
tough, ‘in-yer-face’ heterosexuality of the masculinity performed in mainstream American 
movies; yet our mutual friends commented on his comparatively ‘softer’ ways of walking, 
talking, and moving as typically ‘southern’ – he was from south China – where men are said to 
be much less ‘manly’ than the generally taller, more ruggedly-built northern guys.  
Neither Johnny nor Colin seemed particular self-conscious in the masculinity their 
displayed. However, Johnny introduced me to one of his friends, Jason, in his early thirties, 
looking to get married, who did have a very keen sense of his own masculinity. As a 
northerner, it is possible that Jason felt the need to ‘take up’ the characteristics of ‘tough, 
                                                 
185 Colin had an extensive DVD collection of Western movies, and also drama series, about which he displayed a 
thorough knowledge, mentioning male characters, their actions and ‘catch-phrases’ in casual conversation. 
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manly’ northern men of mainstream discourse, in contrast to the two southerners, Johnny and 
Colin. And yet, as we shall discover below, Jason also performed a consuming masculinity of 
attention to the body in contrast to the image of the unkempt northern man, who gives not a fig 
for his appearance or what others think of it. Jason was working in his mother’s and uncle’s 
very successful medium-sized industrial components sourcing company when I first met him, 
using his IT degree knowledge to improve the company website. Prior to going overseas, he 
had worked for local firms, in marketing and IT departments. He had recently returned to 
China after spending several years studying and working in Europe and North America, and 
was nearing the end of the process to become a Canadian citizen. Although he did not need to 
wear a suit to work, he was very fastidious in his choice of clothes, both at work and at leisure, 
and he always seemed to wear colour-coordinated, brand-name shirts and trousers. He was 
equally fastidious about skincare products and toiletries, which he insisted had to be global 
brand names. Like Johnny, he had his teeth professionally cleaned and polished, when in 
China, and when in the West, where dentists were cheaper, he bought teeth whitening kits 
from chemists and applied them himself.  
Jason was six foot tall, and had a deep voice, which he was proud of, and he openly 
admired the same in other men. At times I suspected he deliberately spoke very slowly so he 
could modulate his voice to a lower pitch. He equated muscles and heavier body weight with 
masculinity, so he took weight-gain supplements and worked out in a gym; and he took up 
tennis (a growing pastime amongst China’s middle class), as he deemed it sufficiently 
masculine, unlike badminton, which he had played as a child. He also told me he was not 
afraid of a fight, and that he disliked effeminacy, childishness and young children; he spoke of 
men he disliked as pure and innocent. Like Colin, he associated beards with manliness; but 
when he grew one, someone said he looked Japanese, so he shaved it off. He also complained 
to me about barbers cutting his hair too short, making him look Japanese. As a proud Chinese 
man, he could not countenance being mistaken for Japanese. Jason’s performance of 
masculinity – a very physical activity for him – required constant attention to his body, and 
seemed to be driven in part by a fear of not being masculine enough: although tall, he was 
naturally quite slim, which seemed to bother him. He acknowledged that his years in the West 
had shaped his behaviour. He said that abroad, he had learnt to stand up for himself by 
becoming more assertive because he was not prepared to be pushed around. Jason thus 
performed – sometimes simultaneously – these two masculinities of northern macho man and 
new, metropolitan consuming man. The contradiction here between these two subject 
positions was so evident that after a bout of Jason’s attempted macho ranting, a friend 
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commented to him, ‘but you’re hardly an alpha male, are you’, to which Jason had no reply.   
 
Grooming the ‘new century man’ 
Many of the gendered attributes that emerge from the accounts of Johnny, Colin and Jason 
converge with mainstream media depictions of the model ‘new century man’, whose physical 
qualities are carefully sculpted and styled. This beardless fresh-faced figure contrasts with the 
widespread view (which Colin and Jason both put forward) that, facial hair connotes 
masculinity, yet should not, so media commentaries on white collar fashion insist, be conflated 
with the ‘femininity’ conventionally associated with soft appearance. This highlights the new 
gender territory white-collar men occupy: their association with global corporate codes, their 
disciplined shapes, and their clean-shaven, well-coiffured, soft-skinned ‘spick and spanness’ 
denote gendered subject positions that confuse the distinction between the conventionally 
masculine and the conventionally feminine.186 Such competing masculine subject positions 
circulate across institutions and media, including the online and magazine articles which 
young men like Johnny consult to construct their ideas about themselves. I now turn to look at 
some of these. 
  In a recent article about the fashion for facial hair amongst Chinese celebrities, the so-
called ‘handsome bearded guy’ (shuaiqi huxu lao) is described as unwaveringly ‘masculine’ 
(yanggang), in contrast with which the beardless ‘metrosexual’ (dushi meixing nan)187 is 
characterised as ‘feminine’ (yinrou).188 The author of this article warns that facial hair is not 
appropriate for ‘nine-to-five white-collar workers’ (zhaojiu-wanwu de bailing) or ‘role 
models’ (shibiaozhe) because their ‘work environment and status are incongruous with it’ 
(zhiye huangjing, shenfen gege-buru), but he allows that people such as the ‘self-employed’ 
(ziyou zhiyezhe) and ‘artists’ (yishujia) can try it out.189 On the one hand this seems to 
‘feminise’ white-collar men to a degree, yet on the other hand it positions white-collar men as 
a desirable stratum above groups like the self-employed and artists.  By providing seemingly 
                                                 
186 Conservative opinion criticizes blurring of the conventional understanding of men as, unlike women, not 
being interested in their appearance. I explore this further in chapter seven.  
187 Metrosexual man is known for his androgynity and narcissisism, and I will return to him in chapter seven. 
188 Jing Si, ‘Nanren cong huxu shuaiqi’ (Guys get gorgeous with beards), Jin yang wang (Golden ram net), 
http://www.ycwb.com/gb/content/2006-01/09/content_1051077.htm (accessed March 29, 2006). Golden Ram 
Net is a large news website, run by the company that publishes the Ram City Evening News (Yang cheng 
wanbao). The biggest websites in China (sohu, sina etc) carry its Guangdong stories. Half of the website’s 
readership is ‘high level white collar’ (gaoji bailing), mostly aged between 23 and 35, university educated and 
earning over 5000 RMB a month, according to their website: see ‘Guanyu women’ (About Us), Jin yang wang 
(Golden Ram Net), http://www.ycwb.com/adv/2007_jynetcompany/ycwb_com.htm (accessed July 20, 2008). 
189 Jing Si, ibid., http://www.ycwb.com/gb/content/2006-01/09/content_1051077.htm. 
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objective justifications for white-collar men’s non-beardedness (work environment, status), 
the author also tries o distinguishes them from feminine, non-white-collar metrosexual, who 
are not subject to these requirements, but prefer a soft, beardless look, the author implies, 
simply for vanity’s sake; as if, perhaps, to rescue white-collar men from charges of femininity. 
White-collar masculinities involve the attention to the body more usually associated with 
women, yet in projecting financial and intellectual power they command respect as symbols of 
sophistication and objects of desire. Though his comments ostensibly reinforce beardedness 
with masculinity in general, the author thus defends the body work required of white-collar 
men. This delicate discursive regulation to claim the conventionally feminised realm of 
attention to appearance for white collar masculinity complicates the task of achieving it, and 
hence implicitly asserts importance of knowledge to know how to spend one’s money to 
construct the veneer of a white-collar man (hairstyle, brand-name outfits, sparkling white 
teeth), that Johnny, Colin and Jason put into practice every day.  
 Other articles in the mainstream media similarly try to defend the ‘new century’ white-
collar man from derogatory accusations of effeminacy. One documents the personal grooming 
and clothing obsessions of two young white-collar men, contrasting their attitude with 
previous norms: ‘the aesthetic perspective of ‘men putting on make-up’ (nan wei ji rong) has 
gradually replaced the traditional idea that ‘men should focus on self-restraint, not their 
appearance’ (nanren bugai zhuzhong waibiao, ying jiangjiu neihan)’ (see figure 1).190 
Becoming a ‘new century man’ (xin shiji de nanren), according to the author, is a conscious 
process of habituation: ‘the new century male without exception has discovered that he ought 
to raise his quality of life; and through dressing with care and living elegantly (chuanzhuo 
jiangjiu, shenghuo xizhi) hopes to make himself more accomplished.’191 Moreover, this 
process relies fundamentally on consumer power and expertise, prompting the author to advise 
the reader not to be surprised if ‘a man lets slip to your face which brand of face cleanser is 
good, which hairdresser has superb skill, which clothing label is for sale on which floor of a 
                                                 
190 Huang Junying, ‘Bailing linan: shishang cuisheng de huayang nanzi’ (The white-collar male beauty: fashion 
hastens the birth of the beautiful man), Guancha yu sikao (Observations and considerations) no. 8 (April 16, 
2006): 50. I have chosen to translate ‘bailing linan’ here as ‘white-collar male beauty’ (the literal translation is 
‘white-collar beautiful man’), to emphasise my focus here on white-collar men’s interest in looking beautiful, but 
this term can also be translated as ‘metrosexual’, which I discuss in chapter seven in the context of the white-
collar man and sexuality. Guancha yu sikao is a nationally available weekly magazine, published under the 
auspices of the Zhejiang Academy of Social Science, with a current print run of 365,000: see Guancha yu sikao 
banyue kan (Observations and Considerations Bi-Monthly)’, Liulanwang (gotoread.com), 
http://www.gotoread.com/mag/8739/ (accessed October 27, 2008). 
191 Huang, ibid., 50.  
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certain mall, or which perfume has the longest lasting scent’.192 In similar vein to the article 
justifying the white-collar man’s  
  
Figure 1 The ‘white-collar male beauty’. Huang Junying, op. cit., 50. 
 
beardless look, the author here urges readers not to ‘ say this is very ‘sissy’ (buyao shuo zhe 
hen ‘niangniang qiang’).193 
 As an example of his argument, the author documents the consumption-based body 
work of Bai Yang and Liu Kang, two young white-collar men. Before Bai Yang leaves for 
work ‘he must spend an hour making himself look good (dali ziji)’. He has a thorough thirty 
minute shower, then puts three skincare products on his face: ‘toner’ (shuangfushui), ‘essential 
                                                 
192 Huang, ibid., 50. 
193 Huang, ibid., 50. 
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elements’ (jinghuasu), and ‘moisturising milk’ (baoshiru).194 He applies mousse to his hair 
and sprays on cologne before stepping outside. Such details are included not just for 
entertainment, in my view, but, following Rose’s account of how ‘strategies’ of (self-
)government from ‘authorities’ prescribe particular body techniques, also fulfill an 
‘educational’ role for young male readers who want to foster a white-collar masculinity, 
although it would seem to be mostly an education in increased consumerism to satisfy 
individual desire and fulfilment. Moreover, in a clear depiction of the process whereby the 
habituated behaviour becomes a ‘natural’ routine, the author explains that daily practice soon 
becomes habitual: ‘although Bai Yang needs to spend half an hour every day doing himself 
up, this has become a habit (zhe yijing chengle Bai Yang de xiguan).’195 Bai’s justification for 
taking so much care over his face, according to the article, is that ‘as far as he is concerned, a 
clean face (ganjing de mianrong) shows the utmost respect for himself and other people’.196 It 
seems perfectly natural to him, as a white-collar man, that he should spend large amounts of 
time and money on personal grooming. 
 Bai reportedly spends over 30,000 yuan every year on Dior, Clinique and other brand-
name products,197 which is two and half times the average total annual income of urban 
workers.198 He also owns over ten brands of cologne, including Dunhill, Boss and Dior, the 
article reveals, which he ‘applies daily according to his mood’ (yizhao xinqing shiyong).199 
This is the promise of the white-collar consumer dream: choice and status, achieved through 
money and the right ‘taste’. This power of choice extends to clothes: the author reveals that 
Bai owns ‘eight well-tailored suits in muted colours and matching ties, six or seven other sets 
of clothes for non-work use, two leather belts – one for jeans and one for suits – and six pairs 
of shoes.’200 Predictably, these items are from famous brands: Dior shirts, Sisly suits, and Lee, 
CK and Levi’s jeans. Just to add to his caché, they were not bought in China: the shirts and 
suits were bought in sales at the Printemps department store in Paris, and the jeans at the 
Harbour City shopping mall in Hong Kong. Bai’s rationale for not buying in China is that he 
might end up wearing the same as somebody else. Foreign travel for consumer purposes is 
thereby added as another defining feature of white-collar masculinities, heightening their aura 
                                                 
194 Huang, ibid., 50 
195 Huang, ibid., 50 
196 Huang, ibid., 50 
197 Huang, ibid., 50 
198 The national average urban wage was almost 12,000 yuan in 2006: ‘Report: Average Income in Beijing Hit 
US$4,660 in 2006’, sina, http://english.sina.com/china/1/2007/0327/107816.html (accessed July 22, 2008). 
199 Huang Junying, op. cit., 50. 
200 Huang, ibid., 50. 
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of exclusivity. The consistent underlying message running throughout the article is that white-
collar men differentiate themselves from other men through informed consumer choices which 
demonstrate their knowledge of ‘luxury’ global brands, positioning themselves within a 
sophisticated, wealthy global class of white-collar men. Such behaviour is also a growing 
trend: ‘these days, the number of white-collar men like Bai Yang and Liu Kang, who live in 
big cities, have impressive salaries and want to spend large amounts of time and money on 
their clothing and looks, is increasing’.201 For the author, there is no doubt that the ‘new 
century man’, the man who is discursively positioned at the forefront of changing notions of 
manhood in contemporary China, is none other than the ‘beautiful white-collar man’ (bailing 
linan).  
 
What’s in a suit? 
The suit is arguably the dominant sartorial emblem of white-collar identity in China, as 
elsewhere. But what is the connection between suits and white-collar men in China? I have 
found that the suit is a marker not only of respectability, but of honesty, integrity, reliability 
and cleanliness. Johnny wore suits to work every day, as do white-collar workers in 
transnational corporations throughout Beijing. The model new century man, Bai Yang, 
reportedly owned eight well-tailored ones. However, China’s governing bureaucrats also wear 
suits, as do many entrepreneurs, and even blue-collar men wear suits for certain occasions. 
When cultural studies scholar Andrew Ross was carrying out ethnographic research into the IT 
industry in Shanghai, he noted the pervasiveness of suit-wearing in a comment on the clothing 
of IT workers in the Pudong Software Park cafeteria: ‘Clothing styles ran the spectrum from 
student scruffy to business casual. Quite a few of the young men wear suits, though this 
fashion decision is not necessarily a mark of corporate belonging – it is a common wardrobe 
choice among all of Shanghai’s classes.’202  
 Nevertheless, though not in itself a mark of white-collar status, when placed within an 
assemblage of ethical practices, body regimes and corporate spaces, the suit confers an aura of 
respectability, honesty, integrity and ultimately cleanliness all of which are inseparably 
associated with the notion of corporate white collar status, as became clear in a discussion I 
had with two students of mine in the private English-language school in Zhongguancun where 
I worked. Henry was a computer software expert in his mid-thirties, and was a senior manager 
                                                 
201 Huang, ibid., 51. 
202 Andrew Ross, ‘Outsourcing as a Way of Life? Knowledge Transfer in the Yangtze Delta’, in Working in 
China: Ethnographies of Labor and Workplace Transformation, edited by Ching Kwan Lee (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2007): 192. 
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for a large Chinese software company; Karen was an affluent accountant in a local firm, also 
in her mid-thirties. The discussion in question concerned the etiquette of door opening, but it 
led to an interesting exchange about the values and attitudes suit wearing produces. Henry 
noted a distinction in the way women responded to him, depending on whether he was 
wearing a suit or not. He said that ‘whenever I hold open my office block’s main door for 
women, and I am wearing a suit, they say ‘thank you’, but when I am casually dressed they 
never thank me.’ Karen’s response was direct and clear: ‘If a man is wearing a suit, I know he 
is hardworking, but if he is wearing, say, sandals and a T-shirt, then who knows what his 
intentions are? If I were to say one word [to him], then who knows what he might do?’203  
Leaving aside the possibly discriminatory attitudes conveyed in these comments 
(Henry for example never opened a door to men, and Karen’s disdain for someone whose 
dress did not denote a particular social status was evident), both Henry’s and Karen’s 
comments echoed the almost idealised moral qualities associated with the besuited corporate 
man, noted in mainstream sociological discourse. Indeed, Karen’s belief that a suit conveyed 
trustworthiness, honesty, responsibility, purity of intentions and so on, rehearsed views 
identical to those in Zhou Xiaohong’s characterisation of the middle class as a model for 
society as a whole, which I outlined in chapter two. In a further gloss on the moral qualities of 
the middle class, Chen and Yi’s survey further suggests that as ‘the only segment of the 
middle class that relies simply on salary to rise to higher positions’ (weiyi jinjin kao gongzi 
jishen zhongchan zhi lie de qunti), white collar workers are as ‘pure white’ (jiebai) as the 
colour of their collars, creating a ‘fresh’ (qingxin) and ‘favourable’ (youyue) impression that 
many ‘petty bourgeois’ (xiaozi) would dearly love to emulate.204  
Linked to Bai Yang’s pursuit of super-clean skin, it seems that such moral and physical 
characterisations of white-collar men sustain a recurring motif of purity and cleanliness, and 
regardless of the ‘reality’ of white-collar man’s corruptibility, the white-collar man, and more 
broadly the middle-class, seem to offer an untarnished prospect of honest, clean behaviour 
when all around is debased. Magazines targeted at white-collar women sometimes also 
indulge in the same ideals of morally pure and trustworthy white-collar masculinities, in the 
                                                 
203 Karen here clearly has in mind the smart, well-fitted suit as part of the ensemble uniform of white-collar men, 
which includes appropriate footwear, as she points out; and, I would add, the level of grooming as depicted in the 
‘new century man’ article, among many other characteristics. Suit-wearing migrant labourers, for example, are 
easily distinguished from white-collar men in a multitude of ways; these two subject positions are discursively 
constructed in different ways, including gait, hairstyle, face care, manner of speaking, bodily habits, facial 
expressions, clothing, footwear, jewellery, technological tools etc. 
204 Chen Guanren and Yi Yang, op. cit., 64-5. The ‘petty bourgeois’ (xiaozi) is a term which has increased in 
usage in China since the 1990s to describe urbanites who aspire to the white-collar lifestyle, but do not quite earn 
enough to pursue it to the same extent as their white-collar brethren.  
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romanticised form of perfect boyfriends or husbands.205  Informants of mine have also 
suggested that the key features women look for in prospective marriage partners are those 
associated with contemporary white-collar status — a good education, high income and 
‘respectability’ (timian). When I raised this issue as I sat chatting one day in a cafe with Mark, 
the owner of a small computer company in his late twenties and a friend of one of my teaching 
colleagues, he further argued that white-collar men are most likely to possess these attributes 
in today’s China, whereas in the 1980s it was employees of government ‘bodies’ (jiguan). The 
besuited, clean-cut figure of the corporate man is generally seen as more ‘respectable’ (timian) 
and ‘moral’ (daode), he believed, than other kinds of men. His words point to the reputation of 
the white-collar man as one of the premier models of the ‘ideal man’ in contemporary urban 
imaginaries in China, and indicate a shift to a valorisation of new forms of masculinities. 
 
Seven lessons in being ‘man enough’  
The purity of the suited man is by no means the only or even main virtue of the corporate 
individual. More macho characteristics attribute the success of the image to his heterosexual 
appeal. Whereas magazines aimed at white-collar women may tend to focus on the warm-
heartedness of white-collar men, magazines targeting white-collar men themselves have a 
different focus. An example is a feature in Nanren zhuang, (For Him Magazine), which 
explicitly sets out to teach its readers how to be ‘man enough’ (gou nanren) by describing in 
fine detail the actions, postures, movements, gestures and similar body work required of a 
‘real white-collar man’ across various sites.206 Like many other similar articles, it is part of a 
discursive regime which produces a particular subject position. Viewed in this way, it is not a 
‘representation’ of white-collar life; rather, it is one of many discursive techniques which 
subjectify white-collar men. But the ways in which individuals understand, adopt, modify or 
reject the various instructions in this article and others like it are not uniform, as the differing 
enactments of white-collar masculinity of my informants demonstrate.  
The feature is a self-styled guide to manly behaviour, and just to remind the reader 
what kind of ‘manly behaviour’ is implied, the English word ‘macho’ is printed underneath 
                                                 
205 For instance, in an article in the magazine How (Hao) about women’s quest for a caring, reliable husband, the 
prospective partners featured were all high-flying, rich, corporate figures. San Qian, Ya Ya, and Young Candy, 
‘Xunzhao wennuanpai nanren’ (Looking for a warmhearted man), Hao (How) 80 (December 2005): 122-131. 
Hao is a fashion magazine aimed at white-collar women between 23 and 35 years old who are seeking a high 
quality life, according to its profile at: ‘How zazhi shiyiyue xinkan tuijian’ (How's New November 
Recommendations) Changjiang wang (Yangtze web), http://www.cjn.cn/fashion/fmx/200611/t230504.htm 
(accessed November 28, 2007). 
206 Lin Lin, ‘Gou nanren!’ (Man enough!), Nanren zhuang (For him magazine) no. 3 (March, 2007): 80-83. 
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the title in huge letters. The subheading of the article reads: ‘How to read the newspaper, carry 
one’s jacket, answer the phone and doze more elegantly: Nanren zhuang teaches you to grasp 
the details, to be a real man (zuo zhen yemenr)!’207 More specifically, this is a guide to 
becoming a manly white-collar worker and without having to deal with the delicate boundaries 
between masculinity and femininity represented by the ‘new century man’ that I discussed 
above. In a stylistic device to emphasise its popular educational appeal, the article’s formatting 
and design suggests that is printed as a ‘handwritten’ book (shouchaoben), a term that usually 
refers to the samisdat like handwritten books that used to circulate amongst the educated youth 
during the Cultural Revolution, either because the book was banned or because people could 
not afford to buy it. By displaying the feature in this way, Nanren zhuang seems to suggest 
that the subject matter holds huge mass appeal, and also a kind of subversive popular appeal, 
perhaps because it is revealing the ‘secret’ techniques that young men can use to ‘pull’ the 
girl(s) they desire, without revealing them to the girl. 
  The article is divided into seven ‘lessons’, covering very common situations and 
activities in the daily life of a young corporate man (the target readership of Nanren zhuang), 
inside and outside of the office. Moreover, the underlying theme of heterosexual desire fits 
firmly within the general editorial slant of Nanren zhuang, which features highly sexualised 
images of young women in every issue. This article, then, addresses the core readership of the 
magazine with its core editorial theme. As I noted in chapter one, Nanren zhuang claims a 
print run of over half a million copies, and so a feature such as this will enjoy significant 
readership figures. 
‘Would you like to get informed and simultaneously attract the gaze of others?’ 
(xiangyao rang ziji zai huode zixun de tongshi xiyin bieren de muguang) is the question that 
starts Lesson One. 208 The author contends that the moment when a man is absorbed in reading 
a newspaper is ‘the moment [he] embodies the height of masculinity’ (tixian nanrenwei he 
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qizhi de juejia shiji) and an unbridled opportunity for women to observe this.209 
 
Figure 2 Lesson One: ‘How to read a paper without wind resistance’. Lin Lin, op. cit., 
80. 
 
Beneath the text for this ‘lesson’, there are three diagrams of a young white-collar man in suit 
and tie holding different sizes of folded newspapers (see figure 2).210 The very detailed 
prescriptions of particular physical movements in the text and images highlight that 
performances of this specifically young, cool, metropolitan, sexually attractive white-collar 
masculinity is as much about specific, habitual actions, as it is about wearing suits. Indeed, 
these refined movements may be seen as key in distinguishing oneself from one’s older, less 
                                                 
209 Lin, ibid., 80. 
210 The first diagram shows the man reading a newspaper folded to a quarter of its size, with one hand holding 
the newspaper in front of him, and the other hand resting on his chin, as if contemplating what he is reading. The 
caption for the diagram promises that the ‘masculinity’ (nanzi qigai) of reading the political news in this kind of 
unaffected manner will attract the gaze of many beautiful girls. The second diagram shows the same man reading 
a newspaper folded to an eighth of its original size, and the accompanying caption claims that nodding his head 
from time to time as he reads will look ‘very elegant and natural’ (xiaosa ziran). The third diagram shows the 
same man intently studying a newspaper folded to a sixteenth of its original size, with the caption: ‘a look of 
incomparable absorption will move even female bosses (nü shangsi kanle ye hui dongxin)’. 
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fashionable, less svelte and perhaps therefore less desirable colleagues, who perform different 
shades of white-collar masculinities, drawing from other discourses. Three further points stand 
out from Lesson One. Firstly, this white-collar man’s consideration of those around him, who 
may not want to be wafted by his newspaper, which exemplifies the feature’s overall tone of 
self-reflexivity; secondly the use of engineering and design metaphors, as if this is the kind of 
language the male reader understands; and thirdly the goal of charming women, either pretty 
girls or female superiors, which brings to the fore the heteronormative sexual aspect of the 
‘desiring’ white-collar man.  
Lesson Two is on dozing – stylishly – during meetings to impress the ladies (see figure 
3).211 The author posits the choice of the ‘single arm style’ (danbi shi) 
  
Figure 3 Lesson Two: ‘How to win a lady’s heart by dozing in the meeting room’; and 
Lesson Three: ‘How to answer the phone in a sophisticated way’. Lin Lin, op. 
cit., 81. 
 
best used on ‘pure and innocent women’ (chunzhenxing nüxing), the author argues, to let them 
see the ‘cute side under [the young white-collar man’s] tough exterior’ (qiangying waibiao-xia 
ke’ai de yimian); and the ‘Rodin style’ (luodan shi), which should be used on ‘mature women’ 
(chengshuxing nüxing), the author recommends, to let them know that the ‘immaculately 
besuited’ (xizhuang biting) man dozing next to them is still a ‘very deep thinking’ (shensi-
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shulü) and ‘fully masculine tough guy’ (chongman nanrenwei de qiangshi nanxing).212 This 
‘lesson’ underlines the notion of the young white-collar man as attractive and charming, but it 
does so in a way that reduces women to foils for his charm. There is no mention of how to 
impress other men in the company, so there is no escape from the (hetero)sexual undertones.     
Answering the office phone in a sophisticated way is the topic of Lesson Three. In the 
humdrum office environment people become dull and stupid, so answering the phone is just 
the occasion for the young office worker to show some ‘manly style’ (nanren zuofeng).213 The 
article suggests that if the reader is under thirty, he can use the ‘energetic leap method’ 
(feishen fa): within three rings of the phone leap energetically to the phone, put it between ear 
and shoulder, turn round 180 degrees, and swiftly half-sit on the table.214 If he is over thirty, 
he can use the ‘gentleman’s method’ (shenshi fa): answer the phone within three rings, put it 
between ear and shoulder, casually answer, and consummately turn motion into stillness.215 
Two diagrams accompany the text (see figure 3), with further phone use etiquette advice not to 
tangle the telephone cord, nor to ‘doodle indiscriminately on the paper [next to the phone]’ 
(suiyi zai zhishang xie hua).216 Here, the different suggested actions for different ages, and the 
labelling of the second method as the ‘gentleman’s’, indicates the production of multiple 
subject positions even within this ‘model’ of sexually desirable white-collar masculinity, 
underlining the important point that the dominant or hegemonic image is always intersected 
with alternative positions disrupting its apparently unitary meaning. 
Lesson Four teaches the reader how to court sympathy through sickness: it stipulates 
that the reader’s target is the ‘thousands of millions of sympathy-filled female compatriots’ 
(qianqianwan chongman tongqingxin de nüxing tongbaomen).217 If he ‘makes his eyes blurry’ 
(jiashang mimeng de shuangyan), puts on a ‘magnetic voice’ (cixing kouyin) and a ‘faltering, 
hoarse voice’ (siyou siwu de huxi sheng), the author is convinced that all the nearby ‘aunties’ 
(dama) will rush over to feed him congee, not to mention the ‘young girl’ (xiaomei) next to 
him;218 Adopting an appropriate breathing rate might be difficult, as ‘normal feverish 
breathing’ (fashao zhengchang de huxi) should not be too fast or too slow, and ‘male charm is 
perfectly embodied in the instant between breaths’ (tu-xi zhijian nanxing meili wanmei tixian). 
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Even if he has pneumonia, the author urges, he must still ‘mount an offensive’ (zhankai 
gongshi) against a young female nurse at the hospital. The accompanying diagram 
 
Figure 4 Lesson Four: ‘How to court sympathy through sickness’; and Lesson Five: 
‘How to carry one’s jacket’. Lin Lin, op. cit., 82. 
 
(see figure 4) shows two young white-collar men demonstrating imaginative techniques to 
make their voices husky, ‘rap singing in a suit’ (chuanzhe xizhuang chang RAP) and speaking 
with the ‘elegance of a Frenchman’s low-toned murmur’ (Faguoren dichen ninan de youya). 
This lesson is infused with the pervasive notion that women should look after men through 
feeding them amongst other things; and when they are sick they should nurse them, and show 
sympathy for them. It suggests that women even find men’s weakness appealing. 
Lesson Five is concerned with the ‘manliest’ way of carrying one’s ‘suit jacket’ 
(xizhuang waitao), the ‘must-have for men at work’ (gongzuo zhong de nanren bi bei 
wupin).219 Seeking a ‘manly’ (nanrenwei) method of holding one’s suit jacket, the author lays 
out four possibilities, with accompanying diagrams of white-collar men in relevant poses in 
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the park (see figure 4)220 The author suggests the reader can select the style that best suits his 
likes and character; and advises putting his free hand into his pocket to ‘keep the body at a 
normal temperature’ (baochi renti zhengchang tiwen), and ‘demonstrates an outstanding 
ability to look handsome’ (biaoxianchulai shua shuai de kanjia benling).221 This lesson 
underlines the importance of not only the suit, yet again, but also related and multiple styles of 
body work: a style is to be chosen, and every single action must be prepared for, practised, and 
all for the sake of, yet again, looking desirable; not simply in a sexual sense, but also for peer 
group status and standing in wider society.  
 How to hold a cup in a café is the focus of the penultimate lesson, which notes that 
women ‘with a bit of taste’ (shaowei youxie pinwei) like to gather in cafes for a cappuccino or 
a mocha and sit there for an afternoon, providing an excellent opportunity for ayoung man to 
‘set about catching his prey’ (xiashou buhuo liewu). 222 Experience proves that as long as the 
young man’s ‘conversational style and actions are sufficiently elegant and witty’ (tantu he 
dongzuo gou youya fengqu), sitting with these beautiful women for an hour will not be a 
problem.223 ‘Moving one’s mouth’ (dongzui), in other words talking, is crucial to ‘attract their 
[women’s] attention’ (xiyin tamen zhuyili) and ‘establish oneself in a leading position’ (shuli 
ziji zhudao diwei).224 When discussing some popular topic together, the author advises, a man 
must also crack some jokes and riddles, and at this time he can sit down beside his target.225 
‘Moving one’s hand’ (dongshou) refers to the way a man holds his coffee cup: holding the 
main body of the coffee mug and not the handle is the fundamental hunting method, and if the 
handle is pointing towards his target it signals an ‘offensive’ (gong), if pointing towards 
himself it shows he is on the ‘defensive’ (shou).226 Accompanying the text is a diagram (see 
figure 5) which shows three young white-collar men in suits and ties drinking in a café, with 
captions commenting on the way they are holding their cups.227 Perhaps the most salient 
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227 One man is drinking beer from a mug, and the caption reads: ‘Even when you are drinking beer, hold the mug 
handle lightly with three fingers, to show your sufficiently strong physique and wrist power (biaoxian ni zugou 
qiangjian de tipo yu wanli).’ Another man is holding a teacup in one hand and a saucer underneath in the other, 
and the caption for him reads: ‘‘Earl style’ posture (‘bojue shi’ zitai): this is a steady and neutral (pingwen er  
zhongli) way of holding a cup, which gives off an elegant aristocratic air (youya de guizu qixi).’ The third man is 
holding the body of a mug, and the caption reads: ‘holding a cup firmly is very attractive to passive girls’ 
(qiangyouli de wo bei fangshi dui beidong de nühai hen you xiyinli). 
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aspect of this lesson is the ‘assembled locale’ of the coffee shop, where body positionings, 
movements, tools, vocabularies and intentions all play a part in constructing a particular 
masculinity. 
The final lesson teaches the reader how to appear manly even from behind. A shirt 
stretched tight by back muscles has a ‘hint of sex’ (xing anshi), according to one ‘expert 
psychologist’ (xinlixue zhuanjia), which ‘excites women’ (dui nüren ciji) and gives them the 
impression of ‘arms they can rely on’ (keyi yikao de bibang).228 The author claims that if a 
man wears a thin shirt, then exerts his back, his back muscles will protrude; or if his shirt is 
tight, then the outline of his muscles will also be prominent, and a strongly-built male body 
will be visible. If, however, a man’s muscles have not developed to being able to take part in a 
boxing match, as the author puts it, then it is best to choose a shirt one size smaller than usual. 
If none of these suggestions work for him, then he can try the ‘cosmetic muscles technique’ 
(jirou huazhuang shu) (see figure 5), which involves the man hugging his chest with his arms 
and exerting his back muscles, or pulling his shirt tightly together at his chest, which also 
produces a strong-looking back.229 As a last resort, suggests the author, if a man has no 
muscles to speak of, and is simply too lazy to go to the gym, then he should just open up the 
top three buttons of his shirt. The overriding message is that no matter what kind of male body 
you have, the fact that it is a male body is enough: there will always be a way to use it to 
demonstrate your masculine credentials.   
The language and ideas in this guide to being a ‘real man’, regardless of how seriously 
one takes its ‘lessons’, provide evidence that discursively constructed masculinity in China is 
predicated on assumptions about distinct ‘naturalised’ male and female characteristics, 
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privileging the male in the public sphere, as I argued 
   
Figure 5 Lesson Six: ‘How to hold a cup in a café’; and Lesson Seven: ‘How to show 
manliness from behind’. Lin Lin, op. cit., p. 83. 
 
in chapter two. The article implicitly assigns an active guile to men, and a naïve passivity to 
‘pure and innocent’ young women, although older women – portrayed as instinctive mothers  
– are also ripe for duping. Men project physical strength, which women like and rely on, and 
men are interested in politics, cars and engineering. The article also offers illustrations of the 
arguments I made in chapter two about how white-collar masculinities are constituted through 
habituation processes, situated within assemblages of places, practices, techniques and 
devices, which are themselves the products of global and locally embedded discursive 
formations emphasising consumerist desire, and white-collar men’s own desirability. Firstly, 
the structure of the feature as a series of detailed lessons on how to acquire the body language 
appropriate to white-collar employees is an obvious template for habituation; the prescribed 
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actions – from holding a newspaper, phone, cup, or oneself at a meeting to hamming illness or 
wearing a shirt – are meant to be practised and mastered so that they look natural. Secondly, 
there are several explicit references to ‘global’ culture which signal the cultural capital of the 
white-collar man: Italian racing cars, Greek gods, rap singers, gravelly-voiced Frenchmen, 
Rodin, wine-tasting, cappuccino, mocha and tea-sipping earls. The main ‘global’ signifiers of 
white-collar masculinity are the transnational spaces he inhabits, including corporate offices 
and Starbucks style cafes. Locally-embedded signifiers, in contrast, might include the way he 
is described manipulating older female colleagues to take pity on his ‘illness’ and cook him 
congee, or how he is portrayed appealing to ‘pure’, ‘innocent’ and ‘passive’ young women 
with his elegant masculinity. In this way, the performance of masculinity as a reiterated 
process, as in Butler’s account, is not a unitary process, but one in which offers various subject 
positions across which the ‘global’ and ‘local’ mix together with other ideas and practices 
creating new lived subjectivities—the kinds of masculinities that my informants performed in 
their everyday lives. Thirdly, the coffee, tea and beer drinking, shown taking place in a sketch 
of a Western-style café, displays the consumer lifestyles of white-collar men, and the potential 
sex appeal to women that their acquisition of such symbolic and cultural capital denotes. 
Finally, the accomplished white-collar men are unequivocally desirable: follow these 
instructions, young men, runs the subtext of the feature, and you shall never want for women’s 
   
Figure 6 Hu Jun on the cover of Shishang xiansheng (Esquire) no. 18 (February, 2007) 
(see note 55). 
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attention, specifically white-collar women’s attention, because you will be the epitome of 
masculinity to them.230 The desirability of white-collar masculinities reflects their high status 
in the social order of contemporary China: white-collar men are seen as winners in China’s 
integration with ‘global modernity’. That is why, at least on paper, they always get the girls. 
 
Cars, apartments and travel 
This section turns to the materia associated with the white-collar man, regardless of the 
specific gender inflections of his image. It highlights Rose’s point that we must go beyond the 
body to see how material objects, tools, devices, technological innovations and so on are 
linked to form diverse embodied subjectivities across different locales, and how they are 
related to routines, practices, habits, emulations, and so on, to produce different meanings and 
subject positions. Advertising, TV programmes and lifestyle magazines play major roles here. 
Purchasing big-ticket consumer items such as a car, an apartment and foreign holidays 
demonstrates– besides accomplished white-collar body work – that Chinese white-collar 
workers they have really ‘made it’, thereby increasing their status and desirability. The 
familiar white-collar theme of manifesting one’s participation in a globally-recognised middle 
class runs through these purchases. The sought-after apartments are almost invariably North 
American-style condominium developments, furnished Ikea-style; the most desired cars are 
imported foreign models, and the most prestigious travel is to Europe and America. The media 
is instrumental in shaping particular conceptions of middle-class status and taste regarding 
these and other items and activities. As Kevin Latham argues, using the example of car 
magazines, media images have a direct impact on the formation of social class: 
Automobile magazines do more than simply advertise or picture cars […]. They depict 
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masculinity. Since the early 1990s Hu has starred in numerous Chinese soap operas and movies, including two 
pioneering gay movies, East Palace West Palace (Donggong xigong) (1996), Lanyu (2001). He embodies the 
sexual desirability that white-collar men seek to emulate, according to Colin, who called him an ‘extremely 
representative man’ (feichang dianxing nanren). In a cover feature for Shishang xiansheng (Esquire), he was 
pictured in several different photographs wearing an office shirt with the top button undone and a loosely-tied tie, 
a fat cigar in his hand in some of the photographs, looking like a young investment banker who has gone to a bar 
straight from the office (Yu Lei, ‘Hu Jun: yiqie keyi chong lai’ (Hu Jun: It can all come again), Shishang 
xiansheng (Esquire) no. 18 (February, 2007): 92-7) (see figure 6). Hu is also the ‘face’ of many consumer brands, 
endorsing stylish cars, clothing and jewellery on TV and city billboards.  According to the article (which also 
mentions his prominence in adverts), he has his own accountant, personal assistant, a large house, drinks vintage 
Western wine, wears sunglasses when shopping, and has slept with many famous actresses (Yu Lei, op. cit., 94). 
This nutshell summary of Hu’s life encapsulates the defining aspects of white-collar masculinity: the global 
sophistication, high-level consumerism, and (sexual) desirability. Of course Hu is not a white-collar man: he has 
not gone through a white-collar habituation process to achieve this lifestyle, but the article seems to holds out the 
allure that his lifestyle – and ultra-masculinity – might just be possible for white-collar men too.  
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certain lifestyles and write for particular audiences with a whole range of assumptions 
about houses, tastes, children, families, social values, attitudes and personal 
aspirations. In this way, automobile magazines identify and demarcate a particular 
social group as envisaged by the editors. This is in turn feeds back into readers’ 
conceptualizations of themselves and others. Hence, through their imagery, depicted 
lifestyles, and glossy, aspirational advertisements, automobile magazines have come to 
play a role in the social imagination and self-definition of China’s new middle 
classes.231 
 
Alongside car magazines, in recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of 
interior decoration and household furniture magazines, as well as travel magazines featuring 
far-flung destinations. These topics, alongside the promotion of other consumer items and 
middle-class lifestyles, are now also highly popular on television shows.232   
Owning an apartment – or even a villa – is perhaps the most important purchase to 
which white-collar men aspire, either as an investment or as a home to live in. According to 
Elisabeth Croll in her study of contemporary consumption, ‘‘owning your own home’ has 
become the most important material pre-requisite for a good life or successful lifestyle’ in the 
high-income groups of China’s cities.233 After buying a home, the next step is to furnish it:  
Among the newly-rich and aspiring, property purchase is one of the main dinner-table 
subjects of conversation and certainly sales figures confirm that both home ownership 
and home furnishing are indeed ‘hot topics’ among this relatively privileged younger 
generation – perhaps the first to have an opportunity to both live separately from their 
parents and express their independence and individuality in their own separate ‘life-
spaces’.234 
 
 The car has become a significant status symbol in recent years, as Croll again points out: 
‘In many consumer surveys in the late twentieth century including those of China’s elite, it 
was ownership of or access to a car which constituted the most potent symbol of the ‘good 
life.’’235 She argues that:  
For the young [i.e. twenties and thirties], an automobile perhaps more than any other 
object signified a fast-moving lifestyle and a new-found sense of freedom. Toyota 
attempted to appeal to this age-group by using an advertising slogan, ‘even further, 
even freer’. […] In numerous glossy car magazines such as Trends Gentlemen, a 
lifestyle magazine targeted at young professional men or middle-ranking Chinese male 
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employees in foreign companies with high disposable incomes of between Y3,000 and 
Y10,000, car ownership along with sport and after-shave was associated with 
sportsmanship, celebrity, success and speed.236 
 
As for expressing individual identity through choice of car, the Volkswagen ‘Jetta’ (jieda) has 
become the ‘standard car’ (biaozhun che) of Beijing white-collar workers aged between 25 
and 40, according to an article in an edited compilation of Xin Zhoukan (New Weekly)237 
stories on the middle class. The revealing subheading is: ‘brand of car [gives] face in the city’ 
(qiche de paizi, chengshi de mianzi).238 More upmarket is the BMW, for which some branded 
accessories are custom-made: Liu Kang, a white-collar ‘pin-up’ discussed in the journal 
Guancha yu sikao, bought some Boss audio equipment for his BMW costing 10,000 yuan.239 
The 2008 MSN online survey found that European cars were most popular amongst white-
collar men because of their ‘speed and handling pleasure’ (dongneng he caokong lequ).240  
 Holidaying abroad has become ‘the middle class’s most enjoyable activity’ (zhongchan 
jieceng zui le de huodong), according to Chen Guanren and Yi Yang. They relate that the 
deputy head of the country’s tourism bureau has described foreign travel as ‘already an 
indispensable new lifestyle for many citizens’ (yi shi bushao jumin buke-huoque de xin 
shenghuo fangshi).241 Commenting on its effect on the middle class, Chen and Yi argue that 
‘[…] going abroad has not only increased their understanding of the world (zengjiale tamen 
dui shijie de liaojie), but has also accelerated the middle class’s sense of openness and the 
global (cujinle zhongchan jieceng de kaifang yishi he quanqiu guannian).’242 Highlighting 
how one’s holiday destination denotes status and class identity, an article in the Xinzhoukan 
compilation states that Europe is the ‘middle class’s paradise’ (zhongchan de tiantang), and 
that even the choice of destination within Europe is a way to demonstrate one’s ‘taste and 
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social standing’ (pinwei ji shehui diwei.243 
Several of my white-collar informants, who, in their own ways and according to their 
own circumstances performed variants of white-collar masculinities, incorporated two or even 
three of these status symbols into their performances, including Beijinger Wen, 40, married, 
with a six-year-old son, and my student at the Sanyuanqiao school. He was the sales manager 
for a large European transnational electrical equipment company. Wen’s main investments – 
aided by family money – had been in property: he told me that besides his own house he 
owned several properties, including a ‘villa’ (bieshu), which he rented out to foreigners for 
two and a half thousand US dollars per month. Wen, always smartly turned out in a well-
tailored suit, drove a large, comfortable company car. He had travelled extensively in the 
world, for business and pleasure, and had stayed in Australia for several months while 
attending an English course. Gansu-born Andrew, in his early thirties, introduced by a mutual 
friend, an ex-state dance troupe dancer turned bureaucrat in the culture ministry, had 
purchased a brand-new apartment in the booming Chongwenmen commercial and 
entertainment area near the city centre. The last time I talked with him, he was pondering 
whether he should buy a car; his sister had just bought one and had been extolling its benefits. 
His job with the culture ministry had taken him abroad for years at a time to Europe and the 
Middle East, and he also took holiday breaks in southeast Asia. Additionally, he told me he 
had a substantial portfolio of stocks which was making him considerable amounts of money. 
Mike, in his late twenties, was the very fluent English-speaking assistant manager of a 
European brand-name luxury goods store (the manager was a European), the son of a regional 
official, and nephew of a very successful entrepreneur, who had helped fund his overseas 
study. I had first met him before going to China when he was studying one of his two masters 
degrees in the UK. He lived in a stylish two-bedroom apartment he had bought for himself, did 
not own a car, but took business and pleasure trips to Europe.  
Johnny, Colin and Jason, the subjects of my three portraits, also aspired to – and had 
achieved, to varying extents – this lifestyle. Johnny, the website developer, owned an 
apartment in central Beijing, which he had bought with some financial help from his brother, 
an architect in Fujian. His efforts to express his individuality in his own ‘life-space’ were 
greatly facilitated by Ikea’s affordable and well-designed furniture, which gave his apartment 
a clean, sleek and contemporary feel in contrast to those apartments, such as that of Jason’s 
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sixty-something parents, which were furnished with predominantly locally designed and 
produced furniture. Johnny made regular trips to Ikea at the weekend, by taxi, just to stroll 
around, perhaps having Swedish meatballs in the onsite restaurant for lunch then picking up 
some small items for the kitchen. He did not own a car because he was a fitness fanatic, and 
preferred to ride his bike when possible, otherwise he would take taxis, although he travelled 
to work by bus and underground. As for foreign travel, he had been to southeast Asia for short 
breaks, and to Germany and France for a longer period to visit European friends he had made 
in Beijing through work and through renting out a room in his apartment. Colin, the graphic 
designer, rented a two-bedroom apartment (because he could not afford to buy one) just 
around the corner from a fashionable commercial area near the CBD, and sublet one room to a 
foreign couple so he could practise his English. But Colin could not afford to buy Ikea 
furniture, so had to make do with the apartment’s existing furniture, which was local and 
older.244 Johnny’s higher social standing was demonstrated through his purchases of Ikea 
furniture. Jason owned an apartment, which his parents helped him buy, and used his mother’s 
chauffeur-driven car or taxis to travel around the city. Besides having lived overseas for years, 
he also took frequent overseas holidays to North America, Europe, and southeast Asia. 
The significance of these select ‘big-ticket’ items is that without them, white-collar 
men might feel they have not really ‘made it’. Placed in an assemblage of white-collar 
practices, they are an obvious indication to the world of white-collar status; moreover, their 
purchase represents the consummation of why men choose to take the demanding, tiring 
white-collar path in the first place. If not for the sake of owning a flash, expensive car, an 
apartment better than the next man’s and the chance to travel in style to fashionable overseas 
destinations, then why become a white-collar man at all? Imported cars, condominium 
apartments and luxury foreign travel are depicted as natural objects of desire in the discourse 
of consumerism prevalent in China today. White-collar men are expected to aspire to them, 
and the careful acquisition, deployment and display of them through an array of techniques 
marks these men out as the representatives of successful, sophisticated, upward mobility; it 
distinguishes them not just from those who cannot afford them, but also from other affluent 
men (officials, entrepreneurs) whose subjectivities are played out through differing tastes and 
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yuan an hour, several times per week, since he wanted to develop a more muscular body. He told me he thought 
that a more attractive body as part of an overall carefully-groomed appearance would help his career. He had also 
moved house, renting a room in a more stylish flat in a more upmarket location.    
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styles of masculinities. These items are the prizes of modernity, available to those who work 
hard, and possession of them ensures happiness, or at least that is what the adverts promise.  
 
 
In this chapter, I have shown that the body culture and material environment of white-collar 
men are constituted through an aspirational consumerism, which manifests a mix of global and 
local tastes. The emphasis in this chapter is evidently on the global side of the global/local 
conundrum, suggesting that white-collar masculinities, at least in terms of fashioning the 
young male body in the contemporary Chinese context draw from versions of a ‘hegemonic’ 
neoliberal model of masculinity, propelled by the forces of the global market’s economic 
capital, and therefore, fundamentally by the state, but also from other, more locally-embedded 
notions about what it means to be a man. It has been apparent throughout this chapter that 
despite the clean-cut, relatively ‘effeminate’ looks in media images of China’s white-collar 
men, despite the invitation these images give to thinking about a spectrum of gender 
meanings, and despite anxieties about the possible gender inflections of this version of the 
image, the main standard they convey is persistently heteronormative. Furthermore, though 
white-collar men’s desirability includes their reputation for relative probity and 
fairmindedness, and even as we shall see in chapter six, equal treatment of women, their 
gendered positioning in heteronormative discourse necessarily sustains their ‘naturalised’ 
advantage over women.  
 Media articles and advertising converge in publicising the desirability of white-collar 
masculinities. Indeed, it could be argued that white-collar status epitomises the goals to which 
young men who seek public and sexual success should strive; the white-collar man has 
replaced the hero of the Daqing oilfields as the number one role model favoured by the state 
and economy. The rewards of white-collar masculinities confirm the legitimacy and benefits 
of the consumerist dynamic encouraged by the market; and they are won through bringing the 
body to discourse in a dedicated habituation process, participation in which requires 
knowledge and money, as does purchasing the big-ticket consumer items that demonstrate 
white-collar status. In this, this chapter also validates a particular social (and even ethical) 
orientation, by indicating the approval given to those who put effort into maximising 
individual competitiveness and working hard to accumulate economic and cultural capital.  
 Finally, insofar as the informants whose stories appear in this chapter are concerned, this 
chapter also shows how the discursive power of these images and articles enter into the bodies 
of young men to become part of a process of habituation. ‘Body work’ is at the heart of white-
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collar success and the acquisition of white-collar masculinities; this is not just a linguistic 
discourse, something out there and detached from individuals’ subjectivities, but precisely 
because it is propelled by desire to ‘become’ through consumption, it also becomes a 
habituated part of bodily and gendered material processes, constructed through assemblages of 
discursive and non-discursive elements. As my ethnographic data shows, these assemblages 
involve a ceaseless interplay between bodies, objects, settings and discourses across global 
and local notions and the subjectivities they produce. My analysis of the interplay between 
lived subject and discourse further shows how hegemonic forces are at work in the internalised 
processes of habituation. The following chapter continues with these themes, and examines the 
effect of these forces on one of the key sites of the production and display of white-collar 
masculinities: the workplace.  
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Chapter Four 
Learning the ropes: from school to work 
 
 
 
A specific kind of workplace is a key setting for the production, display and definition of what 
could be called ‘corporate’ white-collar masculinities. In daily life, of course, there are no 
fixed boundaries between the performance of ‘consumer’ subjectivities, as described in the 
previous chapter, and ‘corporate’ masculinities, or indeed masculinities enacted in leisure 
(chapter five) and domestic (chapter six) settings. Nevertheless, it is important to look at the 
specificity of place within the assemblages of elements which produce subjectivities. My 
ethnographic data, in this chapter largely from a private school I worked in, demonstrates that 
the settings or spatialised sites of masculine performances – in their interrelations with 
discourses, bodies, objects and practices – influence the formation of white-collar 
masculinities in distinctive ways. Discursive regimes of the new, knowledgeable, skilled, 
literate and numerate white-collar subject also play a significant role in shaping corporate 
masculinities. Self-help guides, famous role models and salutary articles are particularly 
important for this first generation of white-collar men in China. Following my ethnographic 
account of corporate masculinities in the private school, I turn to examine the interaction of 
these discursive regimes with the lives of my informants and other white-collar men I 
observed in Beijing. 
 The anthropologist Xin Liu describes the significance of setting in his ethnography of a 
high-tech company in southern China, in the aptly titled chapter ‘A Theater of Desires’:      
The real sense of a setting means the physical environment in which a character is 
situated – that is, an environment or a place to work. In contrast, the metaphorical 
sense of a setting indicates a site of desire and imagination essential to the functioning 
of a character being told in the story. In this latter sense, it is not simply an office or a 
massage parlor where one works; instead, it suggests the location of an image that 
partially defines the content of this image as a character. This metaphorical sense of a 
setting means a background, an immediate background, from which the character 
stands out.245  
 
Xin Liu is right to emphasise the importance of setting. However, the concept of assemblage 
as I use it pushes beyond his idea of setting as metaphor to an understanding of how corporeal 
                                                 
245 Xin Liu, The Otherness of Self: A Genealogy of the Self in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press, 2002), 51. 
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materiality is moulded through situatedness in particular spaces and places. Space, in this 
sense, is not just a metaphorical background, as Liu suggests, but is a social, cultural, 
economic, and political configuration.246 
 Modern offices in gleaming tower blocks and other purpose-built developments form the 
physical and spatial environment of white-collar men at work. Following Liu’s formulation, 
they are theatres where white-collar men play out their desires, and, through the concept of 
assemblage, the spaces within which the subjectivities of white-collar men (and women) take 
form. Liu also emphasises the importance of place, space and background in constructing the 
‘plot’ of one’s research topic:  ‘The most elementary form of plot – that is, articulating events 
and persons into a narrative whole – is placing a character in his or her immediate background 
and then situating this background in the larger picture of society.’247 But Liu’s formulation 
here is rather static; it does not capture the dynamic, fluid, contested relationships formed in 
space and constitutive of space, which the concept of assemblage allows for. In this chapter, 
my accounts of the practices of white-collar men in a private school, and a thorough analysis 
of concepts in popular business literature and how I observed them playing out in daily life, 
paint a very specific picture of a ‘corporate’ masculinity in China formed in the crucible of 
specific working environments. This chapter therefore argues that space and place are 
indispensable components of the assemblages of white-collar masculinities. 
 To understand white-collar men in these terms thus entails examining them in the office, 
a spatial and social site of meaning that occupies a central place in  the assemblages producing 
white-collar practices. In what ways, this chapter seeks to examine, are white-collar men 
connected with devices, utensils, and buildings of their work places? With what practices, 
routines, habits and vocabularies do they negotiate the world of work, and what do these 
suggest for the formation of masculine subjectivities in the workplace? As we shall see, the 
white-collar masculinity of the workplace is a non-unitary composite, constructed through the 
taking up of different subject positions available in discourses and practices of ‘global’ and 
‘local’ business methods and ‘relationship building’ for business purposes. 
 This chapter first examines white-collar masculinities in a private language school, 
contrasting the sophisticated appearance of a large successful international firm operating in a 
very modern and global environment with the everyday realities of the effects of global 
capitalism mixing with locally embedded cultural practices. It goes on to discuss the 
intersection between these and the typical and superficial discursive renderings of ‘bodily and 
                                                 
246 As Doreen Massey argues, for instance, in For Space (London: Sage, 2005). 
247 Liu, ibid., 51. 
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intellectual techniques’248 which form the white-collar subject in the business press, which 
skirt over local realities concerning, for example the building of guanxi (relationship) 
networks of colleagues and customers.249 It then turns to a particularly prominent theme in 
business media articles of the ‘open-minded’ values associated with the successful 
businessmen of today, which leading business figures urge white-collar men to espouse to 
overcome persistent local tendencies towards what are depicted as rigid, selfish, and 
fundamentally limiting practices. Finally, it takes a closer look at two key aspects of key 
‘intellectual techniques’ in white-collar men’s lives frequently flagged up in media 
discussions: their English language abilities and personal financial management skills. In sum, 
through an examination of the formation of corporate masculinities in the particular spaces 
and spatialised discourses of the private school where I worked and discursive intellectual and 
bodily techniques, with this chapter argues that the most prominent models of successful 
corporate male masculinities in China are of young ambitious men who at the start of their 
careers develop the ability to negotiate the complex intermingling of global and local 
prescriptions and practices in the particular spaces of their professional lives. 
  
Johnson’s Language School 
For nine months over 2004-5, I worked part-time as a children’s English teacher at the Beijing 
branch of Johnson’s Language School, a large Taiwanese-owned chain with fifty schools in 
China run on corporate, profit-making principles.250 This work allowed me to witness first-
hand the production and performance of white-collar masculinities at work. During the first 
month, I taught the Johnson’s curriculum to children from well-off backgrounds at a state 
kindergarten in western Beijing in a huge exclusive development of towering residential 
blocks bordered on one side by a five star hotel and on the other by what was the largest 
shopping centre in the world at the time, nicknamed the Great Mall of China. However, the 
school wanted to renegotiate the rate it paid Johnson’s, and the relationship broke down, so I 
was sent to a state primary school in west Beijing, where I continued to teach the Johnson’s 
                                                 
248 Bodily and intellectual techniques are two main modes of subjectification, according to Nikolas Rose, and I 
examine them in more detail below. Rose, op. cit., 30-2. 
249 The construction of guanxi networks is posited on the reciprocation of favours, and is a wide-ranging social 
practice with multiple forms performed across many sites. See Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, Gifts, Favors, and 
Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994); and 
Yunxiang Yan, The Flow of Gifts: Reciprocity and Social Networks in a Chinese Village, (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1996). 
250 Johnson’s was established in Taiwan in the 1980s, and by 2009 had 500 branches, with over 20 of them in 
China. They claim to be the ‘biggest international education group in China’. Fees for children’s education for a 
two-month term of two hours a day are around five to six thousand yuan.      
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curriculum to seven and eight-year-olds for several months. I was then asked to start teaching 
two and three year-olds in the newly opened Beijing branch of Johnson’s, housed in a smart 
three-storey building in a very affluent residential development in a modern, model suburb of 
northeast Beijing, that was noticeably popular with expatriate Korean professionals.  
When Johnson’s first hired me, soon after I first arrived in Beijing, they were in the 
process of establishing their first branch in Beijing. Their China headquarters were in 
Shanghai, where they had found it easier to obtain official permission to set up their business. 
According to Johnson’s head of English, Beijing was renowned as a difficult place to obtain 
permission to open language schools, a complaint I heard from other people in the educational 
business. To accomplish the tricky and important task of opening the Beijing branch, the board 
of directors in Shanghai selected the manager of the thriving Dalian branch, a tall, bullish, 
Taiwanese man in his mid-thirties, called Knight, and known by this name to the staff. Knight 
dressed smartly, always in a suit, and had a gruff, overbearing manner. He brought over many 
staff with him from Dalian, including marketing people, teachers and administrators. His team 
operated from temporary offices for several months while a suitable site for the new school 
was found. To attract the affluent white-collar parents who formed the core of its target 
customers, the site and the school in general, had to encapsulate typical white-collar values. 
For the school to succeed, the combination of building, location, interior decoration, 
curriculum, staff, and atmosphere – the ‘assembled locale’ – had to convince middle-class 
parents that an expensive education at Johnson’s would equip their child with the skills 
necessary to succeed in the global economy. Eventually, Knight and his team located an 
optimum site in a leafy new suburban development in east Beijing near the airport 
expressway.  
The east side of Beijing has seen many new expensive condominium developments in 
recent years between the Central Business District (CBD) and the airport, placing the school 
within easy reach of a large number of affluent couples working for large local and 
transnational companies. The particular suburb that Knight had chosen boasted a mix of gated 
condominium developments, giant malls and glitzy office buildings, hosting many 
transnational corporations including the Chinese headquarters of Siemens and an enormous 
Ikea. As it was a planned showpiece suburb, it was more ordered and cleaner than most other 
parts of Beijing, which was another incentive for local and foreign white-collar workers to live 
in the area. Close by this suburb was another area of streets of very expensive ‘villas’ (bieshu), 
owned by the wealthiest of white-collar executives and other ‘super-rich’ elements of the new 
economy. It made commercial sense for Johnson’s to set up here: the young aspiring white-
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collar couples who populated the area were looking for schools just like Johnson’s for their 
privileged offspring.  
The school occupied the entire top floor of a brand-new three-storey building in the 
centre of a very affluent and sizeable gated residential ‘community’ (shequ), and overlooked 
the community’s private lake and landscaped gardens. Private security officials prevented 
anyone without a valid reason from entering. There was a significant Korean population in the 
estate, and a sprinkling of Korean shops within the community provided them with Korean 
products. On the ground floor of the building was an upmarket gym, part of a well-known 
chain frequented by office workers, a Korean grocery store, and a Western-style café-cum-
bakery. A restaurant was due to open on the first floor after I left. Upon arrival at the building 
a security guard doubling as doorman would open the door for visitors, revealing an 
impressive foyer, with a sweeping staircase leading up to the first floor, making the experience 
more akin to arriving at a hotel. Elevators whisked guests up to the school. Xin Liu recounts a 
similar experience in Beihai on entering the Star Group headquarters: ‘this was a huge hall 
that looked more like a hotel entrance than the headquarters of a company.’251 He elaborates: 
All the offices were located on the eighth floor. Outside the elevator was another huge 
reception area that looked very much like those in Hollywood movies: spacious, clean, 
and extremely well organized. A computer sat on a receptionist’s desk, behind which 
sat two girls who looked like they were just out of high school and who had joined the 
company because someone had recommended them to [the company owner] Panton, as 
I later learned.252  
 
These words could equally describe the experience of a visitor to Johnson’s stepping 
out of the elevator onto the third floor to face two young girls behind a computer at a gleaming 
reception desk. Amidst this kind of modern office interior, Liu could find no sense of the 
history of the company: 
Everything was brand-new and compelled visitors to feel this brand-newness, which 
left no trace of anything preceding it. While standing in the middle of these offices, I 
could not sense anything that might help me trace a past of any sort indicating what the 
company would have been like before these arrangements were made. I also could not 
tell what sort of future this newness indicated. This feeling of being there, in the space 
of a business world, left a strong impression that nothing temporal existed except the 
presence of a present order of things.253 
 
                                                 
251 Liu, ibid., 53. 
252 Liu, ibid., 53. 
253 Liu, ibid., 53-4. 
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I had the same sense that Johnson’s existed in a timeless present, but more importantly, I 
found no sense of the educational: this space resembled a successful business environment 
rather than a school for children. The piped music in the reception area played the same pop 
songs on a loop, over and over again, every day I worked there. The big bright classrooms 
were mopped constantly; in the large library of children’s books not one book was out of 
place; and the educational games and toys in the playroom were neatly ordered on shelves. 
Every day the air echoed with the same Johnson’s curriculum, which was adhered to rigidly at 
every Johnson’s branch, McDonald’s style. Old children moved up a level; new children were 
recruited; the corporate machine kept turning, producing not just ‘educated’ children, but also 
shaping the subjectivities of those who worked there. 
As well as displaying white-collar masculinities at work in a white-collar office 
environment, Johnson’s offered the spectacle of a proto-white-collar training ground. Its 
young students, in the kindergarten during the day and primary-level classes in the evening 
and at weekends, were at the start of their journey to the successful professional careers their 
parents – a mix of white-collar workers, entrepreneurs and officials – desired for them. The 
skills Johnson’s offered fitted these white-collar dreams: English language ability and 
knowledge about Western culture, taught by authentic Westerners, and a training of the body 
in global middle-class personal conduct, such as habituating the students to certain practices of 
hygiene and eating. Put at its most plainly, Johnson’s sold the dream that its students would 
learn how to fit smoothly into a global middle class dominated by Western cultural ideas and 
practices. 
The school made a strong effort to promote its global credentials. The head of the 
English section was Jerry, a native-English speaking white, male, ex-primary school teacher. 
Jerry’s role was to manage the Western teachers and to present a white face when prospective 
customers came to visit as proof of the school’s commitment to inculcating an authentic 
Western-ness. In its promotional materials, the school stressed that native English-speakers 
taught every class in English, suggesting not only would the English they were taught be first–
rate, but additionally that beyond language, the students would pick up the Western body 
language of the teachers through a process of a habituation. The school promised frequent 
educational trips, and one excursion was to an ‘Italian farm’ on the outskirts of Beijing, where 
the pre-school children were led round animal enclosures before sitting down in front of a 
plate of spaghetti Bolognese, which we teachers demonstrated how to eat. Some parents were 
on the trip; they were very serious about making sure their children practised eating the 
spaghetti with fork and spoon. This was an example of the kind of globally-inflected cultural 
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capital the parents wanted their children to accumulate.   
In promoting the global vision of the school, the sales and marketing strategy treated 
the parents as consumers. One insight into this process came from participating in a 
demonstration class at the west Beijing primary school where I taught the Johnson’s 
curriculum twice a week. The purpose of the demonstration class was to encourage more 
parents to sign up for Johnson’s classes. Some of the marketing staff, mostly men, and a male 
technical support staff member were present, as were many female teachers. Jerry, the head of 
English, and I provided the foreign presence. The marketing staff stood around, looking smart 
in blazers, but the local teachers, who put on a fine demonstration, were doing the hard selling 
with energy and enthusiasm. The marketing staff had negotiated this sales opportunity at the 
school in the first place, but the onus was clearly on the teachers that day. The school’s focus 
on providing high levels of ‘consumer service’ made the local teachers sales people as well as 
educators. Who better to assure apprehensive parents that their child’s education in the 
Johnson’s curriculum would be a worthwhile investment than the very people who would 
deliver that curriculum in the classroom? The demonstration class and sales chat were all 
designed to sell the Johnson’s brand. Little gifts bearing the Johnson’s logo were given to 
prospective students; glossy handouts promised English fluency quickly and easily, and the 
room was festooned with the Johnson’s name and logo. Multimedia equipment delivered 
cartoons and educational games to excited children. The chairs were Johnson’s chairs. 
Johnson’s had even laid a new floor in the classroom, and installed air-conditioning. There 
was an air of excitement. Johnson’s were selling a dream for the future, that a child’s path to 
career success could be guaranteed through signing up with Johnson’s, with the implicit 
message that those children not enrolled would fall behind their classmates. Was that a risk 
parents were prepared to take?  
In Beihai, Xin Liu noticed some literal cracks beneath the veneer. Although the offices 
of the Star Group looked splendid, there were actually many problems with the quality of the 
building: the roof leaked, the air-conditioning was badly fitted, the doors did not shut properly 
and the locks were askew.254 Liu surmises that what signifies ‘the power of the laoban [boss] 
is not the perfection of details but the glamour and splendidness of his work space. It does not 
really matter whether there are leaks; what is most important as a symbol of power and wealth 
is the marble, the Italian leather, the master desk – the content of what he owns.’255 After 
working some time at Johnson’s, I realised that the appearance of Johnson’s as a slick 
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globally-oriented company run professionally by sophisticated white-collar men (and a few 
women) instilling proto-white-collar values in its young customers, belied a reality of bad 
planning, flawed implication and decidedly unprofessional and discriminatory gender 
practices, as I discuss below. 
Although the Johnson’s building seemed to be holding together (it was early days) its 
spatial politics were telling: there were no toilets for staff in the school, only for the children; 
staff had to use the toilets on the first floor, soon to be occupied by the restaurant. The 
teachers’ staff room, out of sight of parents, was overcrowded and had only two computers, 
neither connected to the Internet. Knight’s large and imposing office opened on one side of the 
corridor opposite the staff room; an internal window ran the length of the staff room wall, 
giving Knight a sweeping view of the staff room from his office. The head of English, the 
head of Chinese and the accounts staff were squeezed into small, shared rooms next to 
Knight’s office, but the marketing staff had their own spacious suite of rooms off-site in 
nearby premises, containing several computers connected to the Internet, underlining their 
high status. I realised that the reason the library and playroom were so neat and tidy was 
because they were never used: they were not part of the curriculum. They existed purely for 
show, as inducements for potential customers. There was no provision in the curriculum for 
reading stories to the children. Jerry, the head of English, admitted to me that he despaired of 
the centrally-controlled teaching material, which he accused of emphasizing words associated 
with Western culture, such as ‘hamburger’, ‘knife’ and ‘fork’, at the cost of teaching basic 
sentence-building skills. Education, it turned out, was the last of Johnson’s priorities. 
 Men were at the top of the pyramid in terms of ownership and management, and men 
carried out the technical work, whereas women carried out the teaching and administrative 
tasks, with the youngest women, known as ‘babysitters’, holding the lowest status, apart from 
the elderly female cleaners.256 Although the management encouraged the idea that teachers, 
marketing, administration and technical staff were all of equivalent status, the marketing 
personnel, both men and women, were marked out by the blazers they wore which gave them 
a business-like air the others did not have, and seemed to symbolize their authority to talk 
about the school to potential customers. If the marketing staff were privileged in the hierarchy, 
then it was the young Chinese women teachers who were firmly at the bottom. This group of 
young women was further subdivided into ‘babysitters’ and ‘teachers’: the babysitters mostly 
                                                 
256 This hierarchy reflects a national picture in which only a tiny number of women rise to top positions, and on 
average, women earn 18% less than men. Kathleen M. Moktan and Ramesh Subramaniam, Women in the 
People's Republic of China: Country Briefing Paper (Manila: Asian Development Bank, December 1998), 13 
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attended to the most menial of tasks with the children – feeding them, supervising their play 
and nap periods – although the teachers also had some responsibilities in these areas. The 
Chinese teachers were not treated well. They were paid less than 2000 yuan a month (in 
comparison with a foreign teacher who could make that amount with about 12 hours’ work),257 
were expected to work long hours (sometimes they spent 12 hours a day at the school) and to 
make themselves available at the beck and call of the Chinese principal and school 
management. The Chinese principal in particular demonstrated her authority by frequently 
docking money from their salaries, 10 yuan here, 20 yuan there, for minor lapses. This 
constant low-level oppression by the Chinese principal was far outdone by Knight’s 
occasional but intense outbursts directed at the female administration staff, especially the head 
of accounts. On one memorable occasion he shouted and screamed at her in the corridor, 
clearly visible and audible from the staff room. The head of accounts took it stoically but 
everyone was visibly shaken by this unseemly display of rage.   
Knight’s treatment of his staff as underlings who owed him for their livelihood, 
resonates with Xin Liu’s transcription of a conversation he heard between two managers about 
their relationship with their ‘boss’ (laoban) in Beihai: 
Once, at the dinner table, two managers were chatting with each other while I was 
present. One said to the other, ‘I don’t particularly like this term of address, laoban, 
which does not sound good to my ears.’ 
 ‘Because you just came out of school, and you are not used to the real world,’ 
the other said. 
 ‘What is this? To call someone laoban sounds like he is the master and we are 
servants.’ 
‘You think you are not?! We are servants. What do you think you are? Your 
salary is paid by the laoban – not by anyone else. Don’t be naïve in thinking that you 
are not a servant. The sooner you realize this, the better for you.’258 
 
To the casual observer, Knight was running the branch along clearly defined modern 
business lines, with typical white-collar codes and standards in place, but observed from the 
inside it functioned more a like a mini-fiefdom. Although Knight was the general manager of 
the Beijing branch, rather than the outright boss of the company, he was the de facto boss in 
Beijing since the Taiwanese directors were based in Shanghai. He used his position to 
maintain a network of patronage which undermined job titles and responsibilities. Amongst 
                                                 
257 A recent report by the Chinese Academy of Social Science argues that white-collar status in Beijing requires 
a salary of at least 5000 yuan per month: Xie Chuanjiao, ‘Salary Size Set for White-Collar Jobs’, 
ChinaDaily.com.cn, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-11/05/content_6229638.htm (accessed November 
18, 2008).    
258 Xin Liu, op. cit., 43. 
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the team he had brought over from Dalian were two or three men in marketing and IT with 
whom he had a particularly close relationship; they would often go out socializing together. 
Jerry, the head of English, confided in me he thought that Knight treated these men 
preferentially, discussing and setting strategies with them, while simultaneously treating many 
of the women badly and keeping them out of the inner loop. Knight was a bully, and thought 
he was untouchable, but he was going too far in his denigration and exclusion of the female 
staff, and eventually the directors in Shanghai removed him, ostensibly for unsatisfactory 
enrolment figures, but it was widely rumoured that it was because of his persistent 
maltreatment of the female staff. Significantly, the new manager was a woman, with excellent 
people skills, brought up from Shanghai. Many of the female staff were delighted, but 
Knight’s inner court of male staff were visibly furious at what they saw as the great injustice 
of his removal. They resigned, despite the difficulties they knew they would have in finding 
equivalent employment in the highly competitive job market. Their loyalty to Knight 
superseded the financial concerns they had about the consequences of resigning.259  
Knight and his inner circle of ‘henchmen’ enacted different ‘subject positions’ in their 
performative practice as working white-collar men in China. On the one hand, they took up 
the appearance, mannerisms and vocabularies of the slick, smart, market-oriented, ‘global’ 
white-collar man I discussed in chapter two; they are, in some respects, the bright, young, 
tolerant, squeaky-clean products of an educated vanguard, bringing China ‘into line’ with 
glossy models of respectable and respected corporate masculinities. On the other hand, they 
simultaneously took up what could be called ‘guanxi’ (relationship) or ‘gemenr’ (best mates) 
masculinity, most apparent (usually but not necessarily) when men come together as friends 
and for mutual self-interest, often to create networks of privilege which  frequently exclude 
women and less powerful men.260 In the case of Knight and his supporters, this was a ring of 
                                                 
259 I subsequently discovered that Knight had been sacked not for his maltreatment of female staff, but because 
he had demanded huge investment from the owners, citing particular difficulties in setting up in Beijing, but had 
failed to make any profit. Eventually deciding to cut their losses, the owners shut the school, and according to one 
of my informants who used to work there, they took Knight to court and accused him of embezzlement, but he 
claimed that any apparent irregularities were due to the sloppiness of the accountant (whom I remember him 
shouting at very loudly - to intimidate her?). Knight counter-sued for salary not paid, and won! Meanwhile, my 
informant tells me, he has bought two expensive apartments on the fashionable east side, and set up his own 
business, with some of his guanxi circle from Johnsons. He is a horrible person, added my (female) informant. 
The remarkable denouement to this venture bears out my original analysis: it exposed the weak foundations upon 
which the school precariously operated behind the surface glitz, with total power placed in the hand of Knight 
(see below for a critique of this ‘characteristic’ of Chinese businesses), and the importance of Knight’s guanxi 
network of henchmen, who perhaps felt they had no choice but to leave when their patron was dismissed (were 
they complicit in the alleged embezzlement?), but who were rewarded with posts in his new business; perhaps all 
along they knew that Knight would ‘see them right’.   
260 In detailed ethnographic research, Susan Greenhalgh has shown how men in Chinese firms work together to 
reproduce ‘structures of domination’ over women employees. It is this to which I am referring as workplace 
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guanxi masculinity within a company, but networks of guanxi masculinity can take different 
forms in the business world, such as those between seller and customer as we shall see in the 
following chapter, or between entrepreneurs and officials, as Everett Zhang documented, 
through what are termed goudui practices.261 These conflicting masculinities were played out 
in the contested space of the school, which in its very architecture and spatial arrangements 
reflected and produced the global/local interminglings enacted in its gendered effects. The 
assemblage of relations between setting, objects, bodies, spatial practices and routines, 
together with wider social, economic and political contexts of, among other factors, growing 
gender inequalities and the state’s apparent indifference to them, constituted specific 
conditions for the emergence of these fractured and discriminatory masculine subjectivities as 
part of the natural order of things in the school.  
In the rest of this chapter, I investigate the main bodily, sartorial and intellectual 
techniques in discursive regimes which ‘discipline’ the masculine corporate subject, such as 
those who have been the focus of this workplace ethnography. 
 
Bodily and intellectual techniques of corporate masculinity 
In this section, I argue that corporate masculinity, such as I have just examined above, 
constituted and performed in certain workplaces, involves a particular kind of masculine 
subject who is subjected to various discursive bodily and intellectual techniques through, for 
instance, the mainstream media, educational books and university courses. The discursive 
attention to guides to white-collar behaviour is not surprising in an environment where the 
white-collar man is a very new phenomenon, and many young men aspiring to white-collar 
status have not had the opportunity to observe older family members and friends who have 
already reached it. The explosion in publishing in China in recent years has included books on 
business, of which bookshops have rows upon rows, many glossy magazine titles available 
from ubiquitous newsstands and a proliferation of websites. Their immediate audience is 
businessmen themselves, and young business students, including Henry, the computer 
software expert I introduced in chapter three, who told me in a discussion about books that he 
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enjoyed reading the latest books on business management theories. At the schools catering to 
white-collar workers and university students where I taught, the magazine racks in the 
reception areas had well-thumbed copies of business magazines, amongst others on real estate, 
and fashion and consumption for young urbanites.  At a time in China when many people 
entering the business world do not come from professional or business families, these media 
articles play a significant role in shaping ideas about corporate masculinities, including 
routines of office life, ways of dressing, expectations and values. Some of the realities of 
everyday white-collar masculinities, such as the gendered networks of patronage discussed 
above in relation to Johnson’s, are not prominent in these depictions of white-collar men, 
which tend to offer selective accounts of the characteristics, consumer activities and pressures 
that conform to and uphold the ‘global’ status of the corporate image. They thus emphasize the 
subject-position of the young white-collar man at the start of his career, who through intense 
competition obtains a job in a sought-after company, and begins his time-pressed and 
disciplined corporate life wearing the ‘corporate uniform’ of smart suit, tie and expensive 
watch.  
Nikolas Rose has pointed out that bodily and intellectual techniques are key modes of 
disciplining subjects.262 In terms of propagating certain bodily techniques, detailed guidance 
on types of clothing, for white-collar men especially suits, and ways of talking and moving, 
are aimed at inculcating bodily routines to the extent they become part of a polished, ‘natural’ 
performance. In this section, I first look at how the media invention of the ‘Jianguomen man’, 
which renders the white-collar subject visible amongst the skyscrapers of Beijing’s business 
district, sets out a particular guide on white-collar on suit-wearing. Intellectual techniques, for 
their part, involve learning skills of  ‘reading, memory, writing, numeracy’, which, in subjects, 
‘establish a prudent relation to the future, to budgeting, to trade, to politics, and to life-conduct 
in general’.263 Combined with bodily techniques, they form a tool for the fashioning of 
respectable and responsible white-collar subjectivities. After discussing the spatial constitution 
and the suit-wearing habits of the Jianguomen man, I move onto a focus on the discursive 
circulation of intellectual techniques, starting with a living model of white-collar success, Li 
Kaifu, headhunted by Google from Microsoft to lead its China operations, and who has written 
a bestseller on the type of business values he believes make for success in China. Using 
ethnographic material, I relate his points to practices of corporate masculinity. Following this, 
I pinpoint the kinds of literacy and numeracy standards that are set, through discourse, as 
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requirements for the kind of white-collar subjectivity that the modernization narrative requires, 
with reference to how they play out in the practices, thoughts and feelings of my informants. 
 
Jianguomen man 
An article in the magazine Business Watch (Shangwu zhoukan) discusses ‘Jianguomen man’, 
which sets out a comprehensive assemblage of elements and locales which together form a 
composite ‘model’ of Beijing white-collar men.264 Although several suburbs in Beijing host 
white-collar enterprises, the white-collar business heart of the capital is the Central Business 
District with its myriad dazzling skyscrapers running east of Jianguomen, hence one 
 
Figure 7 Jianguomen man. Feng Hua, op. cit., 68. 
 
                                                 
264 Business Watch is ‘China’s most outstanding news-style business media (publication)’ (Zhongguo zui jiechu 
de xinwenxing shangwu meiti); it has a cover price of 10 yuan, a circulation of 186,000, and also sells in Hong 
Kong. See Shangwu Zhoukan (Business Watch Magazine), Liulanwang (gotoread.com), 
http://www.gotoread.com/mag/5667/ (accessed August 13, 2008). 
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journalist’s moniker of ‘Jianguomen man’ as Beijing’s archetypal white-collar man.265 First, 
he is a ‘standard white-collar worker for a foreign enterprise’ (biaozhunde waiqi bailing 
jieceng). He also ‘knows how to play’ (hui wan), how to ‘enjoy life’ (xiangshou shenghuo) 
and leads a ‘happy yuppie life’ (yapi de xingfu shenghuo). Third, he is identifiable through his 
association with global business space and investment. He works in ‘Jianguomen’s upmarket 
office blocks (gaodang xiezilou), which ‘host the China area headquarters of globally 
renowned companies (shijie zhiming qiye)’. Finally, his daily routine, clothing and accessories 
all label him as white-collar: ‘every morning thousands of the white-collar elite (bailing 
jingyingmen) in immaculate suits (xizhuang biting) clutching laptops and briefcases (xiedaizhe 
bijiben huo jiazhe gongwenbao) hurriedly pour into the area from all over Beijing’.266  
As an example of the intense competition and daily demands made on a typical young 
Chinese white-collar man at the start of his working life, the article relates the story of ‘a 
research student from a famous Beijing institute’ called Jiefu (perhaps a transliteration of the 
English name Jeff), who competed with 20,000 people in five rounds of exams before winning 
a position in a Jianguomen firm.267 Right from the start, it was a lesson in discipline, from the 
Western-style office dress code to the security arrangements: ‘On the first day of work, Jiefu 
was informed he had to wear formal clothes (zhengzhuang from Monday to Thursday, a suit 
(xifu), tie (lingdai), leather shoes (pixie), and ‘Badge’ [the English word is used in the article], 
a staff ID to get into the office, all of which were essential.’268 Furthermore, on his first day, 
he also ‘received his first ‘list’ [English word used] from the human resources department’, 
which detailed his many tasks very clearly.269 The article outlines ‘a fairly typical working day 
for Jeff’ (Jiefu bijiao you daibiaoxing de yige gongzuori): ‘He sets out from Jianguomen at 9 
a.m., reaching Tianjin after 11 a.m. At midday he takes some clients out to talk business over 
lunch, at 3 p.m. he has an appointment with the agent for the Tianjin area and at 4.30 p.m. 
drives back to Beijing. He arrives at his office at 6.30 p.m., and still has to write the day’s 
‘Notes’ [English word used] (work report) for his boss.’270 The article’s point is that the white-
collar man’s day is scheduled throughout: he is not master of his own time. The use of English 
words – badge, list, notes – reflects the language of global capital. 
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Jianguomen man, if he is rich enough, wears top quality bespoke suits from London. 
As I discussed in chapter three, suit wearing is a fundamental marker of the white-collar man. 
The marketing and sales personnel in Johnsons school were never seen in any other attire, and 
the level of attention Jianguomen man pays to his suits demonstrates their importance as 
markers of status, even within the white-collar world itself. The elite of the white-collar world 
demonstrate their position, knowledge and wealth (social, cultural and economic capital) 
through their choice of suit: ‘Suits are representative clothing (daibiaoxing de zhuozhuang) of 
the Jianguomen man: an exquisitely tailored old brand suit (jiancai jingmei de laopai 
xizhuang), from Savile Row, for example, is a favourite of Jianguomen’s high-level managers 
(gaoceng guanli renshi).’271 In choosing Savile Row, these men position themselves globally 
within a certain elite, in which a Savile Row suit is appreciated as a sign of good taste. Besides 
the brand label, Jianguomen man picks the colours of the suits to project a certain image of 
himself: ‘black and grey hues, in narrow stripes or extremely light checks, create a steady, 
calm and dignified image (yingzaochu wenzhong de xingxiang)’.’272  
Jianguomen man also displays his status through his choice of watch, which I 
identified in chapter three as a status marker of white-collar consumers. ‘A style of watch that 
symbolizes status and position (xiangzheng shenfen he diwei), like Rolex and Rado, makes it 
look like as if [he] has just come out of a directors’ meeting (kanqilai xiang gang cong 
dongshihui chulai).’273 In short, as the article suggests, ‘it is necessary to be meticulous about 
every detail (zongzhi meige xijie dou yisi-bugou)’, because this is what standard global 
capitalism demands. The white-collar elite derives great benefit from such selective detail, 
because, as the article argues, it imparts prestige and a sense of ‘authority’ (zhezhong 
chuanzhe daban zengjia gaoji bailing de quanweigan).274  White-collar men invest in this 
sartorial performance because it demonstratively positions them at the forefront of a 
modernization process which proclaims the sophisticated corporate look of expensive suit and 
associated accessories as markers of successful participation in a global executive class. 
Jianguomen man in this way is set up as a model to be , aspired and worked towards into 
individual subjectivities. Moreover, this kind of discussion about Jianguomen man presents a 
highly gendered perspective of corporate life. The regimented corporate office system, stark 
architecture and design, and suit as ‘uniform’ all code this entire lifestyle as strongly 
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masculine, semi-militarised, highly competitive, and with little room for emotional 
involvement or individual creativity. In sum, this article concentrates on linking the 
disciplinary body techniques with the sites, spaces and time-keeping regimes that form white-
collar masculinities. 
 
Business idols and business values between local and global 
As we have seen in the first sections to this chapter, as a young boy, the future white-collar 
man is inducted into the values of his future Jianguomen career through acquaintance with the 
cultural and bodily language of white-collar values through insertion into a particular space. 
The workplace shaping of ‘intellectual techniques’ can in many ways be seen as an extension 
of this. In his PhD thesis on Japanese white-collar men, Romit Dasgupta discusses the 
‘crafting’ of white-collar identity in the Japanese workplace through training sessions 
designed to inculcate sets of practices and values.275 Johnny, who worked for the transnational 
IT company, confirmed that he and his fellow employees underwent frequent training sessions 
for team-building and other such purposes.  Even before obtaining a corporate job, Chinese 
youth who wish to become white-collar workers, in the words of an article in the magazine 
Chinese Businessman (Zhongguo shangren), are ‘sculpting themselves’ (diaosu ziji) through 
guides to working in the white-collar world, such as Li Kaifu’s best-selling book, Be Your 
Personal Best (Zuo zui hao de ziji).276 The notion of sculpting has parallels with habituation: 
both are to do with shaping the body and intellect in certain ways, with an implied goal of 
ingraining a certain look or way of thinking. Besides being a ‘business idol of Chinese 
university students’ (Zhongguo daxuesheng de shangye ouxiang),277 Li is Google global vice-
chairman and director-general of the China area.278 Even more than being an idol, the article 
asserts, Li ‘has emerged with the status of someone bent on achieving his aspirations’ (yi 
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lizhizhe de shenfen chuxian), and ‘performs the role of a life teacher’ (banyan rensheng daoshi 
de juese).279 Li is famous for abandoning a high-profile job at Microsoft for Google (which led 
to legal action and eventually an out-of-court settlement), which the article reports ‘ignited a 
big discussion about professional values in China’ (zai guonei yinbaole yichang guanyu zhiye 
daode de da taolun).280  
 The equivalent of a poster boy for white-collar masculinity, Li meets the defining 
criteria of habituation to white-collar body culture that I discussed in chapter two: the display 
of both global and local attributes, professional aspiration, consumer capacity, and desirability.  
His successful habituation is demonstrated in the picture which accompanies the article: he is 
immaculately dressed in a suit, and looks relaxed sitting in a plush armchair at a window 
looking out towards very modern-looking office blocks. He manifests the successful 
performance of body techniques indispensable to white-collar identity, yet a significant part 
his success is due to his ability to clearly set out some of the key intellectual requirements that 
corporate life demands. His career record with Microsoft and Google is more than enough to 
prove his global credentials, and the business values he puts forward in his book, which I 
discuss below, show a strong attachment to Western business theory. At the same time, 
however, the high-level positions he has held in the Chinese business world show that he is 
adept at manoeuvring through its guanxi (relationship) based local business practices, in which 
‘the personalistic qualities of obligation, indebtedness, and reciprocity are just as important as 
transactions in material benefit.’281  Li’s image is suggestive of global corporate masculinity, 
yet his career trajectory demonstrates his mastery of guanxi masculinity: in this way, the 
gendered subject positions Li exemplifies draw from different models of masculinity as best 
suits his purposes in particular situations and particular times. My main point here, in terms of 
the circulation of intellectual techniques, is that Li’s image as a model of corporate 
masculinity is part of a discursive regime that shapes the subjectivities of young white-collar 
men, although, at the same time, the characteristics of Li’s masculinity do demonstrate the 
imbalance between global and local aspects of that model.   
 Li’s apparent aim in his book is to outline a set of values and attitudes, drawn from his 
own business experiences, as a guide for young people at the beginning of their own career 
path.282 Crucially this identifies a certain interpretation of individualism which conforms to the 
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moral ‘standards’ of official rhetoric, namely, the constitution of a particular individualized 
subject/subjectivity.283 Although this model of individualism is available to both men and 
women, for the purposes ofthe current discussion, it is of particular appeal to men, given that 
most students on business courses are male, as are most white-collar employees, and even 
more so in senior positions.  Li puts forward the concept six core ‘life attitudes’ (rensheng 
taidu) of ‘vigour’ (jiji), ‘empathy’ (tonglixin), ‘self-confidence’ (zixin), ‘introspection’ 
(zixing), ‘courage’ (yongqi), and ‘breadth of vision’ (xionghuai), and six ‘ modes of 
behaviour’ (xingwei fangshi) of ‘pursuing a vision’ (zhuixun lixiang), ‘discovering interests’ 
(faxian xingqu), ‘effective implementation’ (youxiao zhixing), ‘studying hard’ (nuli xuexi), 
‘interpersonal exchange’ (renji jiaoliu), and ‘cooperative communication’ (hezuo goutong). 
Such a model leads to success (tongxiang chenggong and can act as a reference (zuowei 
canzhao) for young students choosing their future path, as they sculpt themselves ‘to spur on 
society’s progress’ (tuidong shehui jinbu). Li's ideas are ‘very [centred on the] individual’ (hen 
gexing de): in the terminology of Western ethics, the author argues, they can be called ‘self-
centred’ (zisi).284 However, this ‘is not what Chinese people call  ‘selfish self-interest’ (bushi 
Zhongguoren suoshuo de zisi zili), but is rather ‘for the individual’s genuine interests and 
work’ (wei geti de zhenzheng xingqu er gongzuo), ‘within the permitted scope of law and 
morality’ (zai falü daode yunxu de fanwei nei), and ‘not for some specific enterprise’ (bushi 
weile mouge teding de qiye).285 This depiction of the white-collar worker as more concerned 
with genuine self-development rather than narrow self-enrichment fits the image described in 
chapter two, of the white-collar worker as honest and good for society, implicitly criticizing 
other groups (officials and entrepreneurs come to mind) as corrupt and self-serving.  At its 
heart, it concerns the ‘ideal’ constitution of the individual subject as a key player on the global 
stage, but one with ‘Chinese characteristics’ and frames his ‘life’s work’ as a process of 
working on himself, body and mind, to achieve happiness and self-fulfilment.   
  Li’s concept of self-centredness ‘approves of pluralism’ (zancheng duoyuanhua) 
because it recognizes that ‘different people possess different characteristics and interests’ 
(butong de ren juyou butong de texing he xihao), as well as different talent.286 ‘America is a 
typical society fostering success through pluralism’ (Meiguo shi yige dianxing de chongshang 
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duoyuanhua chenggong de shehui), whereas Chinese society has been deeply influenced by 
‘Confucian ethical values’ (rujia de lunli jiazhiguan). Consequently many ‘professional 
managers’ (zhiye jingliren) seek success through a ‘centralist’ approach (yiyuanhua) and 
‘compromising in the general interest’ (weiqu-qiuquan). Such tendencies, in the author’s view, 
easily push managers to extremes in their dealings with authority, either in adopting a 
confrontational approach with the boss’ (gen laoban duizhegan), which often ends with the 
manager being ‘swept out the door’ (saodi chumen) because the boss feels he is losing control; 
or, on the other hand, in’blindly obeying’ (mangmu shuncong) the boss, though this may result 
in the manager losing his ‘professional standing’ (zhiye lichang) and even his ‘independence 
of character’ (duli de renge).287 Whereas it could be argued that Knight fits the former 
category, and was eventually sacked, I saw the latter occur at another school where I taught in 
Zhongguancun. The Zhongguancun branch was the China headquarters of a chain with 
thirteen schools spread throughout the most developed cities of eastern China, aiming 
specifically at recruiting white-collar students. The school management structure ostensibly 
followed Western business practice (as had Johnson’s): it had sales, marketing, accounts, 
human resources and other such departments. It was autocratically and ruthlessly controlled by 
its founder. The middle managers referred everything up to him because they were so afraid of 
making a decision he disapproved of and suffering the consequences of an arbitrary and heavy 
‘fine’ or worse. It was a perfect example of extreme ‘centralism’ robbing the company of the 
benefits of managerial talent, and yet, on first impressions, it had the look and feel of a very 
slick, advanced, private centre of education run efficiently along the lines of pluralism that Li, 
for example, applauded. Like Johnson’s, the school recruited students through the display of 
stupendous facilities – they had a waterfall in the hotel size lobby, a grand piano, and an 
artificial ‘forest’ lounge area – and vigorous and slick marketing, promising young white-
collars a magical short-cut to fluent English in four months, and playing on their fears of 
losing out on career opportunities if they did not sign up. The teaching staff were unusually 
multiethnic, with white, black, and Chinese American teachers -, many of whom praised the 
owner for his unusual tolerance in an industry which often seemed to indicate an unstated 
‘whites only’ policy. However the owner of this school mixed a combination of what one 
might describe as a switched-on, sophisticated, open-minded white-collar director and a 
ruthless, intolerant, central decision-making boss/entrepreneur in his gendered performance. 
And his mastery of the cultivation of guanxi networks was demonstrated conclusively when he 
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secured a work visa, through his own channels, for one of the teachers whose application had 
been turned down with ‘no hope of success’. As for the ‘cracks in the veneer’, unsurprisingly, 
the English teaching standard and curriculum was chronically inadequate, and the building 
itself was flawed: none of the air-conditioning controls in each classroom worked, since the air 
conditioning system was centrally controlled.  
  This example can be thought of as an instance of the ‘business centralism’ that Li 
critiqued in the article I mention above. ‘One-sidedly (pianmian) seeking achievement or fame 
and fortune, and limiting the routes to success is the typical model of centralized success 
(dianxing de yiyuanhua chenggong moshi)’;288 moreover, he argued that such a blinkered 
approach was at the cost of well-being and personal happiness.  
The mistake of centralised success (yiyuanhua chenggong de wuqu) is to forget the goals 
and ideals that are genuinely part of oneself (zhenzheng shuyu ziji de mubiao he lixiang) 
because of anxiety for quick results and instant profits and short-sightedness (jigong-jinli 
he muguang-duandan)...even if in the end one obtained the longed-for fame and fortune, 
one would not necessarily experience real happiness and well-being (bu yiding neng 
tiyandao zhenzheng de kuaile he xingfu).289 
 
I am not sure if the owner of the Zhongguancun school was happy: he did not look a man at 
ease, and he frequently lost his temper and shouted at staff. Likewise, Knight, at Johnson’s, 
was often tense and bad-tempered. For the many white-collar men and women working under 
such bosses, the unpleasant consequences of such intense centralisation of power, such as loss 
of individual authority and the arbitrary whims of the boss’s mood swings, are simply part of 
everyday office life. 
Li contends that a ‘good manager’ (hao guanlizhe) should know the importance of 
‘managing oneself’ (ziwo guanli). He argues that: ‘in this constantly changing world, to 
discover who one is (faxian ziji shi shei), and to understand what one wants to become (liaojie 
ziji yao cheng shenme muyang), are the basis for establishing dignity (jianli zunyan de jichu); 
and managing oneself  […] is the basic technique for developing rational capability’ (guanli 
ziji…shi peiyang lixing liliang de jiben gong).290 This foregrounding of self-management is 
suggestive of the habituation processes – bodily and intellectual - individuals go through to 
bring themselves to their chosen goals. However, in writing his book, so Li’s reviewer 
suggests, Li does not hope that his readers ‘simply imitate the book’s proposals’ (jiandan 
zhaoban shuzhong de jianyi). A good book provides ‘principles to guide our future study of 
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working life (zhidao women weilai xuexi gongzuo shenghuo de yuanze), and some considered 
ways (sikao fangfa) of dealing with problems.’291 In this light, Li appears as the model 
example of a genuinely pluralistic approach to white-collar work and life.  
The foregoing discussion suggests that the white-collar identity that the Chinese 
business students seek to emulate is one that has already been localized. Li’s book has been a 
best seller, and his popularity amongst aspiring young Chinese is perhaps because he 
exemplifies the successful adoption and adaptation of American business practices for the 
Chinese market. The ‘white collar’ principles Li represents may be similar to those of his 
American counterparts, but they are being applied in a different environment; the values that 
Li outlines in his book may appear to come straight out of an American business textbook, but 
because their ‘effective implementation’ takes place in different cultural, social, political and 
legal contexts, the resulting white-collar behaviour also takes on a different ‘repatriated’ 
form.292 The white-collar man is representative of new forms of masculinity which involve 
picking up techniques promulgated through ‘global’, arguably hegemonic discursive 
formations, whileat the same time manifesting practices from ‘local’ formations, such as 
guanxi and ‘centralist’ management approaches. As the local globalises, the global also 
localizes to form historically and geographically specific forms of hegemonic masculinity.  
Butler’s theory of performativity is helpful in explaining how this can happen, through 
its denial of the pre-existence of internal masculinities, and its insistence that gender is a 
discursively-compelled performance. Johnson’s school or Li’s business training guide offer 
examples of how different masculinities maybe compelled in the same individual, to form 
what may appear, especially to an outside observer as a series of contradictory subject 
positions, none of which seem to sit easily together. The individual who performs them may 
have a sense of this, or he may live his various performances as just normal, conventional and 
unproblematic, both for himself and for others. For instance, Wen, the Beijinger who worked 
as sales manager for the European company whom I introduced in chapter three, had self-
confidence, breadth of vision and an avowed openness to pluralism, all of which sit well with 
Li’s principles. At the same time he often put his considerable charm and business intelligence 
to good effect in sustaining local practices, for example, when buying luxury brand-name gifts 
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for clients and arranging girls for them in karaoke bars and massage parlours.293 As his French 
bosses knew – and they had no difficulty in sanctioning Wen’s ‘local’ role – Wen, as a 
Chinese white-collar man, could move between the local and the global far better than they 
could; he was more adept than they at performing in this localised global/globalised local 
environment. Yet when Wen spent time in the West, he lamented the lack of sites such as 
saunas and foot massage centres, where he could be served by pretty young women. For him, 
this was why he could not live in the West, despite his liking for ‘Western’ values of 
(especially political) pluralism. His gendered subjectivity, then, was the result of an infolding 
of the techniques of several differing discourses.  Or Kevin, one of the marketing executives at 
Johnson’s, exhibited plenty of ‘vigour’, ‘introspection’ and ‘cooperative communication’ in 
chats with me, manifestly worked hard at his job, and clearly had a vision of himself as a 
professional marketing executive. Yet, he was a member of Knight’s inner circle at Johnson’s, 
protected by Knight’s patronage, to the extent that he resigned in anger when Knight was 
removed, perhaps also feeling exposed. The wider point is that the introduction of the kind of 
Western ideas that Li Kaifu represented and encouraged does not, indeed cannot, replace the 
diverse practices associated with success in social and cultural practices esteemed in the local 
context, but interacts with them to create new ‘hegemonic’ forms which simultaneously 
combine the global and local.  
 
The ‘literate self’: English language skills 
Academic and popular accounts which attempt to define white-collar characteristics often 
pinpoint relatively high levels of education and training, which I discuss in this section. 
Education and training concern the inculcation of intellectual techniques and frame the white-
collar subject as productive of a particular form of knowledge, inseparable from the discursive 
expectations of him as a global subject, adept at techniques of social exchange, 
communication skills and so on.  
One particular intellectual technique the white-collar employee is urged to acquire is a 
command of English language. Despite the inspiring example of Li Kaifu and others like him, 
China still ‘suffers from an acute shortage’ of ‘reasonably priced, skilled Chinese employees 
with a few years of industrial experience’, in part, according to Andrew Ross, because of the 
                                                 
293 In the same way that entrepreneurs butter up officials: see Zhang, op. cit., 235-265; and Yang, 2002, op. cit., 
466. I look at Wen’s leisure time activities with his clients in the next chapter. 
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difficulties involved in acquiring a good command of English.294 For their part, white-collar 
workers were keenly aware of the benefits to their career of speaking English. At the 
Zhongguancun school, most of the students were young white-collar workers and teenagers 
from middle-class families, seeking to boost their job opportunities through speaking better 
English. Aware of this, the school advertised on the street, in cinemas and in magazines with 
images of besuited white-collar men and women, and with text that pushed the message that 
improving one’s English would directly result in career advancement.  
With such discursive framing of English as an essential white-collar skill, most of my 
white-collar informants clearly focused on trying to improve their English. Indeed, their 
English language training became as much part of the process of habituation through which 
they acquired the attributes associated with the status and position they sought as any other. 
Speaking fluent English was a skill like any other for them, like choosing and wearing the 
right kind of suit. It was a talent to be displayed, which set them apart from other men and 
demonstrated global-level sophistication. The best English speaker of them was Jason, whom I 
introduced in chapter three, since he had spent many years in the West studying and working, 
although even he was worried about his English deteriorating and asked me to correct his 
mistakes. Johnny, working for a North American IT company, had to use English at work 
sometimes, and because he harboured a dream of emigrating abroad to work,  tried to practise 
his English at every opportunity, even renting out a room in his apartment to expatriate 
professionals for this reason. He also liked to watch CCTV 9, the state broadcaster’s English 
channel, and he spent whole evenings ‘chatting’ on instant messenger programmes with 
foreign friends. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, Colin shared an apartment with 
foreigners too, but Colin’s English was not as good as Johnny’s: Colin worked for a local firm 
with local clients, and the only chance he had to use English was in his free time, unlike 
Johnny. Wen, however, was not enthusiastic about learning English. His bosses wanted him to 
improve, and were paying for him (and one of his colleagues) to be taught by me. However, 
Wen was always trying to avoid formal lessons, which were supposed to take place in his 
office, by suggesting we go out for dinner or some other activity. Wen’s job involved selling 
                                                 
294 Ross’s main argument is that if China continues to train and educate its workforce with white-collar skills, 
then this shortage of skilled employees will disappear, their salaries will drop, and transnational companies will 
outsource more skilled jobs from the West to China. Ross defines the group of employees to which he refers as 
‘locals who speak adequate English, who are familiar with international business practices, and whose technical 
and managerial talents are sufficient to meet the demands of high-value occupations in foreign companies.’ 
Andrew Ross, ‘Outsourcing as a Way of Life? Knowledge Transfer in the Yangtze Delta’, in Working in China: 
Ethnographies of Labor and Workplace Transformation, ed. Ching Kwan Lee (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 190. 
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industrial electrical machinery to Chinese clients, so the only time he needed to use English 
was with his bosses. Wen, at forty, was also a little older than the others; he was already 
sixteen in 1980, so his childhood had not been suffused with Western pop culture. He had 
already established his status with his peers through his managerial position and property 
portfolio; he was good at his job, which required excellent local knowledge of what sort of 
‘gifts’ and wining and dining would enhance relations with clients, and he knew that 
foreigners could not perform this job and that it did not require English. However, his lack of 
English fluency evidently frustrated his bosses, and Wen had admitted that if he wanted to 
climb further up the career ladder, he needed to improve his English. But he was content doing 
his current job. With regard to Ross’s other criteria, familiarity with international business 
practices and managerial talent, Johnny and Wen were best positioned for the former and Wen 
had best demonstrated the latter, although that could be because of longer experience.295  
The critical need to attempt to gain fluency in English is just one example of an 
intellectual technique brought into daily life practices through assemblages of discursive and 
non-discursive elements, anddrilled into young white-collar workers from a variety of sources: 
bosses, parents and schools, self-development books and so on. However, of course 
individuals take up this quest to differing degrees, and the evidence from the lives of my 
informants shows how they ‘bought into’ this discourse to varying degrees. Wen’s superficial 
compliance with his boss’s request to improve his English masked a refusal to take it 
seriously. His strategies for avoiding formal lessons demonstrated that he felt it unnecessary to 
speak fluent English to be a ‘success’: he was doing very nicely already. And even Johnny, for 
all his desire to speak better English, had acquired a surface fluency which allowed him to ‘get 
by’ in his job – but it was enough for him to be living the kind of lifestyle that many could 
only dream of. In other words, individuals took up the globally hegemonic discursive 
                                                 
295 However, Wen might be facing competition for his job in the near future. According to a survey Ross cites, 
the education system may now be producing sufficient numbers of graduates for white-collar entry-level 
positions, so the shortage of experienced, suitably skilled professionals may diminish as these recent recruits 
climb the career ladder. The survey, by ‘global management consultancy Hewitt’, showed that average salaries 
for graduates of domestic and overseas universities peaked in 2002, after climbing steadily since the mid-nineties, 
indicating that supply matched demand in that year: Andrew Ross, op. cit., 192-3. There may even be an 
oversupply. Even a degree from a Western university is no longer a passport to career success, according to 
Mike, the assistant manger of the luxury goods store, who had two Masters degrees from Britain. He said that 
several years ago a degree from a Western university would guarantee an excellent white-collar job, but not 
anymore, since so many people have taken this route that it is no longer so prestigious. This issue has been given 
considerable coverage in the press in recent years, drawing attention to the difficulties graduates find in obtaining 
jobs commensurate with their educational level. See, for example, ‘Cong chu guo liuxue re dao gui guo jiuye 
nan’ (From study abroad fever to employment problems on return), Huanqiu zhiye jiaoyu zaixian (Global careers 
and education online), http://www.wy21cn.com/web_news/html/2008-7/2008714163748986.html (accessed 
November 20, 2008). 
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interpellations of the English-speaking corporate subject in different ways: complying, 
resisting, altering and ignoring them at various times and various places.  
Beyond fluency in English, for white-collar workers to gain an edge in the increasingly 
competitive job market requires disciplining in other intellectual techniques. White-collar men 
must participate in a particular kind of knowledge production, as sociologist Xu Rong points 
out: ‘For white-collar employees across all kinds of industry, mastering specialised knowledge 
has become the foundation of success (dui zhuanye zhishi de zhangwo yi chengwei lishen zhi 
ben).’296 Xu outlines two facets of this, keeping up with vital developments in their field and 
with general current affairs and financial news to help their career prospects and ‘personal 
wealth accumulation’ (geren de caifu jilei), and being able to ‘display their own rich 
knowledge and original opinions’ (zhanxian ziji fengfu de zhishi yu dudao de jianjie) in daily 
social exchange and communication on topical issues.297 Xu argues that ‘[b]oth of these are 
extremely important aspects of middle-class groups’ self-image creation (ziwo xingxiang 
suzao).’298 He attributes white-collar workers’ drive for knowledge to its indispensability in 
furthering their careers in a competitive environment: ‘The intensity of competition has 
exacerbated people’s work pressure (jingzheng de jilie jiajule renmen de gongzuo yali), and if 
they do not want to fall behind the times (bei shidai taotai) and want to continue to raise their 
quality of life (tigao zishen de shenghuo zhiliang), white-collar workers must ensure they 
understand what is happening around them and in the world.’299 Xu’s contribution to the list of 
‘must-have’ skills for corporate employees, therefore, is knowledge of global affairs and its 
intelligent deployment: the white-collar worker uses his specialised knowledge instrumentally 
to aid his desire to improve his job status and material enrichment.  
 The cultivation, display and application of knowledge and skills, such as English 
language fluency, are part of the disciplining effects of the intellectual techniques designed to 
produce white-collar subjects. Now I look at the construction of the ‘numerate self’ and its 
inculcation of prudent personal finance management. 
 
The ‘numerate self’: financial responsibilities  
Conversations with Johnny frequently led to the topic of his expenditure. He would often 
complain to me about how much money he was paying out on his mortgage, on furnishings, 
                                                 
296 Xu, op.cit., 283. 
297 Xu, ibid., 283-4. 
298 Xu, ibid., 284. 
299 Xu, ibid., 284-5. 
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on eating out, on building his business sideline, and proposed expenses on a car. He said he 
dare not stop working; indeed, it was these financial commitments, mostly to keep him in a 
style of living that he desired, that pushed him to put in long working hours, a topic I return to 
below. He told me it was all worth it, though, because it meant he had a pleasant place to 
return to every evening. Wen, too, often mentioned the financial responsibilities that came 
with his role as breadwinner in a family with a high-level lifestyle and high expectations. Both 
men clearly devoted substantial time to planning, and worrying about, their personal finances.   
 In their accounts, are echoes of the discursive subject position of the ‘numerate self’, an 
example of which can be found in Touch (Qingnian shejiao) magazine, which carries features 
on young white-collar work life, fashion, shopping, romance and suchlike.300 An article in 
Touch recounted the growing pressures on Simon, a thirty-year-old white-collar man who 
works in a ‘foreign investment financial organization’ (waizi jinrong jigou bailing), in an 
article with the English subheading ‘Concern about ‘white collar’’.301 Simon’s first major 
investment was a house, in anticipation of marriage, the article reveals, and as one might 
expect with a successful white-collar man, it was Western-style. After achieving the common 
white-collar goal of house ownership, the reality of a mortgage struck him: ‘[…] he very 
quickly discovered that the 5000 yuan bank payment every month became his nightmare; 
moreover, this nightmare would take at least twenty years to get out of (yao 20 nian cai neng 
baituo).’ The large payments ‘clearly lowered his quality [of life]’ (zhiliang mingxian 
xiajiangle) as he sought to cut back on his other expenses, which were for the typically white-
collar interests of travel, partying and expensive clothing. No longer with the capacity to spend 
large amounts of money on conspicuous demonstrations of his status, and implicitly 
desirability, he also worried about whether he was still desirable as a partner. ‘As a result his 
self-confidence began to waver (zixinxin kaishi suizhi dongyao), and even looking for a 
girlfriend made him anxious (xincun-gulü).’ He had not reckoned on the high costs of 
maintaining his white-collar lifestyle. The sports and entertainment facilities in his gated and 
guarded ‘estate’ (xiaoqu) required high membership fees, and he even felt the security guards 
undermined his status by only showing real respect to those residents with cars, whereas he 
came and went by taxi. With a high mortgage, he started to worry about his job security, and 
                                                 
300 Touch is aimed at fashionable young urbanites, has a monthly print run of 100,000 copies and sells for the 
relatively high price of 15 yuan, marking out its readers as reasonably affluent. It ‘extends its readers’ perspective 
and taste on knowledge and elegance in modern life’ (ba duzhe de shijiao he pinwei shenzhandao xiandai 
shenghuo de zhihui cengmian he gaoshang jingjie): ‘‘Qingnian sheijiao’ yuekan’ (‘Touch’ monthly), Liulan 
wang (gotoread.com), http://1756.gotoread.com/mag/6170/ (accessed September 3, 2008). 
301 Mu Yu, ‘Nide gongzuo kuaile ma?’ (Are you happy at work?), Qingnian shejiao (Touch) no. 6 (June, 2005): 
22.  
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for the first time ever, was ‘afraid of ‘losing his rice bowl’ (kongbu diule fanwan).302   
 Many of China’s white-collar workers, according to the same article, like Simon, do not 
have the skills to manage the lifestyle they have worked so hard to achieve. ‘Most white-collar 
workers have received a high-level education, buta high-level education does not necessarily 
teach you ‘life skills’ (gaodeng jiaoyu que wei bi jiaohui ni ‘shenghuo de benshi’).’303 Framed 
in this way, white-collar employees are apparently particularly thoughtless about money 
management. ‘Many white-collar workers often have not seriously considered how to manage 
their money: some spend all their money every month (meiyue dou huaguang); others do not 
care how much spare cash is in their bank account (bu guanxin ziji zhanghu li you duoshao 
xianqian) (they always just put money in their current account); others think that depositing 
money and living off the interest is the only reliable way to make money; and there are still 
others who take their living expenditure and invest it in stocks and so on (nazhe ziji de 
shenghuo fei touzi gupiao, dengdeng).’304 Furthermore, the article warns, not many have 
‘genuinely understood (zhenzheng qule liaojie) the special points and mutual connections of 
the many financial management tools such as deposits, securities and insurance (cunkuan, 
zhengjuan, baoxian deng).’305 The solution lies in white-collar workers adopting 
‘comprehensive financial plans appropriate for their own actual circumstances’ (shihe zishen 
shiji qingkuang  de zonghe licai guihua), the article contends, which should be easier than 
before, since ‘now many banks are pushing their personal financial management business’ 
(xianzai hen duo yinhang dou tuichule geren licai de yewu).306 The article’s main point seems 
to be that China’s white-collar workers are learning that to maintain one’s status and lifestyle 
– keeping up with the Zhangs, in other words – requires careful, long-term planning.  
 This article, then, gives clear prescriptions for the creation of the kind of ‘numerate self’, 
which Nikolas Rose contends is a product of some of the intellectual techniques used to 
fashion modern mentalities. With the help of the banking industry, set up as authoritative 
providers of advice in this article, the white-collar worker is implored, threatened and 
frightened through the example of Simon, to get his personal finances into shape, and to save 
and spend in the responsible ways for the benefit of personal, and ultimately national 
economic and social stability. 
                                                 
302 Mu, ibid., 22. 
303 Mu, ibid., 22. 
304 Mu, ibid., 22. 
305 Mu, ibid., 23. 
306 Mu, ibid., 23. 
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 This discursive portrait of Simon, and the accounts of Johnny and Wen, point to the 
pressures that financial responsibilities bring, and contribute to the long hours and general 
sense of beleagueredness of white-collar men. The discursive theme of ‘intense pressure’ to 
compete on the white collar employee is widely presented. I have lost count of the occasions 
on which male white-collar informants talked with me about their ‘intense pressure at work 
and at home’, and how ‘hard’ (xinku) it was to be a man in China, and doubly so to be a white-
collar man. They often mentioned the ‘responsibilities’ (zeren) they had towards their families 
as husbands and fathers (which I discuss in chapter six) and the workload their bosses heaped 
on them. Wang Xiaoming, one of China’s foremost cultural studies scholars, believes that 
despite the media aggrandizement of China’s white-collar workers, in reality they are a worn-
down few (taking Shanghai, where he is based, as his example): 
[…] advertising and the media present white-collar workers as emblems of China’s 
modernization and vectors of its new purchasing power. So Shanghai’s consumer 
goods, fashion and real-estate sectors target this class as their key market, without 
registering what it really is: exhausted young or middle-aged men and women who 
make up only a fraction of the population, by contrast with European or American 
middle classes.307   
 
Wang suggests that local media and market assumptions of white-collar consumer power, 
imported uncritically from the West, belie local circumstances. Nevertheless, popular 
depictions of the pressured white-collar man resonated strongly with my informants’ 
experiences in daily life, and for them, seemed to underline the multiple burdens of manhood. 
Not least of these were the very long hours they felt obliged to work. At the Zhongguancun 
school, the management staff started at 8 a.m. and many were still there at 9 p.m. when I 
finished teaching. They had only seven days leave each year, and were expected to attend the 
various school-organized student events, such as the parties on festival occasions. Many 
complained of fatigue and overwork. Johnny, who worked for a transnational IT firm, 
frequently arrived late for dinner with mutual friends because of overtime work.  
What makes these white-collar workers the ‘busiest of people’ (zui manglu de ren), 
according to Chen Guanren and Yi Yang’s survey of the middle class, is that they ‘just cannot 
stop working and earning money’ (jue buneng tingzhi gongzuo he zhengqian) because they 
‘want to maintain their high standard of living’ (yao baochi jiaogao de shenghuo shuiping).308 
                                                 
307 Wang Xiaoming, ‘A Manifesto for Cultural Studies’, in One China, Many Paths, tr. Robin Visser, ed. 
Chaohua Wang (London: Verso, 2003), 276. Wang writes on cultural studies and literature. 
308 Chen Guanren and Yi Yang, op. cit., 154. Chen and Yi report that a 2003 survey of the middle class showed 
that out of the 94% of respondents who worked over six hours on a work day, 40% worked eight to ten hours, 
25% worked more than ten hours a day, and more than half frequently worked overtime. 
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‘If I don’t work hard how can I earn a high salary?’ was the question asked by one Zhao, an IT 
professional included in their survey. Many white-collar ‘workaholics’ (gongzuokuang) like 
Zhao, ‘often work at night’ (jingchang zai yeli gongzuo), and although they like time off, 
‘often work at the weekend’ (tongchang zai zhoumo gongzuo).309 Such accounts as this from 
Chen and Yi do not simply ‘reflect the reality’ of survey results; rather, what they do is add to 
the theme of white-collar work pressure and long hours by contributing to the image of the 
white-collar subject wanting or needing to work 12 hours a day in the pursuit of his material 
goals. This then becomes a subject position which is woven into the subjectivities of 
individuals like Johnny, who use it as a legitimizing explanation for the long hours and days 
they put in at the office.   
 In emphasising the work pressures of white-collar employment, the media spends 
much more time promoting the global aspects of the white-collar lifestyle, than revealing how 
interwoven it is with embedded local practices. In the context of the media’s contribution to 
white-collar status as a new hegemonic ‘transnational masculinity’, as Connell put it, its 
attention to this aspect of white-collar status necessarily excludes consideration of the views 
put forward by Wang Xiaoming. However, if attention to the ‘responsibilities’ of white-collar 
life confirms its status, it is mediated by descriptions of its ‘downside’, in what often appear as 
moralistic cautions about the ‘irresponsibility’ of taking on too much. All in all, while these 
disciplining intellectual techniques may lead to complaints that contribute to the discursive 
construction of white-collar life as exhausting and tedious, they also reaffirm the special 
knowledges and skills the white-collar subject is made of, and so propagate the notion of 
white-collar life as the preferred model of young, intelligent, ambitious people.  
 
 
In this chapter, my focus has been on the production and performance of white-collar 
masculinities at work, and the local ‘repatriation’ of the global and the demanding habituation 
processes that would-be white-collar men must go through to achieve and maintain his 
ambitions. I have shown that the sculpting, or tempering, or habituation of individual white-
collar bodies, values, emotions and anxieties take place in - and also constitute - particular 
places and spaces, in assemblages of elements that bring together discourses and practices 
                                                 
309 Chen and Yi, ibid., 155-6. Chen and Yi add that these workaholics ‘become restless when they have nothing 
to do’ (wushi kegan shi hui zuoli-bu’an), and, for example, feel that lying in lazily on a Sunday morning is ‘very 
unbefitting’ (hen bu shiying). Apparently, very few of them have time to enjoy other interests, and relatives often 
complain ‘they spend too much time working’ (tamen gongzuo shang hua de shijian tai duo), and friends 
complain they ‘hardly ever see’ (hen shao jian) them. 
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associated with a polished, global, ‘hegemonic’ masculinity and locally-embedded notions of 
‘guanxi’ and ‘gemenr’ masculinity.  
The spaces and conventions of global business practice subject white-collar men to a 
corporate discipline that regulates their appearance, time and activities, as the article on 
Jianguomen man exemplifies. They work amidst brand new, gleaming hard-edged office 
blocks, designed to facilitate a masculinist global corporate culture of hard-minded efficiency, 
intense competition and ruthless profit-making. Global business values promoted in business 
books and articles encourage Jianguomen men to develop certain characteristics, as they hope 
to become the next Li Kaifu; to this end, bodily and intellectual techniques work their way 
into the lives of white-collar men, including my informants, pushing the wearing of suits, and 
English language ability, numeracy skills and other forms of specialised knowledge, as 
Andrew Ross and Xu Rong point out. However, as they strive to perform white-collar 
masculinities in appearance and behaviour in these globally recognisable corporate spaces, 
they are also subject to work-based and social expectations to perform a more locally-
embedded masculinity, rooted in homosocial activities oriented to building and cementing 
networks of patronage and ‘relationships’ (guanxi), which tend to discriminate against women 
in general and men outside the network. As described by my informants and in many articles, 
the pressures and responsibilities of maintaining a high-level lifestyle, combine with corporate 
discipline and tyrannical bosses who centralise power, to make white-collar men work long 
hours and feel extremely pressured. Despite these challenges, white-collar men outside the 
office are usually able to pursue their largely globally-inflected consumer desires, as I examine 
in the next chapter on leisure activities. Even then, however, whether they like it or not, they 
are often also deeply involved with pervasive business-related guanxi activities,310 which are 
not highlighted in the media discourse, pointing to the interplay of discursive notions and 
practices that complicate the subjectivities of Chinese white-collar men, rendering them more 
complex than the glossy magazine articles on white-collar sports and leisure might suggest.  
                                                 
310 Although I examine in particular locally-embedded forms of guanxi, it also has its global aspects. Likewise, 
consumerism is certainly not entirely global in form; it also contains local aspects.  
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Chapter Five 
Time-out: White-Collar Men away from Work and Family 
 
 
 
Leisure venues and the equipment, spaces and practices associated with them form part of the 
assemblages shaping white-collar masculinities; they contribute to the spatialised and 
corporeal constitution of white-collar subjectivities in specific ways, just as do the corporate 
spaces discussed in the previous chapter. White-collar employees’ consumer capacities give 
them access to a wide range of leisure activities, many of which they enthusiastically 
participate in, in part as an outlet from work pressures, but also for their association with the 
status items of consumer culture identified with white-collar images. Participation in different 
kinds of leisure or ‘out of work’ activities also offers the arrived and aspiring white-collar 
subject the opportunity to engage in and display a range of social relationships that contribute 
to and consolidate the advantages and interests of white-collar status. These activities, enacted 
in specific places, are performative of a masculine status defined through the exclusion and 
objectification of women. Some of these activities, such as sports, require a process of training 
and familiarisation—habituation, in other words – before the practitioner becomes proficient 
not necessarily at playing the sport itself, but in the conventions surrounding it and in the use 
of specialised vocabulary. These activities, venues and cultural objects, including choice of 
sports, restaurants, shops, films and travel, clearly signal white-collar man’s insertion in global 
culture and his taste and status as part of the global middle-class.  
The ‘desiring subject’ expounded by Lisa Rofel – the ‘individual who operates through 
sexual, material and affective self-interest’, and whose self-centred desires are justified as, in 
Rofel’s words, ‘universal human nature’, in contrast to the collective goals of ‘socialist 
experimentalism’ in the Mao era – offers a useful lens to reflect on the gendered character of 
white-collar men’s activities in general, but perhaps particularly with regard to practices of 
leisure and consumption.311 It positions white-collar subjects as naturally aspiring to, inter 
                                                 
311 Lisa Rofel, 2007, op. cit., p. 3. Rofel explains that her understanding of desire derives in part from Deluze and 
Guattari’s emphasis that ‘desire is produced not simply within the individual but through social worlds’ and that 
‘desire’s heterogeneous, productive, polyvocal, synthetic, and ‘nomadic’ qualities were unleashed by the 
‘capitalist machine’.’ She agrees with their critique of psychoanalytic theories: ‘As against psychoanalysis, 
especially the yoke of Oedipus that establishes a totalizing subjectivity, represses the multiplicity of desire, and 
defines desire as lack, Deleuze and Guattari stress the need to see desire as productive flows rather than unities 
and as excessive mobility rather than sedentary stasis. ‘Lack’ is not the product of an Oedipal complex but the 
creation of a dominant class in a market economy.’ Rofel also draws from Foucault’s understanding of ‘‘desire’ 
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alia, leisure practices of consumption in commercialised spaces and in the interior spaces of 
their homes. These relatively exclusive ‘global’ leisure practices, which white-collar men 
participate in through their consumer spending power, are significant components of the status 
that dominant discourse gives to white-collar men, and construct their figures as desirable 
‘goals’ for aspiring youth.  
At the same time, as different kinds of ‘desiring subjects’, white-collar men also enjoy 
spending their leisure time participating in homosocial networking practices in restaurants, 
karaoke clubs, massage parlours, saunas and suchlike – in other words in gendered social 
practices far removed from global ‘models’ though widely associated with ‘regional’ models – 
which have become pervasive in local business culture, and which Mayfair Mei-hui Yang and 
others define as part of ‘guanxi [relationships] capitalism’.312 To gain promotion, for example, 
corporate employees may have to show their adeptness at negotiating these business 
entertainment practices, so for some white-collar men, participation in these activities may at 
least partly be motivated by the desire for personal career advancement. White-collar men may 
also develop ‘expressive’ connections, for example treating their ‘gemenr’ (mates) on a night 
out.313 However, media images tend to exclude those practices that do not easily correspond 
with the image of white-collar men as global consumers, such as instrumental guanxi practices 
and references to activities that might be politically sensitive, such as religious and non-Party 
political activities. Nevertheless, as I discuss below, evidence from my fieldwork as well as 
other sources suggests that white-collar employees, men and women, not uncommonly deploy 
their spending power in contributing to the religious revival of recent years, in which the 
number of followers of Buddhism and Christianity (Protestantism and Catholicism) has 
increased hugely, and new churches and temples have been built across China.314 
Notwithstanding white-collar men’s strong identifications with the consumer values of 
dominant discursively-formed images, their participation in the ‘religious revival’ indicates 
                                                                                                                                                         
[as] that site through which individuals make themselves subjects of specific regimes of power/knowledge.’ She 
concurs with his ‘genealogical method in which he traces how, in different historical moments, various cultural 
epistemes led people to search for the truth of their being in desire.’ Rofel, 2007, n. 43, 211-12. 
312 See Yang, 2002, op. cit., 459-476. 
313 Although one must bear in mind Yunxiang Yan’s caution that these two types of guanxi do not exist in pure 
form, but rather ‘co-exist in almost all activities of gift giving, but in different ratios.’ Yan, 1996, op. cit., 45. 
314 See, for example, Dexter Roberts, ‘China's Spiritual Awakening: Why a growing number of successful urban 
professionals are flocking to Buddhism’, BusinessWeek (January 21, 2008): 50. 
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that the market is not enough to replace the vacuum left by the collapse of belief in political 
ideology.315  
The political scientist, Shaoguang Wang has also identified ‘depoliticisation’ as an 
aspect of leisure practices in post-Mao China, which he describes as the leadership’s strategy 
of ‘keeping bad things in check’, alongside the promotion of ‘commercialization’, 
‘Westernization’, ‘privatization’, and ‘diversification.’316 The depoliticised, religious-leaning 
economic-minded white-collar male subject of contemporary China, who draws his masculine 
power and authority from wielding his spending power, clearly contrasts with the masculine 
subject of the Mao era whose political credentials established his authority, and were tools for 
him to get things done. In today’s China, the apolitical, religious man’s masculinity is 
symbolised by his economic standing. This does not mean, however, that young white-collar 
men do not want to join the Communist Party. Indeed, quite a few of the ambitious young 
office workers I knew in Beijing were members, and when I put it to them, they did not deny 
that many people nowadays join the party for instrumental reasons, to further their careers. 
They said that Party membership is helpful in getting higher-level jobs.317 Moreover, in line 
with women’s relatively minor participation in many areas of the public sphere, the Party is 
very much a man’s club: only 20 percent of its members are women.318   
 The ‘impossibility of politics in China’, to use Rebecca Karl’s phrase,319 is a factor 
which has strongly shaped the lives of all Chinese people for the best part of two decades, 
since the post-1989 tightening of controls on political expression, and the accelerated 
economic marketisation. Its impact is notably seen in the growth of an educated middle class 
dedicated to enrichment and consumerised leisure pursuits, and is commonly explained as a 
‘normalization of everyday life’ (after the huge upheavals of the Cultural Revolution), echoing 
Rofel’s observation about a return to a discourse based on the premise of ‘universal human 
nature’. Karl argues that ‘[t]his normalization is underpinned by an endless pursuit of the 
                                                 
315 Furthermore, Vivienne Shue argues that religions’ claims to truth are contesting the Party’s legitimacy, in 
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319 Rebecca E. Karl, ‘'Joining Tracks with the World': The Impossibility of Politics in China’, Radical 
Philosophy (2005): 20-27. 
 117
commodification of labour-power and primitive accumulation of capital in support of the 
economic and juridical necessity of the state and its new class referents’; and ‘is most often 
promoted as the urgent pursuit of the convergence between China and the world summed up in 
the phrase ‘joining tracks with the world’.’320 White-collar men are amongst the new class 
referents to which Karl refers. Their activities outside the office are better comprehended 
when understood as prevalently constituted through this ostensibly depoliticised, globally-
inflected, socio-economic framework.  The new white-collar men benefit from the polarised 
disparities of this framework;321 their relatively high spending enables them to enjoy leisure 
practices at the vanguard of these changes and that are most often, though not necessarily 
discursively characterized as Westernised, privatized and diversified.322 
  The white-collar male subjectivities constructed and enacted through leisure venues, 
vocabularies and pursuits display the complex intermingling of global and local discourses and 
practices that characterise the ‘consumer’ and ‘corporate’ masculinities explored in previous 
chapters. In the form of the white-collar man, the ‘desiring subject’, born out of neoliberal 
policies, is suggestive of the hegemonic global masculinity of ‘modernity’, associated with 
Connell’s transnational hegemonic subject, who plays in expensive, upscale ‘playgounds’ yet 
who also sees it as his natural privilege to enjoy activities undertaken with other men, 
premised on the exclusion and subordination of women function to sustain male advantage.  
Leisure activities thus add particular features to the assemblage of white-collar masculinity, 
naturalizing masculine privilege as part of the government’s modernization narrative and its 
attendant values linking individual desire to ‘human nature’. 
 
China’s new discourse of leisure  
With the changing nature of leisure in urban China, white-collar men’s emphasis on 
achievement and success as key markers of the new, individualised subject propagated by Li 
Kaifu and others, is echoed by the privatization of leisure. The pursuit of an activity for self-
satisfaction, either on one’s own or with friends, has become more and more common in post-
Mao China, as leisure practices are ‘privatized’, in Shaoguang Wang’s term, moving away 
                                                 
320 Karl, ibid., 21. 
321 Shaoguang Wang, op. cit., 165-6. 
322 However, even those guanxi practices, which are framed as local, are often infused with what are seen as 
modern values and practices, such as business socialising in karaoke bars and saunas, as I discuss below. White-
collar men’s practices in leisure sites, as elsewhere, display the influence of a mix of different discursive 
formations, but my point here is that very often these ‘local’ practices take place across an assembly of sites 
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from the mass activities of the Maoist era. Lisa Rofel’s ‘desiring subject’ epitomizes this new 
discourse of self-fulfilment. As I mentioned above, she suggests that the individual sacrifice of 
personal desire for the good of the community that was encouraged during the socialist period, 
is now viewed as unnatural; and a discourse which promotes work and individual competition 
to achieve one’s personal desires has been particularly prominent since the early 1990s.323 As 
well as incorporating global and local aspects, these desires and the practices they inhabit are 
strongly inflected by gender, sexuality, class and generational referents, in which despite 
different gendered performances distinguishing white-collar men of different ages and 
backgrounds, women are systematically used as foils for displays of male prowess, 
assumptions of heterosexuality are largely unbroken, and money and status are passports to 
masculine privilege. Furthermore, the white-collar subjectivities formed in these contexts need 
to be read within wider societal shifts in discourses of desire, which Everett Zhang has 
documented through a focus on neoliberal influences on medical discourses around impotence. 
In an analysis of the large rise in numbers of men seeking medical treatment for 
impotence, Zhang uses a similar phrase to Rofel’s in the specific context of the emergence of a 
discourse of sexual desire, arguing that a new ‘subject of desire’ has recently appeared in 
China: ‘[…] I argue that a new type of subject—the subject of desire—formed in post-Mao 
China and that ‘impotence as an epidemic’ was a force that helped shape the person 
experiencing erectile failure into a subject of desire by encouraging him to seek medical 
treatment.’324 Zhang ascribes this to changes in what he calls ‘moral symptomatology’, which 
had not previously acknowledged impediments to the fulfillment of individual sexual desire as 
conditions worthy of treatment:  
The production of medical knowledge, and its institutionalization in the birth of nanke, 
was not only a response to illness experiences but also an effect of power. I describe 
the exercise of such power through what I call ‘moral symptomatology.’ Moral 
symptomatology is a mixture of institutionalized judgment, knowledge, and practice 
concerning what illness symptoms qualify as disease and whether an illness deserves 
medical attention. I highlight the moral nature of such a mixture, showing how 
illnesses can be accepted or rejected as diseases by the medical system through a moral 
judgment consistent with both the power structure and the ethos of the larger social 
context. In the case of China, a moral symptomatology hostile to sexual desire was 
rooted in the social processes that arose under the ethos of Maoist collectivism hostile 
to individual desire.325 
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As with Rofel, Zhang draws a distinction between the Maoist, socialist, period, during which 
in his view men’s desire for sexual self-fulfillment was not encouraged, and the post-Mao, 
reform period in which seeking to fulfil personal sexual desire has become discursively and 
morally acceptable, within culturally and socially observed limits. The shift in ‘moral 
symptomatology’ on impotency that Zhang describes reflects the moral shift in 
‘institutionalized judgment, knowledge, and practice’ of personal desire in the broader terms 
that Rofel sets out.  
Yunxiang Yan, similarly, has written about how consumerist ideology has replaced 
communist ideology in what he calls the ‘postreform era’, spawning the pursuit of private 
desire in ‘new public spaces’, ‘sort[ing] consumers into different social groups (and 
sometimes different spaces as well).’326 One such group is undoubtedly white-collar men, who 
define themselves through their choice of leisure activities and where they practise them.  
A significant change in public life during the postreform era has been the 
disappearance of frequent mass rallies, voluntary work, collective parties, and other 
forms of what I prefer to call ‘organized sociality,’ in which the state (through its 
agents) plays the central role. In its place are various newly emerged forms of private 
gatherings in public yet commercialized ventures, such as shopping malls, restaurants, 
cafés, bars, and clubs….. [celebrating]  individuality and private desires in unofficial 
social/special contexts.327  
 
The move from collectivism to individualism in leisure practices and spaces 
exemplifies a profound cultural, moral and ideological shift in expanding:  consumer-driven 
individual freedom, distracting public attention from politically-sensitive issues, and thereby 
helping ‘the CCP maintain political stability and regain legitimacy in post-1989 China.’328 
In line with Rofel and Zhang’s analyses, the ‘new cultural values’ accompanying this 
shift are part of the discourse of ‘naturalised’ desires in China, in which conceptions of social 
gender performance are naturalised in leisure practices as much as at work and in the family, 
as I demonstrate elsewhere in this thesis. Significantly, it is only the middle class which has 
the economic capacity to make the consumption of most imported goods and services an 
everyday lifestyle choice, as Yan’s research on McDonald’s shows: 
Consumption of imported material goods also carries social meaning. As I note 
elsewhere, when the fast-food giant McDonald’s entered the Beijing market, local 
customers flooded into the restaurants to taste American cuisine. As a result of constant 
interaction between McDonald’s management and local customers, the fast-food outlets 
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have been transformed into middle-class establishments where consumers from different 
social backgrounds can, in addition to dining, linger for hours, relaxing, chatting, 
reading, enjoying the music, or having parties. Through these activities, Chinese 
customers redefine the concept of fast food and use McDonald’s restaurants as a bridge 
to bring them the experience of consuming a Chinese version of American food culture 
and, in a larger sense, to link them with the outside world.329 
 
Here Yan demonstrates the association between middle-class elements such as white-collar 
workers and American, or Western, leisure practices like eating in McDonald’s, though at the 
same time also makes clear that Chinese consumers ‘redefine’ these practices in a 
‘localisation’ (bendihua) process They take up multiple positions in the subjectivities they 
perform at McDonald’s, combining ‘global’ and ‘local’ values, vocabularies and practices, and 
link their McDonald’s performances into a wider assemblage of locales and techniques, all of 
which come together to produce particular meanings in the Chinese context. For instance, 
McDonald’s restaurants in the West are not usually deemed ‘middle-class establishments’ 
where people ‘linger for hours’. Furthermore, Mark, the owner of the small computer firm, 
and I discussed the ‘localisation’ of Kentucky Fried Chicken menus, which he called 
bendihua. The localized menus proclaimed that they offered a healthier choice of products 
than the original American menu, and that they offered food more suited to the tastes of the 
Chinese consumer. This was framed within a larger argument that the revamped menus 
contributed to the development of a strong, healthy nation. Appadurai’s concept of the 
‘repatriation of difference’ to which I referred in the previous chapter is again useful here to 
understand the mix of the global and the local, by describing how practices are reworked to fit 
into broader state agendas (and then re-inserted into global discursive formations). 
 
Leisure consumption and white-collar homosociality  
As we have seen in the last chapter, pressure of work is commonly represented as part of the 
white-collar worker’s ‘lot’. It is therefore used to recommend a range of leisure activities and 
interests, both to protect the white-collar employee’s health and to give him a sense of 
personal fulfilment.330 The ethnographic data that I discuss in this section shows that Chinese 
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white-collar men’s personal consumption of leisure is inflected with notions both from 
‘hegemonic’ global discourses and local practices. I argue that Chinese white-collar 
professional men, while aspiring to participate in and be identified with a sophisticated global 
middle-class consumer culture, do so in ways that are rooted in local custom, naturalising 
contradictory yet mutually intersecting subjectivities. Hence, the same individual enjoys 
‘traditional’ homosocial activities, including some predicated on the explicit subordination of 
women, alongside individualised leisure activities that confirm his modern credentials. As I 
suggest later on in this section, the contradictory subject positions established by these 
activities demonstrate that despite the emergence of the individualised white-collar subject, in 
the terms suggested by Yunxiang Yan above, many assumptions and practices surrounding 
gender roles and attributes remain locked in the naturalised positions of earlier times.  
Media articles about the leisure pursuits of white-collar men tend to accentuate the 
‘global’ attributes of the places they frequent, the consumer activities they enjoy and their 
imagined desires. For example, the article about the ‘Jianguomen man’ quoted in the previous 
chapter, argues they enjoy ‘singing, clubbing, ten-pin bowling, shuffleboard…in short, they 
will not let anything good fun and trendy slip by (haowan you shishang de dongxi tamen dou 
buhui fangguo).’331 Their exuberance might be because most of them are unmarried and far 
from home’, a category into which many of my informants, including Johnny fell; and ‘since 
most of them are single, and their families are not in Beijing, they do their utmost to look for 
excuses to be happy.’332 Jianguomen men are more discerning than the average bar-goer, the 
article contends: they ‘occasionally hang out in bars’ (ou’er ye hui qu paoba), but much prefer 
more refined spots to the ‘raucous Sanlitun’ (xuannao de Sanlitun) bar district.333 Besides this, 
the article relates, Jianguomen men ‘have a heartfelt love of good food’ (dui meishi dou you 
yizhong youzhong de aihao)334, to the extent that they will, as my informant Wen often did, 
‘often drive tens of kilometres just to have seafood or game (yewei)’ where, in contrast with 
his business banquets, they can really enjoy good dishes with friends. Another increasingly 
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common white-collar male pastime is touring by car. ‘Perhaps,’ the article concludes, 
‘wandering about from place to place (liulang-piaobo) is a dream in everyone’s hearts, and 
Jianguomen men are no exception.’335 
Such media representations set out a series of white-collar subject positions that clearly 
intersected with the self-descriptions of many of my informants. Johnny, the web designer 
from Fujian, frequently participated in similar activities to those described above. He was a 
frequent visitor to the new public spaces that ‘Jianguomen man’ enjoys: the restaurants, the 
malls, cafes and clubs, and, I would add, airports. Johnny regularly ate out in McDonald’s, 
KFC, and other Western restaurants, but also often ate out in Chinese restaurants, favouring 
the upmarket chains which had lush interiors and superior service, as he had the disposable 
income to patronise restaurants priced beyond the reach of working-class Beijingers. Johnny 
lived within walking distance of Wangfujing, the most well-known upmarket shopping street 
in Beijing, and often went to the shopping malls there to browse, buy and eat. The landmark 
‘Oriental Plaza’ (Dongfang guangchang), which boasts large numbers of global luxury brand-
name outlets, cinemas, and access to the Beijing underground system was a favourite. 
Alternatively, he would take a taxi to Ikea, as I mentioned in my profile of him in chapter 
three. Johnny enjoyed foreign travel, as I also mentioned, and regularly went to Beijing capital 
airport to meet foreign friends and colleagues, to go on holiday and occasionally for business 
trips. At home with friends, in the evenings and weekends he would sometimes sit around the 
TV in his IKEA-furnished lounge to watch Western movies on DVDs. When he was by 
himself, he told me, he often surfed the net and chatted online with friends in China and 
around the world, many of whom he had initially met online. Some of them, he revealed, 
became his sexual partners.  
Jason, who was working to improve the website for his mother’s manufacturing 
company, for the most part enjoyed similar leisure activities to Johnny’s. He particularly 
enjoyed eating out at quite expensive restaurants, Western and Chinese, and also enjoyed 
Western fast food such as KFC. His favourite ‘hangout’ was any branch of Starbucks. He 
liked the clean, modern styling of China’s Starbucks’ branches, and he would often sit there 
using his laptop, or chatting with friends, drinking cappuccinos and eating blueberry muffins. 
As I mentioned in chapter three, he was a keen tennis fan, as a player and a spectator, and he 
followed the international tennis scene closely. He was even chosen to be a helper at the China 
Open tennis tournament, because of his good English, his experience of living abroad and his 
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enthusiasm for tennis. His choice of tennis – seen as a rather exclusive sport – suited his 
affluent, urban image.336 Jason’s other huge passion was electronic gadgets: he often went to 
Beijing’s huge computer malls to browse and purchase new items. At home, either alone or 
with friends, he enjoyed playing the latest video games he had bought in the malls, and was an 
avid reader of the technology press, pursuits which, in China as in the West, are predominantly 
coded as masculine. Similarly to Johnny, he used online chat programmes to keep in touch 
with his friends around the world, and meet potential romantic partners.  
If these leisure activities denote the consuming individual’s access to practices 
spawned by globally-inflected market interests, others suggest a much greater attachment to 
local custom and particularly to activities that shore up masculine status through his 
homosocial positioning. When eating with groups of friends, I noticed that Johnny would 
often subsidize less well-off friends when the bill came, in a display of ‘generosity’ (dafang), 
widely considered to be a manly attribute associated with historically-embedded codes of 
masculinity such as those of the homosocial hao han, which I discussed in chapter two.337 The 
less well-off friends would respond to Johnny’s generosity by, for example, bringing back 
products from their hometown as gifts for him after the Spring Festival.338 Johnny’s friends, 
who through eating out with Johnny signalled aspirations to pursue leisure activities in the 
relatively expensive sites frequented by corporate employees, at the same time practised 
‘guanxi masculinity’, deliberately taking steps to maintain a relationship with Johnny using 
culturally embedded techniques of appropriate behaviour and obligations between male 
friends. Jason was even more demonstrably generous than Johnny. He would sometimes foot 
the entire bill for large groups of friends eating together; at other times, when shopping, he 
would buy very expensive consumer items as gifts for friends, neatly bringing together 
masculinities of leisure practices, consumption and dafang.  This deployment of ‘traditional’ 
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subject positions alongside those of the sophisticated modern consumer, demonstrates  the 
‘composite’ or ‘assembled’ gender subjectivity that Johnny and his friends construct through 
their everyday practices. In this instance, there is no conflict or contradiction between the main 
positions they identify with in going out to eat together; indeed, this is good example of the 
‘expansion’ of apparently inconsistent masculine subjectivities in China, combining discursive 
techniques in practices that are simultaneously globalised white-collar and specifically 
Chinese.   
Johnny also occasionally visited nightclubs. On one Saturday night, a group of us went 
to E-Shock, a fashionable nightclub in east Beijing because Johnny had obtained free entrance 
tickets. The group comprised Johnny, Kerstin, his German tenant, with whom he practised 
English; Bing, Kerstin’s Chinese language exchange partner who worked for a transnational 
telecommunications firm (another young white-collar male); and me. The club was fitted with 
international standard lights and sound, and pounded out very loud dance music: it looked like 
clubs I have been to in London, Singapore and Hong Kong. The cover fee was 50 yuan and the 
drinks were expensive, so the clientele were relatively well off. Many of the (mostly young) 
men were in suits, as if they had come straight from the office. Most of the clientele were 
Chinese, with only a few, mostly male foreigners present. At one point, the music changed and 
a spotlight fell on a scantily clad Caucasian – possibly Russian339 – woman with long blonde 
hair, who descended from above on a moving platform and gyrated sexily round a pole to a 
song with very sexual lyrics. The entire dance floor stopped to watch this performance. There 
were more men than women in the club and this performance was clearly for them. Johnny 
and Bing did not appear surprised at all, but Kerstin and I were shocked. This was outwith our 
expectations for an international-style dance club catering to the city’s business elite; it was an 
instance when Kerstin and I, as the two ‘outsiders’ present, had to confront the disjuncture 
between what to us seemed to be a surprising manifestation of masculine subject positions, 
and what to our hosts seemed to be a ‘normal’ expression of masculine interest in a particular 
setting and space. Encapsulating Sheldon’s Lu’s conceptualization of the construction of a 
‘transnational male imaginary’, which I discussed in chapter two, these Beijing white-collar 
men could be thought of as situating themselves as imagined sexual players at a global level, 
where they had the spending power to pay, for example, for the opportunity to ogle a sexually 
objectified blonde Caucasian woman, and therefore engage with the feminine ‘West’ as a 
dominant sexual subject. The entire scene seemed to demonstrate the acceptability of blatant 
                                                 
339 Scantily clad Russian dancing girls have been a noted feature of clubs in Beijing in recent years, according to 
Johnny. 
 125
sexual objectification of women in the white-collar world, even to their girlfriends standing 
next to them in the darkness of the dance floor, literally bearing out Kathleen Erwin’s point, 
mentioned in chapter two, that Chinese women are eclipsed in these re-imagined sexual 
relationships. The desiring masculine subject of this leisure activity appeared as the 
naturalised beneficiary of the hierarchical gender arrangements of the government’s 
modernization narrative.  
At the Sanyuanqiao school where I worked I often chatted with Peter, an English 
language graduate in his mid-twenties, and whom I asked to tell me about his leisure activities. 
He said he ‘played cards and ball’ with his male friends, and sometimes just took some 
‘exercise’. When I asked him to explain what he meant by ‘playing ball’, he looked 
momentarily surprised at my ignorance, then told me ‘basketball’ (lanqiu). Basketball (which 
is associated with the middle class) was almost a default leisure time activity in his life, he 
explained, as it was for many of his male university classmates whom he still hung out with. 
According to anthropologist Kevin Latham, drawing on the arguments of Andrew Morris, a 
historian of modern China, the huge popularity of contemporary global basketball culture 
reshaping the ‘popular cultural identity of millions of mainly young Chinese.’340 The ‘strongly 
individualistic elements of contemporary global basketball culture – which include the way 
that stars are marketed and present themselves – have found their way into Chinese basketball 
fandom, whether it be through the desire to be a unique hero like Michael Jordan or Dennis 
Rodman or through the desire to experience the personal exhilaration of scoring a ‘slam dunk’ 
basket.’341 One of my teenage students at the Zhongguancun school where I worked had gone 
so far as to take the same English name as his favourite American NBA basketball star; and he 
told me this was not uncommon. Yet, as Latham points out, this does not mean that young 
Chinese men are aspiring to be American: rather, they are ‘engaging, in their own ways, with a 
negotiation of their own very Chinese identities.’342 The point is ‘generally to be successful, as 
a Chinese, like the top American stars, but not become one.’343  
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Chinese white-collar men clearly take up global discourses ‘in their own ways’, as I 
argued at the start of this section. From this perspective, playing basketball appears as much as 
a locally embedded form of homosociality as a component of a new popular culture. Young 
men can be seen all over Beijing’s university campuses playing basketball. Peter said that 
whenever he wanted to play, both when he was at university and since, he would just go along 
to a basketball court and join in, a practice which other informants confirmed as widespread.  
 Bruce, the 25-year-old confident, ambitious and hard-working Anhui-born manager of 
the Sanyuanqiao language school, especially enjoyed playing football. Yet, in contrast with 
Peter, his enjoyment of such a homosocial activity added an explicitly hierarchical element to 
his masculine subjectivity. I pointed out that football was largely an all-male activity and 
asked him if, like Peter, he mostly socialised with male friends. He said he did, and explained 
why:  
For me, I have many friends, these boys are real friends (ting gemenr): in Beijing dialect 
it is ‘ting gemenr’, which means real friends (ting pengyou). In fact men are more 
magnanimous when they’re together (zai yiqi de shihou nanhaizi bijiao dadu): they 
don’t care so much about little things (buhui tai zaihu  xiao de shiqing). So getting along 
with men is more relaxed (gen nanren xiangchu bijiao qingsong); whatever you chat 
about with men, they don't care about the details. But women are possibly more 
meticulous and more sensitive (danshi nüsheng keneng bijiao jingxi, bijiao mingan). If 
you chat with them about something quite detailed, they will care about it very much; so 
when you socialize with them or make friends, there might be a bit of a problem 
(jiaowang de shihou, huozhe zuo pengyou, keneng hui you yidian wenti). 
 
Bruce was not alone in his view of ascribing an innate larger vision to men, here developed 
through the initial association with football. Many men and women I talked to told me that 
men were only concerned about life’s big issues, not the little details, whereas women, were 
deemed to be naturally predisposed towards trivia and gossip indicating a gendered 
assumption which the arrival of the new masculine subject apparently has not shifted.344 For 
Bruce and many men, in what perhaps is a contemporary rendering of the wu masculinity 
which I discussed in chapter two, spending time with their gemenr was simply less 
complicated and less hassle than when women were around: they did not have to be so careful 
about what they said and did. So, he would ‘go out to sing in karaoke bars and have a drink’ 
with his friends, and when still at university, would ‘mostly drink and play football’ with his 
friends. (wo shang xue de shihou zui duo de shi he jiu he ti qiu).’  
 Women did not feature in these largely homosocial leisure activities. Indeed, Bruce’s 
view of women in general was that they should be around for a man when all his friends were 
                                                 
344 See Evans, 1997, op. cit.  
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otherwise occupied. ‘A girlfriend is important to have by your side (you yige nüpengyou zai ni 
shenbian hen zhongyao)’: to fit around the man’s busy schedule, and to provide support, when 
required, for their male partner. This kind of assumption corresponds with the dominant 
gender discourse of the reform era, as discussed previously, which positions women as 
naturally caring and attentive, and men as more actively engaged with life’s big issues, as 
Bruce’s own words above confirm For Bruce, it signified his self-constitution in an 
assemblage of gendered assumptions and practices that illustrate the bewildering array of 
subject positions available to the white-collar man, ranging from the women-excluding and 
belittling wu masculinity, gemenr homosociality, the ‘macho’ masculinity of the ‘modern’ 
male subject who plays football and goes out drinking, to the polished, smooth-talking and 
ambitious white-collar subject, intent on self-fulfilment through achieving material goals.  
 Many of my informants’ leisure interests, as I have discussed above, clearly intersect 
with the popular media positions attributed to the white-collar man. Noticeably absent from 
these are leisure activities and attitudes that denote other culturally embedded expectations of 
masculinity. The homosocial ‘gemenr’ activities enjoyed by Johnny, for example, suggests a 
kind of ‘traditional’ masculine behaviour not associated with ‘Jianguomen man’, Bruce’s 
belittling of women could be seen, in part, as an effect of his preference for homosocial 
company, and similarly, is absent from media descriptions of white-collar man. It is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation to discuss the historical and cultural discourses constitutive of 
these activities. Suffice it to say, however, that they suggest white-collar man’s insertion in a 
multiplicity of discursive possibilities in institutions and social structures only tenuously 
linked into dominant media.  
 Peter similarly claimed not to be particularly interested in political issues, but he was 
concerned that China should continue its embrace of the market and its participation in the 
world economy, thereby raising its global status. When hanging out with his ‘gemenr’ in 
homosocial groups they covered ‘big’ topics associated with men’s interests. He told me they 
‘chatted about China's current situation (tan Zhongguo de xianzhuang): the economy […], also 
politics, and China's status (Zhongguo de diwei), global status (zai shijie de diwei).’ When 
they tired of this, their thoughts turned to sex, he told me: ‘if we had nothing to do we talked 
about women, a global problem (shijie wenti)!’ Peter’s concern with the economic 
performance of China reflected the personal dividend he stood to earn, as a member of the 
middle class, from growing prosperity, and showed his investment in a consumption-oriented 
masculinity. Moreover, his interest in China’s global status reflects his participation in the new 
middle-class imaginary of China’s affluent young male urbanites, keen to taking their place on 
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the global stage as equal players in neoliberal markets with young men from the global North.  
 
Business socialising  
My ethnographic data in this section on pervasive practices of ‘yingchou’ (business 
socialising) point to a series of subject positions which are explicitly ‘local’ (and maybe 
regional) but which are not ‘hidden’ or ‘excluded’ as components of white-collar masculinity. 
Here is an instance when the global/local does not pan out into the desirable/articulated and 
the ‘excluded/obscured’. The masculine subjectivities of white-collar men are constituted 
through practices of clear and sexual exploitation of a subjectified feminine other, in this case, 
of young female migrant workers in entertainment venues. This adds to the cases discussed 
above in which masculinity is constructed through the subjection of the sexy female pole 
dancer, or through the denigration of ‘un-masculine’ leisure activities such as belly dancing. 
These practices may appear as conflicting to ‘outsiders’, but to my informants they were 
accepted parts of life for white-collar men. This also is an instance when the corporeality of 
the masculine body emerges, clearly, as the site of competing discourses and desires, in terms 
of the differing values of bodily capital that are deployed. 
White-collar leisure practices are not solely undertaken for a release from pressure of 
work, as I have already suggested. Many after-work activities take place as part of business 
socialising (yingchou) with clients and colleagues, and signify an inescapable ‘misery’ 
(xinsuan) and additional pressure in white collar men’s life, according to an article originally 
printed in the Guangzhou Daily (Guangzhou ribao: ‘[Business] socialising’ (yingchou) is 
something they ‘cannot evade’ (tuituo budiao).345 The article relates the story of a ‘financial 
securities company’s trading department manager’ who has at least three social engagements 
with clients every week.346 He claims to get nervous if a day goes by without seeing his major 
client.347 However, business socialising is not altogether an unwelcome pressure, according to 
the manager. On the plus side, he argues it ‘boosts knowledge and experience’ (zhang jianshi) 
and ‘builds friendships’ (jiao pengyou), though more negatively, he suggests that the ‘wining 
                                                 
345 This article was originally published by the Guangzhou Daily, according to the website Jinrong jie (Finance 
World), which has republished it: ‘Bailing fengguang beihou de xinsuan: tuituo budiao 'gelei' yingchou’ (The 
Grief Behind the White-Collar Scene: ‘All Kinds’ of Inevitable Socialising), Jinrong jie (Finance World), 
http://news2.jrj.com.cn/news/20060217/000000060862.htm (accessed August 22, 2008). 
346 ‘Bailing fengguang beihou de xinsuan: tuituo budiao 'gelei' yingchou’ (The Grief Behind the White-Collar 
Scene: ‘All Kinds’ of Inevitable Socialising), Jinrong jie (Finance World), 
http://news2.jrj.com.cn/news/20060217/000000060862.htm (accessed August 22, 2008). 
347 Ibid. 
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and dining ‘wrecks’ the body’ (‘cuican’ shenti de chi-he).348 He admits that people have an 
ulterior motive for such socialising: ‘in fact sometimes people really hope to get something out 
of socialising.349 Perhaps what they get is invisible, but perhaps it helps their work and 
career.’350 He admonishes those who ‘overlook’ what they get for themselves and ‘push all the 
‘sins’ onto ‘socialising’ (ba yiqie ‘zuiguo’ tuidao ‘yingchou’ shenshang).’351 Socialising is half 
the battle in keeping clients happy, he confesses, and depends on the company’s strength and 
quality of service (kan gongsi de shili he fuwu de zhiliang).’352 Moreover, he has no doubt as 
to the necessity of socialising: ‘If there is no socialising, people will not even know you exist 
(lian nide cunzai dou buzhidao), so how can they possibly take note of you (zhuyi dao ni)? 
Because of this, socialising is an unavoidable (bukedang) part of working life.’353  
The golf course is a favourite venue for entertaining clients.354 It has even such an 
essential part of life of working life that the cost has become a daily item of expenditure for 
some companies. ‘Considering golf a ‘work requirement’ (gongzuo shang de xuyao) has 
already been incorporated into some domestic enterprises’ list of daily expenses.’355 Xu points 
out that because golf is most often played for business rather than personal purposes, 
companies usually bear its (high) cost. ‘Indeed, for many years now there’s been a saying 
‘chat about golf at the office, and about business at golf’ (zai bangongshi tan gao’erfu, zai 
gao’erfu tan shengyi), which also illustrates how rare it is in China for someone to pay for golf 
out of his own pocket.’356 Golf has also only recently grown in popularity, as political controls 
and rhetoric over ‘bourgeois’ sports have diminished, and it symbolises individualistic – and 
corrupt – capitalist practices, according to the sports journalist Dan Washburn: ‘It's an activity 
loaded with political implications; there's a reason why the sport, which earned the nickname 
‘green opium,’ was nowhere to be found during the first 35 years of the Communist regime. 
Golf, the belief goes, is an aristocratic, individualistic, even capitalistic pursuit linked to 
corruption in the minds of many.’357 The ‘corruption’ most often associated with golf in the 
                                                 
348 Ibid. 
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354 According to Xu Rong, ‘a phenomenon that has relatively Chinese features (bijiao juyou Zhongguo tese de 
xianxiang) is inviting clients to play [golf] (qing kehu da).’ Xu Rong, op. cit., 288. 
355 Xu ibid., 288. 
356 Xu ibid., 288-9. 
357 Dan Washburn, op. cit. 
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public mind is the bribing of officials with club memberships to facilitate business deals,358 
but also includes businessmen entertaining clients and the secretive agreements they come to 
on the fairways, far away from the watchful eyes of those who cannot afford the club 
membership and green fees. The golf club and course is a site with restricted access, only 
available to those in the upper echelons of business and government circles.  
Many of these themes were present in Wen’s practice as a sales manager, who 
frequently participated in business socialising activities, including golf. Although, as I show 
below, the distinctions of value—negative and affirmative—apparent in the articles I have 
described above, are less prominent in Wen’s own articulation. Many of his weekday evenings 
after work were taken up – pleasurably, he told me – with entertaining clients, which involved 
activities such as eating out in high quality restaurants, going for foot and all-body massages, 
soaking in saunas, karaoke singing359 and playing golf, the same homosocial activities that 
many white-collar men – including Wen – also pursued to let their hair down with friends, 
purely for fun. 
 Several years before, Wen told me, he had gone to Australia for a few months to learn 
English, but he found himself bored in the evenings because he could not find the kind of 
leisure facilities nor the social atmosphere that he enjoyed at home. The restaurants he went to 
just did not have the same feel as they did in Beijing, he complained, and he could not get 
used to socialising in bars. He particularly missed having foot massage, and urged me to set up 
a Chinese-style foot massage centre upon my return to London. This became apparent one 
evening, when he took me to a huge, high-class leisure development in west Beijing where he 
often took his clients. It consisted of a collection of buildings, set in their own grounds, 
housing a large seafood restaurant, hotel, swimming pool and other sports facilities, and 
separate sauna complexes for men and women. On arrival, after Wen had parked his car 
(guided to the space by several attendants), we were driven in an electric golf buggy to the 
main entrance. Wen recommended we start with a relaxing soak in the sauna complex. The 
male-only area comprised large pools of different temperatures to soak in, a sauna cabin, a 
steam room and open-plan massage areas with vigorous male masseurs. It was very well 
                                                 
358 ‘Can Probes of Golf Membership Listings Help to Expose Corrupt Officials?’ BeijingReview.com, 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/forum/txt/2007-03/12/content_58895.htm (accessed August 25, 2008). 
359 Karaoke singing – in tune – is such an important business socialising skill that white-collar workers are 
flocking to pay for singing classes to gain in confidence and become better at it, according to an article originally 
published in the Youth Daily (Qingnian bao), and republished on the popular Shanghai news portal, EastDay.com 
(Dongfang wang): He Mei, ‘Hu shang bailing hua qian 'xue changge': 'maiba xunlianying' zouqiao’ (Shanghai 
white-collar workers pay to ‘learn singing’: ‘king of the mike training camps’ in high demand), Dongfang wang 
(Eastday.com). http://why.eastday.com/q/20071212/u1a382543.html (accessed August 22, 2008). 
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appointed and exuded an air of luxury: many male attendants were on hand to bring towels, 
drinks and help with the simplest of tasks, quickly and unobtrusively.  
Looking round at the clientele, I noticed that a certain type of male body was on 
display. The clients were generally in their forties and fifties, and most were noticeably 
overweight, including Wen. The few younger clients seemed fairly slim. The overweight 
clients seemed almost to revel in their bulk: Wen said – with what seemed to me like pride – 
that he topped 80 kg on the scales (he was not a tall man), and suggested jokingly that I 
needed to put on weight. I thought of all the business dinners that these men had eaten to reach 
this size. Perhaps, I thought, bulk was a kind of bodily capital for these businessmen, an 
embodied marker of success, power, and indeed masculinity, which distinguished them from 
their younger, less affluent and slimmer selves and less successful counterparts. This focus on 
body shape clarifies distinctions between white-collar masculinities: for some young gym-
going men, their bodily capital is enhanced if they develop toned, fit bodies; for older men 
who are already established in their careers, their yingchou activities have produced large 
bellies and overall bodily bulk which symbolizes their positioning as successful businessmen. 
The aging body plays a role here, as does generation, but these characteristics are not fixed, 
there is no inevitable process here: masculinities are fluid and contested within individuals, 
and some, though not all, younger men are clearly keen to resist the ‘big belly’ look.  
After spending some time in the sauna complex, we walked through the mixed pool 
area and into the hotel, which were all conveniently connected. Wen led me into a room with 
two single beds, which it transpired he had booked as soon as we arrived. As soon as we 
entered the room, two young women, both about twenty years old, appeared: Wen, following a 
well-established pattern with his clients, had arranged a massage for us both. I was struck by 
how contented and relaxed Wen was: he evidently adored the attention of the young woman. 
There was nothing sexual in the massage, but there was plenty of banter to and fro between 
Walter and the young women, who teased Walter about the size of his stomach. They seemed 
to be seasoned in massaging overweight middle-aged men, and knew how to keep them happy.  
Wen told me repeatedly how much he enjoyed these leisure activities he did with his 
clients — the saunas, restaurants, foot massage, karaoke, and so — often citing his 
disappointment that conditions were different in Australia. He could not understand why this 
kind of business socializing culture was not more prevalent in Western countries; he claimed 
that many of his French male colleagues loved this lifestyle in China. On another occasion he 
took me for a foot massage, where again two young women attended to us. We also visited 
restaurants on numerous occasions. He told me that without these activities he easily felt 
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bored. Though he went shopping in malls with his wife and went to restaurants with his wife 
and son at weekends, these more family-oriented leisure activities did not measure up to the 
enjoyment he found in; going out with his clients to the saunas and karaoke.360 
Although white-collar women do go for saunas, foot massages, eat out, it seems to be 
mostly white-collar men who engage in business socializing activities. Furthermore, it is 
mostly Chinese white-collar men, not foreigners, who carry out these business socializing 
activities, so Wen informed me. This was not only for language reasons, he said, but also 
because of the need for a thorough understanding of how to behave and what to say, which 
requires knowledge acquired over time (which one could call a habituation process). Foreign 
bosses are well aware of this, according to Wen, which is why they employ locals like himself 
as sales managers and other similarly responsible personnel. Chinese white-collar men, along 
with other men, such as entrepreneurs and officials, thus dominate the spaces in which they 
carry out their leisure activities, whether for business socializing or fun, served largely — so it 
seems— by young women migrant workers from the provinces. Indeed, men’s domination of 
the social space of Chinese food restaurants puts women off eating in them: I noticed that all-
female groups are much less common than all-male groups. Women feel more comfortable 
eating in the less gendered atmosphere of fast-food restaurants. ‘[…] fast-food restaurants can 
offer a more socially gender-neutral and less hierarchical social space than other eating 
venues, and it may be not so much the food that is important in consumption but the social 
space associated with it.’361  
Young women also provide sexual services to white-collar men and their clients as part 
of business socializing. In his study of business practices in southern China, Xin Liu recounts 
a story he heard from a young man who started working in Haikou in 1992. The young man’s 
first boss emphasised to him the fundamental importance of sex with young women in 
business socialising: ‘What moves the great men around is women – xiaojie’, who knew how, 
in the boss’s words, to ‘fuck in right places and at right times’.362 Liu found that in the practice 
of business life in Beihai, there was ‘’a golden production line of entertainment’ (huangjin 
liushuixian) designed for entertaining government officials or business partners and including 
                                                 
360 Karaoke, which I do not cover here, is nevertheless a significant business socialising activity as I have 
indicated above.  
361 Latham, op. cit., 254-5. Latham cites Yunxiang Yan’s ‘McDonald's in Beijing: The Localization of 
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The Consumer Revolution in Urban China, ed. Deborah S. Davis (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
2000), 201-225.   
362 Liu, op. cit., 46. 
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three crucial steps’, which were a banquet, karaoke with xiaojie, then a visit to a massage 
parlour.363 As is clear from what I have already described, Wen’s principle white-collar 
business socialising activities closely followed this ‘golden production line.’ Similarly, as 
Everett Yuehong Zhang has commented in writing about business socialising between 
entrepreneurs and officials in Sichuan, the entrepreneurs demonstrate their economic power – 
and masculinity – when they provide young women for the officials’ sexual pleasure, and the 
officials demonstrate their political power – and masculinity – by delivering favours to the 
entrepreneurs. In this way, the masculinity of the entrepreneur and the official are constructed 
through the site of the girl’s body.364 This argument can also be applied to white-collar men 
when they engage in similar activities: for example, sales manager Wen demonstrates his 
(company’s) economic power, by taking clients on all-expenses-paid nights out along the 
‘golden production line’, canoodling with attractive young women throughout, and resulting in 
the client delivering the contract. The end result is that Wen is happy, the client is happy, and 
both have demonstrated their power and masculinity, through the subjugated, feminised 
‘Other’ of the massage girls.  
Wen’s masculinity is multiple and conflicting. For a start, we can identify the 
importance of guanxi masculinity, although this time the guanxi are not being developed 
between male colleagues, but between Wen and his clients. The seller-buyer relationship is 
cemented through the yingchou practices, which themselves are inculcated in subjects through 
mimesis, emulation and so on; there are no textbooks on yingchou, no ‘how-to’ guides in the 
men’s magazines which suggest ways of procuring prostitutes for one’s clients. Wen thus 
simultaneously and smoothly positions himself as the sophisticated, well-educated, honest, 
clean-minded white-collar sales manager and as a Chinese man well versed and skilled in the 
arts and practices of leading clients through the ‘delights’ of the ‘golden production line’, a set 
of behaviours he also performs with his gemenr, and even with me, his English teacher, to an 
extent. Even though my relationship with Wen was supposed to be 90 minutes of English 
practice in his office very week, he drew me into participating in these practices, which for 
him, were the very essence of what it meant to be a man. Therefore, as a masculine subject, 
Wen displayed what might have appeared as incongruous masculinities to the views of 
outsiders, but which Wen revelled in: the respectable, educated corporate man, the yingchou-
adept guanxi man, the dafang man (Wen treated me to many of these leisure activities), the 
fat-bellied man of wealth, and so on.  
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The notion of assemblage underlines how the locales, routines, practices, gestures, 
mental techniques, value systems and so forth all come together in subjectification processes 
to produce Wen’s multiple masculinities. Different assemblages produce different masculine 
subjectivities. That is what happened to Wen in Australia. He found himself being produced as 
a different kind of masculine subject there, through his relationship with and responses to the 
dominant discourses and practices due to the particular conditions which exist in Australia, 
and he did not like it. Different assemblages produce different kinds of masculine subjects. 
And with this last point in mind, we can see again the kind of change that ‘white-collar men’ 
represent in China. Through their taking up of models of clean, honest ‘global’ corporate 
masculinities, their simultaneous taking up of chummy, chauvinist guanxi masculinities and 
historically-inspired generous dafang masculinities, in a reiterative gender performance, they 
habituate themselves to a new composite ‘Chinese white-collar’ masculinity, drilled into the 
body over a period of time so much that it becomes a ‘natural’ way of being, inseparable from 
how they conceive of themselves.  
What I want to make very clear is that I am not suggesting here an understanding of 
‘global’ masculinities as ‘good’ or ‘advanced’ and some local masculinities as ‘bad’ or 
‘backward’ Rather, I am highlighting what I found in my extensive fieldwork, that discursive 
formations in China invariably position globally-inflected corporate masculinities as models to 
be desired, and that while these glossy masculinities are clearly sometimes pitched as using 
devices to seduce – and exploit – women (see chapter three’s ‘seven lessons in being ‘man 
enough’’) they do not advocate the kind of yingchou activities that are founded on the sexual 
commercial exploitation of women’s bodies. These disjunctures reveal not an apparently 
‘seamless’ to-ing and fro-ing between written discourse and subject formation, through, for 
example, habituation techniques but of subjects’ simultaneous insertion in diverse discourses 
of masculinity, deeply embedded in ideas of cultural and social custom.  
Anthropologist Tiantian Zheng’s research on businessmen’s ‘sex consumption’ as part 
of business socialising in Dalian’s karaoke bars, which she identifies as sites of consumption 
in the new consumer economy, throws more light on the formation of the white-collar subject 
of ‘yingchou’.365 She argues that the businessmen clients of the hostesses, along with other 
users such as government officials, ‘partake of the services offered by hostesses and at the 
same time engage in ‘social interactions’ (yingchou) that help cement ‘relationships’ (guanxi) 
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with their business partners or their patrons in the government.’366 These men see these sexual 
practices as part of a normal, Western ‘modern lifestyle’,367 she contends, in contrast to the 
unnatural constraints of Maoism and Confucianism: ‘[c]lients conceive of their sex 
consumption as the embrace of a western-oriented model of modernity and a rejection of 
artificial restraint imposed by a puritanical Confucian-socialist system.’368 To some, 
particularly but not only necessarily non-Chinese observers, however, the mixing of guanxi 
practices of sex consumption with notions of modernity and naturalised, morally acceptable 
masculine sexual behaviours may seem to signify a jumble of contradictory masculinities, 
defined both by an embrace of the liberatory invitations associated with the ‘western-oriented 
model of modernity’ and, at the same time, with a rootedness in local cultural custom. Men 
such as Wen display versions of masculinity that they imagine signify the self-fulfilment 
‘natural’ to men in their position, and which are crucial to their notions of self-worth and 
success. This could be considered an instance of the split imaginary, where the subject’s 
notion of what is going on does not coincide with the dominant other’s, that is, the 
western/global observer’s.  
As with Zhang’s observations about officials and entrepreneurs in Sichuan, Zheng 
contends that the male clients construct a masculinity through the act of sex consumption: ‘I 
argue that the clients’ ‘consumption’ of hostesses becomes the criterion by which clients 
evaluate each other’s moral quality and business competence […]. Male consumers strive to 
demonstrate a rational, ‘cool’ masculinity […].’369 Manifesting masculinity through taking 
part in such activities is a fundamental aspect of determining success in business in China: 
‘Success or failure at projecting a masculine image crucially determines participation and 
relative position within the elite, male-dominated circles of Chinese business and 
government.370 Through participating in such activities, Chinese white-collar men are not only 
constructing their own individual masculine image, they are also part of the construction of a 
wider gendered economy of exploitation and inequality. 
 
Keeping fit and maintaining status 
In this section I look at how some of the assumptions, motivations and anxieties of white-
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collar subjectivities are constituted in and expressed through sports and keeping fit. Such 
activities brought sports and health vocabularies and practices together with male bodies in 
particular venues, and produced multiple and sometimes conflicting masculinities in my 
informants. Sports and exercise played an important part in most of my informants’ lives. 
Some emphasized it as a body-toning exercise, others for the business networking 
opportunities it offered. Sports and exercise were also seen as good ways to de-stress. 
Whatever the particular interest and emphasis, however, sports and exercise were inseparable 
from social and class inflections. The types of sports and exercise, where they were practised 
and with whom were all important considerations for my informants. Moreover, the gendered 
characteristics and notions involved in their pursuit of these activities were prominent, ranging 
from assumptions about gender capacities through to the feminizing of some pursuits.  
  Most of my informants stated that at some time or other they had been to a gym, and I 
soon realised that going to the gym – a stylish, upmarket gym – is a popular leisure practice of 
white-collar men, partly because, as Xu Rong aptly noted, many companies pay for their gym 
membership.371  The media also propagates white-collar men’s gym usage: a page two 
advertorial in Shishang jiankang (lit. ‘Fashionable Health’), the Chinese edition of the men’s 
fitness magazine Men’s Health catering to affluent urban men,372 combines the white-collar 
passion for upscale gyms and foreign travel by extolling two ‘cool’ (ku), ‘top-grade’ 
(gaodang) gyms in New York, with accompanying photographs displaying their fashionably 
designed interiors.373 In the affluent business districts of Beijing, such as Jianguomen and 
Zhongguancun, large hoardings parade the names of gym chains like ‘Nirvana’ (Qingniao) 
and ‘Hosa’ (Haosha), both of which have many gyms in Beijing and beyond. They are well 
equipped with sophisticated fitness machines and also offer many exercise classes, saunas, 
steam rooms, sometimes swimming pools, internet access, juice bars and so on. The monthly 
fees are usually several hundred yuan although an annual subscription works out cheaper. 
These gyms are aimed at white-collar office workers: the Nirvana gym in Zhongguancun, for 
example, is described in a website introduction as a ‘4000-square-metre white-collar exercise 
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area’ (4000 ping mi de bailing yundongchang).374  
  Young white-collar workers are a key target of commercial gym chains, perhaps partly 
because articles in the metropolitan media encourage white-collar men to take individual 
responsibility for their health and fitness, and partly because they (or their companies) can 
afford it. In this way, an assemblage of sites, values and practices come together in ‘body 
techniques’ which discipline or fashion young white-collar males, like Johnny, Colin and 
Jason, who buy into the images and textual prescriptions of toned, healthy bodies as markers 
of ‘quality’ (suzhi) and status. Cheaper independent gyms do exist for students and those with 
less disposable income, but their equipment, facilities and fittings are not nearly as good as 
those in the upmarket gym chains. At the top-end of the scale, the top-level white-collar 
managers work out in the very luxurious expensive gyms in five-star hotels, which are out of 
the financial reach of most ‘ordinary’ white-collar workers. When I lived in Zhongguancun, 
from time to time I visited the ‘Intellifitness’ gym near Tsinghua University which served 
students and staff from the university (a wealthy Tsinghua postgraduate introduced me to it) 
and white-collar workers from its science park and other offices in the neighbourhood. Its 
name alone suggested it catered to a more discriminating clientele, who were concerned about 
getting smarter as well as getting fitter – in other words, who were disciplined by discursively-
formed intellectual and body techniques, in their quests to be sophisticated urban subjects. 
And as a sign of its white-collar status, the gym had an advertising banner outside boasting of 
awards it had received from high-end men’s magazines. The ‘Intellifitness’ gym was one of 
only several upscale gyms in the area. Even the nearby English language school where I taught 
contained a small but well-equipped gym and a large dance studio as a pulling factor for 
prospective students, most of whom were white-collar workers.  Johnny and Jason regularly 
attended well-appointed relatively expensive gyms which helped reinforce their white-collar 
status (and so did Colin as soon as he could afford it, paying for his own personal trainer as I 
mentioned earlier, since he believed a gym-toned body could contribute to his employment 
prospects);375 and they believed keeping a trim and toned physique made them more sexually 
attractive in the circles they moved in.   
  I noticed quite a number of women were working out at Intellifitness, which made me 
                                                 
374 ‘Qingniao jianshen (Zhongguancun dian): shangjia jianjie’ (Nirvana gym (Zhongguancun branch): 
businessman's introduction)’, Souzhe wang (sozhe.com), http://www.sozhe.com/youhuiquan/sjinfo.php?id=1467 
(accessed August 18, 2008). 
375 A health researcher, Ta Trang, of Washington State University, told me in July 2006 that some of her white-
collar informants said that maintaining their ‘suzhi’ (literally ‘quality’, meaning they were higher ‘quality’ people 
than others) was their reason for going to the gym.  
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wonder if white-collar gyms were relatively women-friendly, given that mainstream gender 
discourses, as discussed previously, seem to associate gym-going with men, corresponding 
with the discursive distinction between naturalised characteristics of the physically strong man 
and the relatively weak woman. I asked Jason and Terry, another administrative colleague of 
mine in his mid-twenties at the Sanyuanqiao school, for their opinions about this. Jason 
acknowledged that many people did still believe that women should keep their bodies slim:  
Working out, basically, everyone has their own desires (geren yiyuan), and most people 
say that Chinese women should be refined and elegant (wenwen-erya); with petite and 
nimble charms (jiaomei xiaoqiao-linglong); relatively small in shape (waixing bijiao 
xiao yidian); slender (xianxi); cute (ke’ai); and gentle (wenrou). Most women are like 
this, and I think most women also prefer this (daduoshu nüsheng shi zheyang, erqie wo 
juede daduoshu nüsheng ye xihuan zheyang).  
 
But he made clear that he, personally, accepted that women could build up their bodies if they 
chose to, even if most people disagreed:  
In today's society, some women are tall and strong (wuda-sancude), or have built up 
their muscles (jirou fadade). I think individuals' tastes are different (geren de pinwei bu 
yiyang). In my opinion, there’s nothing not allowed (mei shenme bu keyi); but most 
people (daduoshu ren) hold a somewhat different view. 
 
Terry, in contrast, had a less stereotypical view of women’s ‘sporting’ activities, and for him it 
was totally ‘normal’ (hen zhengchang) for a woman to want to work out. For him, it was 
simply a matter of people keeping fit: ‘first of all, in China, people think working out is a way 
to attain good health (yizhong weile dadao jiankang), so I think everyone needs to work out 
(meiyige ren dou xuyao jianshen).’ The media often portrays white-collar men as more open-
minded in their understanding of gender behaviour (as I investigate further in chapter seven), a 
subject position which Terry seems to fully take up here. 
Lifting weights in the gym, the main activity men did in the gym, is not the only option 
as a leisure practice of suitable status for white-collar men. Some white-collar men look for 
more exotic and interesting ways to de-stress and simultaneously get in shape, and gym chains 
provide an increasing array of exercise classes which reflect international middle-class fitness 
trends, one of which is belly-dancing. An article in the China Daily reports that ‘a growing 
number of young and middle-aged men, especially white-collar workers and students in 
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Chengdu are signing up for belly dancing classes’, as a 
means of ‘weight loss and release from work pressure’.376 A ‘Night of Belly Dance’ at a 
fitness club in Guangzhou, claims the article, attracted ‘more than 20 male sales managers, 
                                                 
376 Ma Lie, ‘China's Beer-Belly Males Giving Belly Dancing a Whirl’, China Daily, August 9, 2007, 4. 
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firm owners, software engineers and government officials’.377 Zhong Hui, a Beijing-based 
belly-dancing teacher, believes that the growth of white-collar male interest in belly-dancing 
in particular is because ‘white-collar men like the dance more than exercise with dumbbells 
and push-ups because the latter is dull and dry.’378 However, because belly-dancing involves 
wearing ‘navel-exposing shirts’ and ‘mastering the sinuous movements of the Middle East art 
form associated with seductive women’, many of the male belly dancers are reluctant to tell 
their friends about their hobby because it transgresses the boundary of conventionally 
publically acceptable male behaviour: it is seen as un-masculine. The more quirky new 
‘leisure-time belly dancer’ identity available to white-collar men disrupts hegemonic 
masculine assumptions. These two conflicting masculinities collide within individuals, who 
then opt to conceal the ‘transgressive’ masculinity from most people in their lives.379 These 
conflicting masculinities are typical of the new white-collar subject, and in this case point 
specifically to the association of the white-collar man (here the white-collar male belly dancer) 
with the so-called femininity, of the ‘metrosexual’ or even ‘androgynous’ man (terms which I 
examine in more detail in the final chapter). This association commonly appears as a means of 
reinforcing the values of an earthy, tough model of masculinity, including the nanzihan figure 
associated historically with peasants of the northwest and which became popular in the ‘root-
seeking’ movements of the 1980s, as discussed in chapter two. 
Golf, however, is a white-collar leisure practice which is not deemed unmasculine; it is 
a game still dominated by men, as I mentioned above, and golfing features covering the top 
global golfers, technique tips and useful information, make frequent appearances in elite 
men’s magazines such as Shisang jiankang (Men’s health) and Shishang xiansheng (Esquire). 
The high cost of playing golf, however, puts off many aspiring golfers, as Xu Rong points out: 
‘golf […] is already popular to some extent (youle mouzhong chengdu de liuxing) amongst 
urban white-collar workers (chengshi bailing) in contemporary mainland China. Many people 
yearn to experience this ‘refined and graceful sport’ (gaoya de yundong), but the very high 
outlay (gao’ang de feiyong) makes most of them recoil.’380 Dan Washburn, a sports journalist 
specializing in golf in China, shares this view: ‘[…] in today's China, although it is slowly 
becoming more accessible, golf indeed remains a rich man's game. With virtually no public 
                                                 
377 Ma, ibid., 4. 
378 Ma, ibid., 4. 
379 Ma, ibid., 4. Due to some of their non-conventional bodily practices, white-collar men are quite often accused 
of – and defended for – transgressing conventional masculine behaviour: I examine this topic more closely in 
chapter seven. 
380 Xu, op. cit., 288. 
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courses to choose from, 18 holes in China will cost around $60 [420 RMB] on average 
[…].’381 One of Xu Rong’s informants described even higher costs: ‘playing golf requires tens 
of thousands of yuan every year (meinian jiwan kuai qian), […] and a thousand yuan for one 
round; unless you are a member, altogether you must pay over a hundred thousand [yuan] 
(shiji wan).’382 Xu Rong comments that because of this, ‘many white-collar employees can 
only go to relatively cheap driving ranges to practise’,383 such as the one near Sanlitun in east 
Beijing which I frequently used to walk past in the evening, floodlit and busy.  
A student of mine at the Sanyuanqiao school, Hu, a smartly-dressed salesman in his 
early thirties from Wen’s sales team at the European electrical equipment company (I 
introduced Wen in chapter three), spent much of his free time enthusiastically learning golf, 
and each time we had a class – which was a ‘one-to-one’ tutorial – he wanted to learn golfing 
phrases. He was not particularly interested in learning general English, but in what one might 
call a kind of linguistic habituation process, he made an effort to learn golf jargon with the aim 
of using it effortlessly to impress his white-collar colleagues and clients. However, he 
lamented that he could not afford to join a golf club: his only experiences hitherto had been at 
practice ranges. He was a keen sportsman, and also played tennis. Hu’s choice of golf and 
tennis were for reasons of status: he was a white-collar man on the make, and these were the 
sports that white-collar men aspired to. On the one hand, golf is attractive to high-flying 
white-collar men because of its sophisticated, global associations: playing golf is an effective 
way to display that one has ‘made it’ to the global middle class. On the other hand it offers its 
exclusive practitioners a private world of their own in which to seal business deals, which I 
examine in more depth below.   
From the ethnographic data and media reports presented in this section, it is clear that 
white-collar men’s sports and exercise pursuits are contested in very gendered ways, centring 
on debates around which pursuits are appropriate and which are not for men and women to 
practise, and in the noticeably gendered distributions of bodies across spaces and places, from 
the distinct activities that men and women carry out in gyms through to the male-dominated 
fairways of elite golf courses. The subjectivities fashioned in these assemblages underline that 
in today’s China, despite his acceptance in some respects of women’s ‘equal rights’ to pursue 
a fit and healthy body, in many ways the white-collar man is deeply implicated in reproducing 
                                                 
381 Dan Washburn, ‘Golf in China: All Growing, all New, all Raw’, ESPN.com, 
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gender inequalities.   
 
The religious economy and ‘apolitical’ white-collar man 
White-collar men are increasingly participating in religious practices, not as acts of political 
opposition or subversion, as I argue in this section, for reasons often related to consumer 
desire and status. Looking at how religious practices are shaped in ensembles of sites 
(churches, temples) discourses (state appropriation, commercialization) and practices 
(donations, worship, tourism) revealed another infolded position in my informant Johnny’s 
subjectivity – as a middle-class Buddhist – which intersected with his identities as a polished 
corporate employee, a sophisticated consumer, a man of great dafang (generosity) and large 
guanxi networks, and a trim and conscientious gym-goer. The pleats and folds of these 
infolded exteriorities combined in their own shifting, fragmented and sometimes contradictory 
ways to produce a subjectivity that Johnny recognized as himself. Johnny was increasingly 
active in Buddhist practices, such as going to temples on holy days, and although he initially 
had shied away from explicitly identifying as a Buddhist, his MSN tagline is now ‘almost 
Buddhist’. By identifying as Buddhist, Johnny projected a disinterest in politics, and inserted 
himself into a local religious economy of ideas and practices. This aspect of his masculine 
subjectivity was explicitly economic-oriented, as I explain below.  
Johnny’s parents were Buddhists, and his home city in Fujian was famous for its 
Buddhist temples and statues. In Beijing, Johnny took me to see a special display of Buddhist 
statues on sale, in a dimmed and peaceful museum-like room that was — incongruously (to 
me, at least) — part of a huge department store in the shopping Mecca of Wangfujing. This 
was a clear example of the intersection of religion and commercialization: customers with 
plenty of money – the statues cost thousands, even tens of thousands of yuan – could buy a 
Buddha statue to display in their home for their own private religious purposes and/or 
aesthetic pleasure. Johnny had a business idea at the time, to start exporting such statues from 
his hometown, which he proposed to do with the help of a mutual British, Buddhist friend. For 
Johnny, Buddhism and commercialism went hand in hand, and he saw no contradiction in the 
marriage of these two discursive formations; in an era in which neo-liberal doctrines in China 
extended to the commercialization of, it seemed, absolutely everything, why not too for 
religions. And so too for the state, of course, which promulgates these policies: for instance, 
Buddhist sites are commercialized ‘parks’, often run by local governments. For example, the 
Badachu gongyuan (literally ‘Eight Big Places Park’) in Beijing is a popular weekend leisure 
site, with working temples (which are so crowded on important religious dates that police have 
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to manage the crowds), fairground-style stalls and a cable car. Such commercialized religious 
sites are legion. Johnny, his German tenant Kerstin and I went on a day trip to a famous 
Buddhist cave near Beijing. There were many statues in the cave and a temple at the cave 
mouth; on a nearby hillside were the ruins of a once bustling temple complex. To enter the 
mountainside we had to pay an admission charge, and there were further admission charges 
for the temple and cave, and then a charge for the cable car to get back down the mountain. 
There were many day-trippers, strolling through the cave and through the woods on the 
hillside. Buddhist sites such as this in contemporary China occupy an uneasy middle ground 
between Disneyfied relics for tourist meanderings and consumer purchases, and functioning 
places of pilgrimage and worship, with visitors often combining the two to various extents.  
Not only Buddhism is booming, but Christianity too, and even Confucianism is 
enjoying a revival. Jason was a Catholic who had used the religious community for support 
when living abroad, but who very rarely took part in any religious practices, which he found 
boring. His father was a Catholic, so he was baptised when he was a baby, but his mother was 
a Buddhist. A large new Protestant church had just been built in the heart of Zhonguancun 
when I was living there. Designed by a German firm, it sat prominently amongst the computer 
malls and office blocks, serving the area’s affluent parishioners who raised 6 million yuan to 
fund the project, according to the China Daily.384 Many of the congregation are current or 
future young white-collar workers: ‘Up to 70 percent of the church's parishioners are young 
people from nearby universities and leading IT companies.’385 The underlying pull for these 
people, in historian Daniel H. Bays’s view, may be because ‘[p]sychologically, different forms 
of Protestantism can offer for intellectuals or the urban middle class an identification with the 
West and modernization.’386 Here, too, commercialism is combined with religion: on the 
ground level, looking out onto the street, was a Starbucks style coffee shop. Christianity is 
associated with Western cosmopolitanism, and commercialism, as Duncan Hewitt, an ex-BBC 
China correspondent, points out. ‘For some young people, particularly students, Christianity 
has become quite fashionable in recent years, partly because of its status as a foreign import’, 
and he adds, because ‘it offers a new commercial opportunity.’387   
Confucianism is also witnessing a revival of interest among China’s new white-collar 
sector. Two of my students at the Zhongguancun language school were full-time PhD students 
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at a nearby university, writing theses advocating the application of Confucianism in modern 
life, a field they claimed was exercising a growing number of Chinese scholars, especially 
with regard to moral issues. Books on Confucianism were piled high in Zhongguancun’s best 
bookstores, and according to Duncan Hewitt, ‘a number of private schools offering an 
education in the Confucian classics have opened in several Chinese cities.’388  At the same 
time as advocating Confucianism, they were also promoting the consumer health products of a 
Hunan-based company owned by the family of one of the students, suggesting that for them at 
least, there was no conflict between Confucian values and consumerism.  
Has depoliticisation increased the appeal of religion for white-collar men? Both 
Johnny and Jason displayed a complete lack of interest in politics, and if political topics came 
up in conversation they usually switched to something else. Jason’s favourite line when a 
political topic came up was ‘What’s the use in talking about something you can’t change?’ 
When I spoke to Johnny about the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, he said that all he knew was 
that some policemen and soldiers had been killed. I told him that many students had died, 
which spurred him to check some non-Chinese websites about the massacre. He claimed to be 
shocked by what he saw and that he had had no idea so many students had died. For him, as 
with Jason, politics was profoundly boring, providing evidence for Karl’s thesis of the 
impossibility of politics in contemporary China. 
 Depoliticisation and the subsequent ideological vacuum have increased the appeal of 
religion, suggests political scientist Hongyi Harry Lai, as it ‘meets the population’s needs for 
psychological comfort and spiritual fulfillment, especially in confronting a variety of problems 
inherent in the modernization program, including increasing marketization, rapid social 
transition, and emerging social problems.’389 Daniel H. Bays, writing about Protestantism, also 
feels that rapidly changing economic and social conditions may facilitate its growth amongst 
white-collar workers: 
China has finally joined the World Trade Organization. That may mean even more 
rapid economic and social change as, under the pressure of international competition, 
state-owned industries and the entire public sector shrink even more rapidly and 
private enterprises and economic networks grow. This might constitute an opportunity 
for further expansion of Protestantism in China. As a Chinese business and 
technocratic class in urban China becomes more like its counterparts in Singapore, 
Penang, Vancouver and Silicon Valley, the growth of Protestantism in all of those 
places outside China may constitute a model for its future religious trajectory within 
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China as well, at least in urban areas.390 
 
In sum, the involvement of white-collar employees in religious practices, of whatever 
faith, manifests the general defining characteristics of this new social sector: a mixture of 
global and local affiliations, consumerisation, and the necessary habituation to a set of rituals 
and the concepts that underlie them. These new spiritual habituations are formed through 
engagements with particular sites, discourses and practices that thereby encapsulate the mix of 
desires and interests typically embodied in white-collar men, including consumer and status 
aspirations, and undoubtedly also indicate what many have called a moral or ideological 
yearning left by the moral vacuum of the post-Mao era. 
 
 
To conclude, this chapter’s examination of white-collar men’s leisure practices, highlights 
several defining features. They have at least two main underlying motivations, which may be 
present mixed together or singly, as outlets from pressure of work, and for business socializing 
purposes; and apolitical religious practices may also be motivated by a search for ideological 
or moral beliefs. They are strongly infused with capitalist, consumerist ideologies; they 
manifest global and local aspects; they require a process of habituation before they are 
mastered; they are depoliticized; and they justify as natural the privileging of men through the 
services provided by women. These features have all emerged in the context of the gendered 
discourse of desire that is prevalent in China now. White-collar men like Jason, Johnny, Peter 
and Bruce all fit within the terms of Rofel, Zhang, Yan and Wang as ‘desiring subjects’ and 
‘subjects of desire’, pursuing privatised, Westernised, commercialized, and depoliticized 
leisure activities. Furthermore, they undertook these activities in homosocial ‘gemenr’ groups, 
echoing historical notions of masculinity. The ‘overdetermining’ gender discourse shaping 
these practices and their sites often strongly privileges their associated ‘masculine’ 
characteristics over women. It is through these, also, and through their display of authority 
over the feminine that the status and authority associated with the masculine subject is 
produced and affirmed. 
Concerns are increasing about the work pressures of white-collar lifestyles, and so 
white-collar men are urged to take up sports and leisure pursuits; yet, unhelpfully from a 
personal health perspective, outside the office their unavoidable and frequent business 
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socializing also takes a heavy toll on their bodies. Through their choice of leisure sites and 
activities, from eating out to playing sports to working out in the gym, facilitated by their 
spending power and cultural sophistication, white-collar men manifest particular tastes, 
distinguishing themselves from other groups of men. Most notably, they demonstrate their 
aspiration to be part of a globally-recognised middle class. Increasingly, white-collar men are 
participating in China’s religious revival, in mainly Buddhist and Christian circles, yet their 
involvement is underscored by material desire, consumerism and depoliticisation. Desire is a 
salient feature of business socializing practices, too, in the form of desire to advance one’s 
career, and also desire for the young women in bars and massage parlours who are the vehicles 
through which white-collar men often construct and perform their multiple, diverse 
masculinities, as they seal their business deals.  
How do young white-collar men negotiate their stressful working lives, busy leisure 
lives, and the demands of a relationship or marriage? The next chapter deals with these issues, 
as it looks at how notions of the spousal ideal play out in practice. 
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Chapter Six 
White-Collar Husbands: Conjugal Ideals and Breadwinning Pressures 
 
 
 
What kinds of husbands and partners do white-collar men make? This chapter explores the 
formation of white-collar conjugal masculinities, through an analysis of relationships with 
wives and girlfriends, the domestic spaces and objects which come together in assemblages 
which infold particular routines and habits into the subjectivities of husbands and partners of 
women. White-collar conjugal relationships depicted in the media commonly suggest an 
equivalence between ‘middle-class’ marriage, increasing prosperity, and greater gender 
equality. Model husbands are portrayed as more caring, understanding, and more accepting of 
gender between husband and wife. Yet these ideal relationships often present gender roles 
which hark back to deeply embedded understandings of distinctive male and female attributes 
and practices. My informants’ opinions suggest widespread anxieties about men’s declining 
influence and authority and reveal persistent attempts to maintain men’s dominant status in 
relationships, for example, in avoiding having relationships with women who earn more 
money than them. Many white-collar boyfriends and husbands articulate profound anxieties 
about their personal relationships with women: a sense of being hemmed in, not being 
acknowledged, being denied an authority they want, and being increasingly threatened by 
women’s rising economic and cultural leverage. A beleaguered sense of fear of 
disempowerment that I not infrequently noted in my informants draws on naturalised ideas of 
gender difference that have very little to do with the glossy media veneer of the new white-
collar man, but which reveal the inheritance of a legacy of what are appropriate distinctions in 
gendered behaviour and practice. In the fast-changing and competitive social and economic 
climate of contemporary China, in which gender opportunities relationships and roles are in a 
constant state of change, particularly due to women’s increasing economic power, men and 
women widely seem to resortto conventional conceptions of gender as an unchallenging 
certainty that provides reassurance and comfort.391  
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The discourse of modernisation frames the wider changes in Chinese society as a 
movement to more equality, democracy and self-fulfilment, including in the gendered aspects 
of personal relationships. Yet my interviews with young white-collar men suggest a very 
different view. Their views illuminate a dissonance between the enlightened, tolerant and 
confident husband portrayed in mainstream media, not least in, for example, car adverts, or 
TV programmes as explored further on in this chapter, and the kind of anxious conjugal 
subjectivities they exhibit. They complain about pressure to bring in money, to be the 
breadwinners, some are not keen for their wives to work, and they certainly do not want their 
wives to earn more than they do. When wives do earn more, they disdain them, calling them 
henpeckers. This is the double bind that white-collar men put themselves in: the pressurised 
breadwinner and henpecked husband. They retrench to what they know best: stereotypical 
ideas of men and women, demonstrating a profound inertia of gender attitudes. Thus in the 
assemblage of ideas, emotions, fear and anxieties that constitute the complex multiplicity of 
masculine subjectivities, lies a deep unease about equality in relationships with women, 
including wives, lest it lead to the tables being turned on them and their eventual loss of 
dominance in the home.  Wider changes in Chinese society over the reform years have also 
shaped the employment, spatial and familial structures containing white-collar men’s intimate 
relationships with lovers, parents, siblings, children and so on. Many of the young white-collar 
men I interviewed were living far from home, and were unmarried – though most planned to – 
and had no children, and so their most significant day-to-day relationships were with their 
girlfriends, wives, or boyfriends. I do not therefore deal with issues of fatherhood in this 
thesis, since, as I noted in chapter one, within the parameters of my field work, and in the 
context of discussions about what my informants considered significant in their day to day 
lives, fathers did not figure much. Without exception, they professed a strong sense of filial 
obligation, but in practice many of them did little more than call their parents occasionally and 
visit once a year for a few days at the Spring Festival, and some went back to their parents’ 
home even less frequently. References to such activities did not feature prominently in our 
discussions so I do not examine practices of filial piety here, (though they too are 
unquestionably part of the wider construction of masculinities and demand future study). My 
fieldwork conversations about significant family and intimate relationships thus focused on 
relationships with wives and girlfriends, and I follow this focus in this chapter. White-collar 
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men’s gay relationships and issues of sexuality also featured in such discussions but I leave 
these for the following chapter.  
To understand how the wider societal changes have influenced the discourses and 
practices of these intimate relationships, I first investigate the impact of these changes on 
white-collar men’s families generally, then look more closely at how they have affected power 
sharing between white-collar men and their partners. I discovered that one of the factors which 
‘unbalances’ power sharing is the widespread attitude that men should be the main 
breadwinner, which many informants complained put them under heavier pressure to achieve 
career success than their partners. I investigate this breadwinning pressure on corporate men 
and end the chapter with a closer look at the contrasts between such views and the spousal 
ideal presented in mainstream media. 
 
White-collar relationships in context: changing families in reform China 
Despite the relative Westernization of the ‘managerial elites’, who are particularly active in 
promoting ‘Western culture in the workplace’, Yan Yunxiang argues that ‘[i]n their private 
lives, however, many of these elites remain rather traditional, especially in the way they deal 
with gender relationships, the education of children, and interpersonal relations.’392 Yan’s 
reference to ‘traditional’ gender relationships suggests the hierarchical, patriarchal neo-
Confucian model, which has come to typify notions of the ‘traditional’ Chinese family, 
although in recent years, the idea that women often have a much stronger profile and decision-
making power in family life than men has circulated with increasing strength.393 Although I do 
not examine filial obligation here, it is worth noting sociologist Martin King Whyte’s 
observation – which reinforces Yan’s argument – that in urban China ‘it appears that […] 
sentiments of filial obligation remain robustly intact’, despite other transformations such as the 
notable ‘shift from arranged to free choice marriages’.394  
There have been changes and continuities in attitudes to sons, too, as Harriet Evans 
points out in her research on mothers and daughters in contemporary China. On the one hand 
she acknowledges large long-term social shifts away from patrilineal power: ‘Urban attitudes 
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towards the importance of sons have been shifting since the early days of the People’s 
Republic. Women’s employment in urban areas; higher levels of education; increasing 
tendencies towards neolocal marriage and residence; and property, inheritance, and legal 
rights, as well as reduced fertility, have all contributed to undercutting traditional patrilineal 
biases.’395 On the other hand, she also highlights the persistence of discriminatory attitudes 
with regard to the significance of sons: ‘changing practices do not signify a simple rupture 
with beliefs and ideologies of the recent past. Urban women’s descriptions of growing up in 
the 1980s and 1990s continued to demonstrate the cultural importance of sons; their accounts 
indicate the profound embeddedness of the gender hierarchy of the symbolic order that 
persists through and despite equal material treatment.’396  
In their well-known work on families in the post-Mao era, sociologist Deborah Davis 
and anthropologist Stevan Harrell seek to explain changing patterns of family behaviour with 
reference to wider changes in society, arguing that behavioural shifts demonstrate ‘the 
adaptation of cultural rules to changing and diverse political and economic circumstances.’397 
They believe that examining family adaptations in the wider context of societal change sheds 
light on underlying transformations in family life, contending that the ‘different outcomes of 
adaptation to different circumstances’ allows them ‘on the basis of empirical case studies, to 
begin to make certain generalizations, not so much about outcomes as about processes.’398 My 
interviewees’ diverse approaches to family life – ranging from a deep identification with 
‘traditional’ values of male authority and responsibility, to a desire to forge an independent 
life style with tenuous links to the family group – can be usefully analysed through this 
argument when understood as part of an assemblage of the discursive and non-disursive 
elements that produce new masculine subjectivities. All can be seen as different adaptations to 
the changing economic and social climate (such as economic privatisation and social 
atomisation), which is placing more and more emphasis on individual actions and 
responsibility. However, as the views of Yan, Whyte, and Evans suggest, the transformations 
of the private lives of individuals occurring within changed economic and political 
circumstances, to use Davis and Harrell’s words, ‘play themselves out against the background 
of a Chinese family culture that does change, but only slowly.’399 
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Elisabeth Croll has noted the pressure that men are put under to make a lot of money, 
simply to attract a girlfriend or wife: ‘[f]or young men too, having prospects is important when 
it comes to meeting girls, having a steady girlfriend and proposing marriage. […] In the cities, 
it is more likely to be the young men themselves who feel the pressure to increase their 
‘prospects’ with a good match.’400 Croll quotes a young male industrial researcher in Beijing, 
speaking for aspiring young men as a whole: ‘We’re under a lot of pressure. You’ve got to 
earn big money and get a big house – they are now standard criteria for women looking for a 
husband.’401 Croll notes that this kind of pressure on men to provide materially for their 
partners was already present in the 1980s: ‘Many of the lyrics of popular songs speak of the 
pressure on young men to reach the standards required for matrimony.’402 
 In line with these analyses, my research amongst young white-collar men reveals a 
similarly complex picture: a sense that gender hierarchies in families are diminishing, yet still 
persist, and that the younger generation have more independence than previous generations, 
yet must still heed parental desires. In a discussion with me about the different treatment of 
sons and daughters, Peter, whom I introduced in chapter five, initially quoted an old saying 
decrying the waste when a daughter marries and leaves: ‘marrying off a daughter is like 
pouring away water’ (jiachuqu de nü'er, pochuqu de shui), whereas ‘the son can be at his 
parents’ side’ (erzi ne, keyi zai fumu shenbian), before suggesting that the situation is ‘is 
slowly becoming [more] equal’ (xianzai manmande pingdeng). But he added the caution that 
‘girls are still not fully affirmed’ (nühai’er haishi burong bei kending). Likewise, from the 
son’s perspective, he expressed the desire of aspiring young people to be more independent 
and live away from their parents: ‘no young people nowadays, whether male or female, want 
to live with their parents (dou bu xihuan zhu zai fumu shenbian)’. But he admitted that parents 
still exercised a major pressure in decisions to get married, saying that he would get married 
and have children partly to keep his parents happy, which was a response I also heard from 
several other informants. 
 Yet young middle-class men and women are postponing marriage plans while they 
complete their educations and start their working lives. The average marriage age for white-
collar couples is higher than that of the population at large.403 This corresponds with the 
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vanguard role of the middle class in the society-wide shift in emphasis to economic 
development through individual enrichment, and the encouragment to aspiring young urban 
professionals to develop a career as a priority before settling down to married life and having 
children. In his book documenting social change in contemporary China, Duncan Hewitt 
records the example of a young white-collar couple in Shanghai taking an unhurried attitude 
towards marriage, suggesting that this is a widespread trend.404 In the opinion of Bruce, the 
manager of the Sanyuanqiao school, white-collar men have to establish a good career before 
getting married and having children, which places an ‘extremely big’ (feichang da) pressure 
on them. The average age of marriage among such men has consequently been getting ‘later 
and later’ (yue lai yue wan), and is now ‘very late’ (hen wan): some men were leaving 
marriage until they were ‘over twenty-eight or even thirty.’ Terry also emphasized the extent 
the marriage age had already changed:  ‘Yes. I don't think this is a case of whether it will 
change or not (bushi shifou hui gaibian): we should say it's already changed (yinggai shuo 
yijing gaibianle). As far as I know, in China many people over thirty […] are still not married 
(yiran meiyou jiehun).’ And he acknowledged that social acceptance of the thirty-plus singles 
was ‘slowly improving’ (xianzai manmande hao).405  
 Moreover, Tang Meiling reports that her survey showed that ‘the proportion of 
unmarried young white-collar workers under 25 was 87.8%, only 51.7% of 26 to 30 year olds 
were married, and 6% of those 31 or over were not married’, and that there were significant 
number of singles: ‘of the unmarried white-collar women, 47% had no current boyfriend  […], 
and the proportion of white-collar men without a girlfriend was 43.8%.’406 That 94% of white-
collar workers over 31 are married shows that most still eventually succumb to social 
expectations that ‘thirty’ is a normative limit. Tang proposes several reasons for the rise in 
white-collar marrying age, the first of which is higher levels of parental education: ‘young 
white-collar workers with better educated parents tend to marry later, and they are more likely 
to have a child later especially if their mothers are better-educated.407 Tang found that for 
white-collar women, the mother’s age is particularly influential, whereas for men, their own 
educational level is more important, which she suggests ‘may be related to the relatively large 
amount of time it takes to obtain a high educational level, and may also be related to the 
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relatively high desire for personal development of better-educated men, who do not want to 
take on the burden of a family too early on.’408 A further reason is the influence of working in 
foreign and private companies: ‘a higher proportion of young white-collar workers who 
worked in foreign investment enterprises and individually-owned private enterprises were 
unmarried and childless’, which Tang suggests may be related to the higher economic benefits 
of working for this kind of organization.409  These findings confirm that white-collar men and 
women are delaying marriage while they concentrate on furthering their education and career. 
 One reason for the very high marriage rate is the strong legal incentive to marry if one 
has children. For example, applying for a residence permit (hukou) for a child is much easier if 
the parents are married, according to Mark, the computer company owner. The residence 
permit helps children get access to local education and other services; without it, large 
additional fees must be paid to schools. Mark told me that despite apparent equality in the law, 
there is much real-life discrimination against unmarried mothers from the authorities, who 
require that unmarried mothers go through additional bureaucratic hurdles and pay extra fees 
to obtain a residence permit for their child.410 Belinda told me that as soon as cohabiting 
couples had children, they would almost invariably get married. Terry concurred with this 
view, and thought that this would remain the case, because as soon as ‘children are involved 
(qianshedao haizi), people feel it [marriage] is a responsibility (renmen renwei shi yizhong 
zeren)’. Peter believed that cohabiting couples had to get married, children or not, the sooner 
the better: ‘If a man and a woman live together...if they first get engaged then they can live 
together (dinghun yihou keyi tongju), but they must get married within a year or as soon as 
possible. Although there's no time limit, they have to get married [eventually] (suiran meiyou 
shijian de xianzhi danshi bixu yao jiehun).’  
 While the marriage rate remains high for white-collar men there has been a noted 
increase in the number of professionals without children, as Terry brought to my attention. ‘In 
Chinese society these days, there are many couples who don't want children (you hen duo fuqi 
buyao haizi); dinkies: dinky families (dingke: dingke jiazu).’411 The number of dinkies is on 
the rise, according to a survey conducted by Sun Zhongxin, professor of sociology at Fudan 
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University: they now compose 12,4% of families in Shanghai, and Sun remarked that ‘the 
percentage would have been even higher if we had only surveyed couples aged between 20 
and 40.’412 Another survey, conducted in Beijing by a market research firm, ‘found that one in 
every ten households in Beijing had chosen not to have children.’413 Terry remarked that 
dinkies would probably still receive pressure from their parents to have children, but he argued 
that ‘perhaps, it's precisely only with this kind of rebellious thinking that society can change’ 
(yexu zheng shi zhezhong fankang de sixiang cai shi shehui fashengle gaibian).  
 In Terry’s eyes, the decision not to have a child might appear to be a ‘rebellious’ 
response to normative expectations and pressures, but the underlying reasons lie with the 
issues of core importance in white-collar life: money, quality of life and career. One of the 
motivations for being a dinky in China is the rising cost of paying for a middle-class education 
and lifestyle for one’s child, according to Peter, who told me that having a child in China now 
was ‘really expensive’ (te gui). Dinkies are mostly concerned with their own quality of life, 
according to sociologist Li Yinhe, who has been quoted as describing dinkies as ‘mostly 
hedonists who value individuality and the quality of married life more than parenthood.’414 A 
majority of the married respondents in Tang Meiling’s survey of white-collar workers still did 
not have children.415 Tang’s respondents said this was mostly because of work pressure: ‘the 
proportion of young married childless white-collar workers who put off having a child for 
work reasons was the highest, at 44.7%: they thought that having a child would affect their 
work (sheng haizi hui yingxiang gongzuo). If they were busy at work they would have no time 
[to look after the child], or they feared they would lose their job.’416 Furthermore, competition 
in the job market is so intense that losing one’s job during maternity leave is a realistic fear for 
many women, according to one female professional, interviewed by Xinhua.417 In sum, it is 
the demands and temptations of the market economy which encourage white-collar workers to 
focus on career development, material accumulation and satisfaction of personal desires, and 
is leading some of them not to have children.  
 
Power-sharing in the white-collar household 
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The transformation of a particular aspect of intimate relationships which my informants often 
mentioned, and which often gave rise to very heated opinions, was power sharing between 
husband and wife. Such transformations are being effected through the linking of many 
elements, including historical notions of appropriate relations between husbands and wives 
drawing from ‘traditional’ precepts, more recently-established socialist viewpoints, as well as 
biologising ‘scientific’ ideas which entered China in the early 20th century, as I discussed in 
chapter two. Crucial to this mix are notions and practices surrounding the gendered division of 
space, which are of particular relevance in today’s climate where increasing numbers of men – 
and women – are expressing the belief (and living a corresponding reality) that women are 
more naturally suited to and indeed ought to spend more time on domestic tasks and child-
rearing than men, and that a husband’s career choices should come before his wife’s. All this 
produces very complex gendered relations between husbands and wives that do not fall into 
simple binary categories (as I indicate below with the story of the mother of one my 
informants, who ‘wears the trousers’ in her marital home), and also often conflict with global 
‘hegemonic’ ideas of the gender-enlightened and ‘politically correct’ white-collar husband.  
A survey conducted by the All-China Woman’s Federation has revealed that wives 
have more decision-making power over daily expenses than they used to, which Chen Aihua, a 
professor at Nanjing’s Southeast University, argues is due to ‘[i]mprovement of women's 
economic status and education’. However, the survey also showed that men are more likely to 
retain decision-making power over large items of expenditure.418 My informants’ views were 
varied: some believed unequivocally that men were the masters of the family, while others 
argued that many women have substantial domestic power. ‘In China there is an old saying: 
for all to be well in a country, the first consideration is family (yige guojia yao hao, xian xiu 
jiating). First sort out the family, then sort out the nation (jiating nong hao, ranhou nong 
guojia)’. These were the words of Peter, one of the administrative assistants at the 
Sanyuanqiao English school, referring to a canonical item of China’s Confucian tradition to 
stress the importance of the family in Chinese culture. And he was clear about who he thought 
was in charge of ‘sorting out’ the family – the man. However, in the current competitive 
climate of China’s market economy, he argued that a man’s ability to ‘sort out’ his family 
depended initially on ‘sorting out’ his career. At the heart of a successful modern Chinese 
family, in Peter’s view, is a man who ‘after getting a good job and becoming reasonably 
successful, looks for a wife and then gets married’ (youle ziji de gongzuo yihou, fazhan de 
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bucuo yihou, zhao yige laopo, qizi, ranhou jiehun). Having married, Peter insisted, it was the 
man’s responsibility to ensure that his children were well educated: ‘this is something that a 
man has to do’ (zhe shi yige nanren bixu zuo de shiqing). Peter’s view was unequivocal: 
family welfare depended first and foremost on the man, and for a man to be considered 
successful in life, he must establish both a career and run a flourishing family.  
Terry, Peter’s colleague, also saw the man as most important figure in the family.  ‘For 
example, traditionally in China – possibly there are also these customs in modern society – the 
man is considered the main figure, or the mainstay (zhizhu) of the family.’  He mentioned a 
long-established saying to explain that while men attended to work outside the family, a 
women’s lot was to take care of domestic duties. ‘As for women, how to put it? In Chinese 
there is a saying, “men control the outside, women control the inside” (nan zhu wai, nü zhu 
nei).’ In Terry’s view, Chinese society would never fully rid itself of this concept: ‘I think 
with society's constant progress (suizhe shehui de buduan jinbu), this kind of opinion will 
possibly slowly weaken but won’t die out, (zhezhong kanfa keneng hui manmande jianruo, 
dan buhui xiaowang).’419  
Such widespread and pervasive notions about the proper role of men in the family and 
their relationships with their wives and girfriends inevitably inflect how white-collar men 
conceive of their own masculinity. Wen, the sales manager for the European electrical 
equipment company, concurred with these views in many respects. He felt pressurized, as the 
‘breadwinner’ of the family, to provide for his family. This folds another ‘subject position’, 
the ‘anxious breadwinner’, into the complex mix of the subject positions informing Wen’s 
sense of his own masculinity. His wife did not work – which he acknowledged was a mark of 
status demonstrating his financial power – and they had a son whom his wife wanted to go to 
an outstanding primary school she had selected, even though they did not live in its catchment 
area. Furthermore, he himself wished eventually to send his child to an overseas university, 
because he considered the Chinese education system too limited. To ensure a place for his son 
at his wife’s choice of primary school, Walter told me he had to pay a ‘holding fee’ (zhanzhu 
fei) of 60,000 yuan (over four thousand pounds) to the principal of the school because they did 
not live in the catchment area. But this was only a temporary measure: he then had to buy a 
house within the catchment area. Nevertheless, he also suggested that women held 
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considerable power in family matters.420 He told me he did not contest his wife’s decisions in 
many domestic issues, for the sake of domestic harmony, and gave as an example his wife 
insisting on choosing the decor for their houses. Even if he did not like it, he said, he still went 
along with it, because if he did not it would end in a quarrel or divorce. In this regard, Wen 
was behaving more like the tolerant, open-minded white-collar men of the narratives in 
women’s magazines (see below). However, his wife’s remit did not extend to utilities such as 
the electrics and the plumbing, which he handled because his wife did not know anything 
about them. The positions Wen adopted suggest tactical manouevring on his part, a 
recognition that he must in some respects ‘treat’ his wife kindly and respect her rights, yet at 
the same time display his desire to hold onto areas of control he deemed significant, or 
unquestionably a man’s responsibility. Wen’s acknowledgement of his wife’s domestic 
influence is just as Croll suggested in her study of China’s ‘new consumers’, where she agrees 
with the notion that women from affluent backgrounds have a significant degree of domestic 
decision-making power. She cites a survey on the spending patterns of China’s super rich that 
‘suggested that many of the key decisions to do with family or personal daily consumption 
were made by wives.’421  
 In some families, it appears that the wife/mother is completely in charge at home, in 
terms stereotypically associated with the husband’s/father’s profile. Jason, who was helping 
out with the family firm, described his mother’s dominant role in just such a way. In the 
1980s, his mother had worked for a state company sourcing and selling industrial components, 
before setting up her own company with her brother to do exactly the same thing operating 
from an office in a business park. In Jason’s view, she was an early version of the white-collar 
worker turned entrepreneur in the early reform era. Her business success had enabled Jason to 
pursue further education in the West, and had funded foreign holidays for the whole family as 
well as the purchase of a second house. Jason was not entrepreneurially minded, he happily 
confessed, and took no strategic role in the company, preferring to work in a normal 
employee’s role. His mother’s obvious business acumen was coupled with a strength of 
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character which Jason contrasted with his father, whom he described scathingly as being 
weak-willed, and not exhibiting, in Jason’s view, the masculine qualities of determination and 
decisiveness. Jason was determined not to be like his father. He described his mother as a 
‘strong woman’ (nü qiangren), and on the several occasions when I visited their home, it was 
clear that she headed the family in conventional gender terms: it was she, not her husband, 
who seemed to ‘rule the outside’ (zhu wai). His father shopped, cooked and cleaned, while she 
made business calls and chatted with guests. In Jason’s words: ‘It’s my mother who’s in 
charge (wei zhu), because she has always been considered as a strong Chinese woman 
(Zhongguo nü qiangren), the kind with a strong personality (hen you gexing). My father is the 
opposite (fanguolai): he’s a househusband (jiating funan) who cooks in the kitchen (xia chu 
zuo fan) and takes care of household chores (caoli jiashi).’ Jason believed this kind of 
domestic arrangement was now very common: ‘Nowadays, most of this so-called henpecking 
(suoweide qiguanyan), the wife controlling the relatively passive husband (zhangfu bei laopo 
guanqilai, bijiao beidong yidian), is extremely widespread (feichang de pubian).’422   
 Despite Jason’s assertion of the spread of the dominant and implicitly ‘henpecking’ 
wife, when I asked four young white-collar working adults – two men and two women at the 
Zhongguancun school – who they thought should have the final say in the family, nobody 
unequivocally chose the wife. Robin, who was very easygoing, laid open the possibility that it 
could be the wife, when he argued that stability in the family required one partner – either 
husband or wife – to be dominant; he claimed that research shows if power is equally shared it 
leads to instability. Elizabeth thought that the husband should have the final say, although she 
believed housework should be equally shared. Justin, who was usually very politically liberal 
in his opinions, also said it should be the husband. Vicky, who was often a strong advocate of 
women’s rights in class discussions, felt that power should be shared equally between husband 
and wife. In another class, during a discussion I initiated about the power balance between 
husbands and wives, I asked Ryan, a 29-year-old police detective originally from Henan, 
whether he expected his wife to ‘obey’ (tingcong/fucong) him. He replied yes, he did want her 
to obey him, but with a long face he admitted that in reality he had to respect her wishes; this 
caused great laughter in class, although Ryan did not seem too amused. The women in the 
class – most in well-paying jobs – nodded but rolled their eyes when I asked if most Chinese 
husbands expected their wives to obey them, leaving me with the sense that they would not be 
rushing to obey their partners. 
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 Two of my female colleagues at Johnson’s believed that in contrast with women’s 
changing role and position, men were rather slower to adapt to changing circumstances. 
Belinda argued passionately that many men still try to ‘control’ (guan) their wives and 
girlfriends, adding that this type of ‘traditional thinking’ was very ‘deep-rooted’ (genshen-
digu) and ‘serious’ (yanzhong). However, as a young modern woman, she believed herself to 
be relatively independent of her boyfriend. Claire, too, thought that younger men’s attitudes 
had not changed much from those of the older generation. In her view, Chinese men, 
particularly men with high salaries, generally felt that women should not go out to work nor 
should they go out to have fun, though she added men on lower salaries needed their wives to 
go out to work to bring enough money into the family home. Moreover, she noted that a wife’s 
greater career success often caused problems at home, because of the husband’s difficulties in 
accepting his ‘inferior’ status (zibei), which she attributed to the higher status men historically 
enjoyed. Most women, she suggested, were content with ‘traditional’ arrangements, and 
despite their higher educational level relatively few wanted to pursue a career. And is if 
echoing the ‘truth’ of their views from the ‘man’s perspective, Bruce, the manager of the 
Sanyuanqiao language school, made it clear that he was both unwilling and unable to 
countenance an inversion of conventional gender roles: 
Lots of people don't like the idea. Why? Because from a man's point of view, the 
traditional definition is that men go out to work, women stay at home to cook meals and 
such like (chuantong de dingyi shi nande zai waimian gongzuo, nüde zai jiali zuo fan, 
qita zhexie dongxi). Let me give you a personal example. Formerly I knew a woman, she 
was 26, 3 years older than me. She had her own career, a car, and also a house. She 
wanted to have a relationship with me, but I thought maybe I couldn't…couldn’t really 
accept it (wo keneng bu hui…bu tai jieshou), because if she earned money (ta zhuan 
qian) and I go and spend her money (wo qu hua tade qian), then I'd be a ‘little white 
face’ (xiaobailian).423  
 
I laughed when he said ‘little white face’ and asked, ‘don't you want that?’ He laughed, then 
looked serious, replying: ‘No, it’s [about] a kind of self-confidence’ (buyao, shi yizhong 
zixinxin). Bruce did not want to take up the ‘subject position’ of xiaobailian, although it is an 
established and not uncommon male identity in China. Bruce feared association with the term 
xiaobailian because it implied reliance and dependence on women’s economic wealth and 
favour, challenging his sense of what he saw as rightful masculine dominance in intimate 
relationships with women. Such fears are nurtured and magnified in the current climate of 
male anxiety about the rising economic independence of women. In Bruce’s estimation, the 
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dependency of ‘little white faces’ on women’s wealth conflicted too much with his investment 
in his desired status as the self-sufficient, affluent, breadwinning provider; it was a step too 
far, a contradiction that he could not resolve in his construction of his self-image.   
In her survey of conceptions of breadwinning amongst thirty-nine married couples (from 
various backgrounds) in Beijing, the sociologist Jiping Zuo, found that husbands and wives 
still generally conceptualised breadwinning and the division of domestic duties and family 
responsibilities along conventional gender lines. Whereas neither expected the wife to 
relinquish her work role, both believed that the husband should be the obligatory provider and 
the wife should combine work with household responsibilities.424 However, some women do 
give up their careers for their husbands: an English medical researcher in Beijing informed me 
that some intelligent and well-qualified Chinese women she knew had given up good jobs and 
their career ambitions to put their husband’s career first. The researcher said it was clear the 
women did not want to anger or disobey their husband, and subscribed to the idea that a 
husband puts career first and a wife puts family first. Zuo found that professional women’s 
level of personal income was crucial in determining whether they chose to continue working 
or leave to raise a family. Professional women in high paying jobs ‘all expressed their desire 
to stay in the labor force even if their husbands could support the family’; however, ‘[b]y 
contrast, professional women with low income, little intrinsic benefits, and long work hours all 
expressed their desire to return home provided that their husbands were able to support 
them.’425  
Zuo also looked into the husbands’ points of view, which she found to be very 
supportive of working wives if they could add significantly to family finances: ‘The husbands 
shared similar opinions to those of the wives with respect to wives’ family roles. An 
overwhelming majority of men firmly supported the wife’s employment (37 out of 39). Men 
not only welcomed their wives’ employment but also cherished it when their wives made 
significant financial contributions to the family.’426 Zuo attributed this to state promotion of 
women in the labour force: ‘The 40 years of gender equality education and practice have 
instilled in men, as well as in women, egalitarian beliefs about women’s work role.’427 Zuo 
even found some middle-class men who professed disappointment and regret that their wives 
had no career. ‘One scholar, who married a staff member from a research institute, reported 
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that ‘I thought that we would have something more in common had she had a career of her 
own.’’428 However, Zuo also found that although many men preferred their wives to keep 
working even if the man’s income was enough to support the family, ‘most men had no 
expectation of their wives’ being committed breadwinners’,429 because they still expected their 
wives to shoulder the double burden of work and family duties. ‘The data show that in spite of 
the fact that 90% of wives held a full-time job, 70% of them shouldered more household 
responsibilities than their husbands did.430  
 
Breadwinning pressure on white-collar men 
In the changing social and economic conditions of the reform period, a new subjectivity of the 
anxious white-collar male under pressure has emerged, as I have pointed out above, 
characterised by an anxiety about his status, as represented through salary, educational 
qualifications, in relation to his wife’s. These anxieties are driven by widely circulating 
notions about a general rise in women’s power and a decline in men’s in recent years, as I 
mentioned in chapter two, and by a marked return to strongly-embedded notions of ‘natural’ 
gender roles and characteristics. The typical ‘anxious white-collar male’ believes that being a 
man in today’s China is much more onerous than being a woman, so both my informants and 
media discussions would suggest.  He generally holds that he has to be the dominant wage 
earner in the household, and finds it very difficult to accept his wife earning more than him. If 
she does, and she chides him, he complains of being henpecked. Indeed, if his salary is high 
enough, he would prefer she does not work at all. He also much prefers his educational 
achievements to outrank his wife’s. He is content to ‘allow’ his wife to run domestic sphere 
activities, such as daily household tasks and raising children, as long as he maintains pre-
eminent status in public sphere fields such as career and even leisure activities. Of course, he 
does expect her to bring in a salary if his is not high enough, but this causes him increased 
anxiety, since he does not want her salary ever to eclipse his own. The subject position of the 
‘anxious breadwinner’, produced through gendered cultural discourses of male fears about 
challenges to what is seen as men’s rightful position in the family is driven by increasing 
education levels and earning power amongst women. It was articulated by my informants in 
their references to ‘historically’ embedded ideas of men’s authority over women, rooted in the 
biologising ‘scientific’ discourses of their educational backgrounds and the nanzihan 
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masculinities resurrected by the root-seeking movement in the 1980s, all of which contradict 
the image of the smooth, liberal, women’s rights embracing ‘new man’ of the metropolises, as 
I investigate further in the following section. First, however, I look more into the formations of 
the ‘anxious breadwinner’ discourse through analysis of my informants’ ideas and practices. 
A key issue that comes to light through my ethnographic data here is that men’s 
anxieties about their authority in a highly competitive society in which women are gaining 
increasing status, and their related anxieties about their position in the conjugal relationship, 
are conducive to men’s denigration of their wives’ position as a way of reaffirming the 
masculine self..431 This was apparent in various comments my informants made. ‘One can say 
that Chinese people are rather chauvinistic (keyi shuo Zhongguoren dou shi feichang de bijiao 
da nanzizhuyi)’, Kevin argued, but suggested, as Terry had, that in recent years this attitude 
has ‘faded and decreased (you danhua you jianshao).’ However, it had not disappeared, he 
maintained, therefore ‘[men] feel under a bit more pressure (hui ganjuedao yali hui da yixie).’ 
As professional, educated women seem to be increasingly empowered, and men feel under 
more and more pressure, many men resort to the comfort of gender stereotypes they already 
know. This is one reason why in the more open reform era some men have been so vocal in 
their calls for women to leave work and return to the home,432 and some of those who can 
afford it, like Wen, prefer their wives to be full time housewives and mothers. Kevin had a 
girlfriend, and even though he said he agreed in general with the principle that men and 
women should be equal, he admitted that he felt under pressure to make more money than her, 
to be the highest achiever in the relationship. Because of this, he concluded, it was not easy 
being a man in contemporary China. Wen, too, felt embattled and said that Chinese men were 
very ‘xinku’ (hard-pressed). He was particularly concerned about inflation, and complained to 
me with an exasperated sigh over dinner one evening that even the cost of maids was going 
up.  
 As exemplified by Bruce, white-collar men’s unwillingness for their wives to become 
the main breadwinner means, in effect, that they bring more pressure on themselves and in my 
experience are very vocal in complaining about this pressure. Bruce attempted to sum up for 
me the pressures and responsibilities of the contemporary white-collar man as he saw them: 
                                                 
431 Cultural discourses of male anxieties in times of social and economic uncertainty and attempted reclamations 
of dominant masculine subjectivities through increased misogynistic notions and practices have historical 
antecedents in China at least as far back as the late Ming period. T'ien Ju-K'ang, Male Anxiety and Female 
Chastity: A Comparative Study of Ethical Values in Ming-Ch'Ing Times (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988). 
432 Wang Zheng, ‘Gender, Employment and Women’s Resistance,’ in Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and 
Resistance, ed. Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003): 160-4. 
 162
‘It’s because Chinese boys are relatively responsible minded (Zhongguo nanhai’er bijiao 
zeren xinde.) Why? You have to get married (yao jiehun), you have give your wife a home 
(yao gei ni laopo yige jia), a comfortable place (anwei de difang), you need a reliable job 
(kekao de gongzuo), you go back and forth, take care of your family (zhaogu nide jiali ren), 
and perhaps above you there are your parents (ni keneng shangmian hai you fumu).’ He joked 
that the sole purpose of white-collar men was to make money for their wife, children and 
parents to spend as consumers: ‘We jokingly say Chinese men are now just money-making 
machines (kaiwanxiao de shuo Zhongguo nanren jiushi zhuan qian jiqi): they make money, 
women spend it ([tamen] jiushi zhuan qiande, nüde jiushi hua qiande). And all the shops, 
sellers, clients, and women: they're all earning men's money (dou zhuande shi nande qian). 
Because who is given the money earned by men to spend (nanren zhuande qian shi gei shei 
hua de)? It's given to their wives, children and parents to spend (gei laopo hua, gei haizi hua, 
gei fumu hua). Bruce believed that money is what attracts women to men in today’s society, 
not looks: 
You can see lots of very ugly boys (chou de nanhaizi), but actually they've got money, 
so they can get a very pretty girlfriend or wife (qishi you qian, you hen piaoliang de 
nüpengyou huozhe hen piaoliang de laopo.); and there are some very fine-featured boys 
(ting qingjun nanhai), who don't have money (mei qian). The key factor here is not 
about whether you're handsome or good-looking (bushi chuyu ni shuai huozhe bushuai): 
it's about whether you have money (chuyu ni you qian meiyou qian).  
 
In Bruce’s view, the man is the linchpin provider for the rest of Chinese society, and it is his 
responsibility to earn enough money to provide for his family; but Bruce spoke cynically 
about the chances of making money on merit, and that the desire for money led to criminal 
behaviour:  
If you look at young people in their 20s, in China…I can talk about the negative and 
positive, right (wo buguan shuo fumian haishi zhengmian dou keyi, shi ma)? It’s realistic 
(jiushi hen shijide). If you look at 20-something boys, driving cars or whatever, there are 
two possibilities, one is that their family gave it to them (jiali geide), the family has 
money (jiali you qian), the other is that for sure he has done something bad (ta mei zuo 
haoshi), namely cheated people (jiushi pian ren). 
 
Bruce’s cynicism conflicts with the mainstream academic and popular models I discussed in 
chapter two of the squeaky-clean, honest, pure young white-collar men, who make their 
money through their own hard work, not through corruption or nepotism. 
Women’s ideas about breadwinning pressures on men are of course no less constructed 
through these various discursive formations. For example, Belinda, my colleague at Johnson’s 
school, also thought that being a man was a heavier burden than being a woman in 
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contemporary China because of the burden to provide for his partner: ‘ the most important 
reason is that if a girl maybe does not work hard herself (nühai’er, keneng ziji bu nuli de hua) 
but marries a good husband (jia yige hao laogong), she will possibly still be very happy 
(keneng ye hui hen xingfu); but for a man, when he has just started maturing (nanren gang 
kaishi chengshu de shihou), he has to go and earn lots of money himself (rang ziji qu zhuan 
hen duo qian); it is the only way he can provide for his girlfriend (zheyang cai neng yangqi ziji 
de nüpengyou).’433  
Following the logic of the Belinda’s sentiments, professional women often forgo their 
own career advancement to support their husband’s career, which puts even more pressure on 
white-collar men. In her survey on breadwinning in post-Mao urban China, Jiping Zuo, found 
that many of her male respondents felt pressure from their wives to be successful in their 
careers: ‘Many men wanted to be successful because that was what their wives wanted them to 
be. Many wives said that it felt right when a man had a higher achievement than did his 
wife.’434 Zuo quotes the wife of a man who had reached a high-ranking position in a 
government agency: ‘He knows that he has to keep making progress in his career to make me 
happy. He is a little concerned that I might leave him if he failed to do so.’435 Another example 
Zuo gives is a businessman who said that ‘men would be looked down on by their wives if 
they failed to provide. His wife replied to the issue by saying, ‘I can understand it if his career 
suffers due to uncontrollable forces, but I won’t forgive him if he has no career ambition or 
overly devotes himself to domestic work.’’436 Zuo also reports that some women told her they 
had passed up job opportunities to ensure their husband stayed as the main breadwinner of the 
family: ‘[…] some other women refused to be ‘overly’ committed to career pursuit for fear of 
crossing the breadwinning boundary. Several women stated that they passed up a few job 
opportunities in support of their husbands’ career. They did so to not hurt their husbands’ 
feelings and to maintain the harmony of their marital relationships.437 
An additional burden on men and their families is the requirement to pay for the 
couple’s housing: ‘One aspect of the cultural model of patrilocality that did not disappear by 
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the late 1990s was the expectation that grooms would provide marital housing. The ability to 
live up to this expectation remained an important determinant of whether a man could win a 
bride.’438 This has become more difficult in the reform era, according to Fong, ‘as more 
housing became privatized rather than provided by employers.’439 This put more financial 
pressure on the parents of boys: ‘Unlike sons’ parents, daughters’ parents could invest all their 
savings in their daughters’ education, rather than saving part of it for the purchase of marital 
housing. The need to obtain housing to attract a spouse was thus a disadvantage for sons and 
their parents.440 When I raised this issue with Mark, the computer company owner in his late 
twenties, he confirmed that it is the groom’s family that is expected to provide the marital 
housing. 
Men are also under pressure to work longer hours than their spouses because they are 
viewed as the main provider. ‘Among dual-earner couples, husbands are found to work longer 
hours than wives, wives’ earnings tend to be considered as secondary, and husbands are still 
expected to be the main providers.’441 Zuo found considerable evidence of husbands working 
more and earning more than wives: 
There were far more husbands than wives entering the private sector to seek higher 
earnings. Husbands were more likely than wives to moonlight. Wives were more likely 
to sacrifice their own career in support of that of their husbands than the other way 
round. More wives than husbands became unemployed workers. Of the unemployed 
workers, husbands tended to obtain another job more often than wives. Wives were more 
likely than husbands to quit the job in the situation in which one spouse’s income alone 
could sufficiently support the family. The above patterns resembled the general trend in 
Beijing and urban China.’442 
 
Overall, the evidence suggests that generally both white-collar husbands and wives place 
more expectations on husbands to have successful careers, capable of providing the bulk of 
family support, and that many wives are content to have a secondary status to their husbands. 
This is occurring at a time great social and economic change from which middle-class women 
are benefitting in terms of educational and career opportunities, and in which many men feel 
doubly pressured through their ‘obligation’ to provide and the knowledge that their wives may 
well have the potential to earn as much if not more than they do. To neutralize the ‘threat’ that 
this presents to their status and self-image, white-collar men often resort to encouraging their 
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wives to leave their careers to attend to domestic matters, further adding to their sense of 
pressure. Furthermore, accompanying the rise in the educational and employment 
opportunities for women is a cultural discourse of idealization of the good husband, associated 
with the better educated and cosmopolitan white-collar man, which as I have shown above, 
contributes to men’s self identification. The white-collar husband is thus additionally 
‘pressured’ to treat his wife with care and loving respect as an equal, conflicting with his 
attempts to maintain his dominant status. It is to this idealization of the good husband as an 
aspect of men’s gendered subjectivities that I now turn.  
 
The spousal ideal and his discontents 
In this section, I examine how the pressure to have a happy marriage is constructed through 
the intertwining of discursive formations with the material settings, practices, emotions and 
values productive of the subject positions that white-collar husbands take up, three of which 
are particularly preeminent. First, the reinforcement of notions of gender difference in 
marriage legitimise men’s view of themselves as hopelessly burdened, as mentioned above, 
and also reaffirm a fundamentally unchanged ideology of women’s emotionality, dependence 
and service. Second, also discussed above, the concurrent production of male anxieties about 
their position in society and the family, and the performance of their manhood, as seen in the 
concerns about potency about which Everett Zhang has written and in my informants’ 
comments about all aspects of their lives may reflect a kind of ‘siege gender mentality’ of the 
dominant under threat. And third, the idealisation of the good husband, which I look at in 
detail below. For the white-collar masculine husband/partner, these produce multiple, at times 
conflicting subject positions: his economic ‘burden’ is to provide a suitable middle-class 
lifestyle including condominium apartment, an appropriate brand of car and the consumer 
frills that the wife of a white-collar woman. However, he worries about his wife contributing 
too much financially lest her success detract from his status and in that respect would rather 
she not work, but he really needs her income. At the same time, he knows that being a ‘good’ 
husband means treating his wife as an equal, respecting her wishes, and encouraging her in her 
own journey of self-fulfillment, and yet he must also be tender towards her and a ‘manly’ 
protector if necessary, as I examine below in my discussion of the ‘Happy Heroes’ TV show. 
Furthermore, the additional competition in the marriage market from the increasing number of 
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foreign male white-collar professionals working in China’s big cities leaves the Chinese 
white-collar man feeling even more under assault, beleaguered and disempowered.443  
Three related points can be drawn out from this. First, despite men’s anxieties about 
overwork and not wanting their wives to go out to work, they are still subject to an idealisation 
of conjugal contentment. They have to be the good husband, who works on himself to be more 
caring and understanding towards his wife. Yet this also shores up the conventional gender 
asymmetry of marriage: men’s love of their wives is eulogised not to imply that he should not 
be the breadwinner but rather to keep his wife happy as the servicing dependent wife. Finally, 
the ideal couple are depicted as practising a unity of consumption: the house, the car, the 
holidays are material goals for the couple’s happy life together.  
The idealisation of happy companionate conjugality has been a constant feature of the 
reform era discourses positioning contemporary subjectivities in China.  ‘Since the early 
1980s, the ‘privatization’ of matters associated with love and marriage has been accompanied 
by the widespread use of romantic imagery to contextualize descriptions of the ideal marital 
relationship.’444 Tang Meiling implies that the idealization of family life serves as an imagined 
respite from intense career pressure: ‘At work, young white-collar workers have a strong sense 
of urgency and strong pressure (hen qiang de jinpogan he yali) and relatively high career 
development demands (jiaogao de zhiye fazhan yaoqiu); in life, they pursue a warm, romantic 
and happy family life (zhuiqiu wenxin, langman he xingfu de jiating shenghuo).’445 However, 
Tang acknowledges the practical difficulties in balancing work and family: ‘‘Start a family 
and establish a career’ (chengjia-liye) is the issue facing every young white-collar worker, but 
tension and pressure (jinzhang he yali) often mean working and family life cannot both be 
satisfactory’ (gongzuo he jiating shenghuo buneng liangquan).446 Harriet Evans argues that the 
wife’s placing her husband’s career before her own is promoted as a way to resolve this 
tension: ‘the wife’s self-sacrificing support of her husband has been reinforced as a gender-
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specific requirement of the harmonious ideal of conjugality.’447 According to Evans, dominant 
gender discourse ‘effectively biologizes the sexual and moral imperatives imposed on women 
in representations of wifehood’.448 This means that the conjugal ideal of the harmonious 
white-collar couple, in which the wife plays the predominant domestic role while remaining 
subservient to her husband, is presented as the natural way of things, perpetuating an unequal, 
hierarchical reality at times obscured by images of equal say within the marriage. 
A television show, Huanle yingxiong (Happy Heroes), broadcast in 2005, manifested 
this two-way pressure of developing a hard, corporate white-collar masculinity and a caring 
conjugal masculinity. It followed six men, all between twenty-five and thirty-five years old, 
and nearly all with white-collar professions, who were on the verge of getting married, as they 
went through individual and group tests in a training camp to see who was the number one 
‘good man’ (hao nanren). In recognition of the mix of global and local aspects involved in 
contemporary relationships, the website introduction to the show states: ‘In these days of 
cultural collision between East and West, people are no longer certain about the traditional 
views on family and marriage. There is no (longer a) fixed definition of a ‘good man’.’449 The 
eclectic activities which the men had to undergo included various ‘psychological’ tests; 
looking after young children in a kindergarten; filming an MTV style music video about ‘good 
men’’; wearing knights’ armour to show how tough they were; a table tennis competition; a 
painting competition in which their fiancees directed them to paint something; baking a cake; 
cooking a savoury dish; answering questions on resolving daily life problems in the home; and 
they had to guess their fiancees’ answer to a specific question, to see how well they knew their 
fiancee.  
From the type of activities the programme makers selected, their assumptions about 
what a ‘good man’ should be able to do are clear: he should be domesticated and be able to 
look after children, yet he should also be tough and able to handle himself in public, physically 
if necessary. A lot of the activities pointed to the men’s relationship with their partners, 
promulgating the message that to be a good man one needs to be a good husband. Implicitly, 
this marginalises all those who are not married, particularly those beyond the average 
marrying age band. The range of activities is indicative of how masculinities are constituted, 
as Rose emphasizes, not merely through linguistic interpellation, but also through bodily and 
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mental techniques concerning particular objects and issues in particular spaces. For example, 
the performance of the caring, tender husband and father is demonstrated through caring for 
children in a kindergarten setting, or baking a cake in a domestic setting, or even answering 
personal questions about their fiancee to show an intimate bond that ‘transcends’ physical 
place. However, in contrast, the competitive and sophisticated ‘knight’ is constructed in 
assemblages of displays of physical prowess, energy and dexterity, such as dancing, singing 
and using props in music videos or taking on competitors in sporting settings, such as the table 
tennis table, bat in hand. This is not to deny the importance of linguistic interpellation in the 
construction of these contrasting, sometimes conflicting, always shifting masculinities, but to 
draw attention to the materiality of discursive formations, the body connected with routines, 
habits, movements in assemblages that, in very complex ways, infold these practices into 
‘psychological interiors’ which may seem perfectly natural, unchanging, and justified to 
individuals in the ways they live and articulate their gendered selves.  
Distinguishing the winner from the other competitors was his mastery of romantic 
language: in his website profile he wrote that his wife ‘is the most beautiful and kind-hearted 
woman in my mind’s eye; marrying her is the most fortunate event of my life (neng qudao ta 
shi wo zhe beizi zui xingyun de shiqing).  I would marry her again in my next life and the life 
after that (laishi de laishi, wo haishi yao qu ta)’450 Loving words like these no doubt touched a 
chord with the younger female viewers of the show, and it was most likely their voting power 
which ensured his victory. Comments from Belinda, my co-teacher at Johnson’s, echoed the 
sentiments of the wives on the programme: she stated that her ideal boyfriend would be 
‘responsible’ (zeren xin), ‘dedicated to his work’ (shiye xin), and crucially, would love her 
very much. It is clear that in competitive and fast-changing times, men – and women – turn to 
those discursively-formed gendered configurations which provide them with most reassurance, 
infolding particular ideas, values and practices ‘within’ themselves, and thus developing ways 
of seeing themselves as gendered in particular ways; which here involves a return to an ideal 
of warm, companionate, yet deeply gendered conjugality. 
 As the winner of Huanle yingxiong demonstrated, the ‘good man’ and husband has to 
work on himself to be such, so that his performance of masculinity can encompass these 
sometimes conflicting masculinities. Through this performative process, ‘global’ and ‘local’ 
ideas are taken up to create new white-collar masculinities, which make complex and 
competing demands upon the men who take them up. This new ‘model’ of a white-collar 
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husband should treat his servicing, emotional wife with loving kindness. At the same time, 
both he and his wife expect him to be successful in his career. He has the complex task of 
learning a cool masculinity primarily suited for office life, to demonstrate his urban 
sophistication and corporate suitability; yet also develop a caring, sensitive and respectful 
masculinity for an idealised intimate relationship of domestic bliss, which at least palliates his 
wife’s unequal domestic burden. Some corporate men struggle to live up to the loving ideal, 
James Farrer notes, instead treating marriage ‘as a practical step they would take after 
establishing themselves in a career, substantiating the complaints of educated women […] that 
men treated relationships in a businesslike fashion.’451  
 An account of the tensions in the marriage of two office workers in Qingnian shejiao 
(Touch) magazine exemplifies the mainstream discursive depictions of the emotionally 
dependent wife, and the husband who works at being more sensitive to her needs.452 Zhou 
Jing, the 28-year-old wife, a clerk (wenyuan), describes how dependent she was on her 
husband emotionally after having their daughter: ‘After giving birth to our daughter I suffered 
from post-natal depression: everyday I lay in bed, I didn't want to keep on taking medicine, 
and for more than half a month my husband stayed at home to take care of me. He didn't go to 
work until my state of mind had got a bit better.’453 She reinforced her emotional helplessness 
through her outline of her prolonged low spirits: ‘My depression continued at a lesser degree, 
the whole day I would hold our daughter and gaze out the window; suddenly I felt that nobody 
cared for me, even to the extent that I lost faith in life.’454 She was unable to break out of her 
unhappy state, which she visited upon her husband: ‘At that time, my husband worked far way 
at the Outer Pudong Bridge, and whether he came home quickly or slowly, I continuously 
complained to him and expressed my dissatisfaction, and blamed him for not calling to see 
how I was. Perhaps it was due to my bad mood, what I said was always sarcastic: at that time 
both of us were in sullen moods, neither side yielded, blaming each other.’455  
 Her husband, Duan Ran, a 30-year-old purchasing manager (caigou zhuguan), revealed 
how he had felt under huge pressure at work and at home during this period: 
At that time my state of mind was also not good. During the day I had a lot of pressure at 
                                                 
451 James Farrer, Opening Up: Youth Sex Culture and Market Reform in Shanghai (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2002), 220. 
452 Ai Lei, ‘Yadang Xiawa ruci butong’ (The differences between women and men), Qingnian shejiao (Touch) 
(June 2005): 12-19. ‘Yadang Xiawa’ literally means ‘Adam [and] Eve’, which acknowledges the familiarity of 
Qingnian Shejiao’s predominantly middle-class readership with Christian mythology.  
453 Ai, ibid., 12. 
454 Ai, ibid., 12. 
455 Ai, ibid., 12, 14. 
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work, I had to suffer my boss's criticisms; and after work I was again met with my wife's 
insults: I couldn't bear these ongoing insults. When I got angry, I really felt like escaping 
to my parents' home. Why is that women can go back to their parents' home but men 
can't?456 
 
However, in a revelatory moment, he perceived his wife’s utter helplessness, weakness and 
reliance on him: ‘Just when I was getting ready to step out and escape, I saw my wife's 
helpless state of mind; perhaps my stopping momentarily gave her inspiration, she said: ‘Don't 
go, I need you too much! Hold me tight in your arms! I need your warmth, your strength.  
Husband, please don't go!’’457 It was then that he began to ask himself about love’s ‘true 
meaning’ and to question his own actions: 
At that instant, for the first time I comprehended: what is love? What is the true meaning 
of love? I couldn't help think, genuine love, means having your partner's interests at 
heart, means no matter what happens, the two people must help one another in times of 
difficulty, with mutual love and respect. I had always bragged I was a qualified husband, 
full of love for my wife, but just as she said, I had absolutely not accompanied her 
through the crisis: the time when she had complained because her pain or 
disappointment, I had just thought of escaping. 
 
 In a happy ending to the article, Duan resolved to become a better person and to 
‘understand’ his wife fully. His attention to himself, or ‘care of the self’, outlines the process 
of body – and mental – work he had to go through, to measure up to the ideal of a loving 
husband: 
Right from that day on, I reflected and weighed things up, in the end how I could get 
along with my wife. So that she wouldn't get hurt again, to help her through difficulties, 
to take her from sadness to happiness, from anger to joy, I worked hard to change 
myself, to understand her, to satisfy her needs, and to let her understand my thoughts 
and needs; in these ways, one can resolve every kind of emotional conflict.458  
 
A psychologist is quoted in a commentary on the account, to lend weight to the idea that 
husbands must work at showing love to their wives: ‘[…] the wife only needs to get her 
husband's concern (guanxin), understanding (lijie), respect (zunzhong), devotion 
(zhongcheng), tenderness (titie) and comfort (anwei), even if it's just a silent embrace, a light 
caress and looking into each other’s eyes (yanshen de duijie).’459  
 In the above narrative, the place where the husband, habituates himself to a more 
‘tender’ masculinity is the matrimonial home, and he decides to leave the ‘pressured 
                                                 
456 Ai, ibid., 14. 
457 Ai, ibid., 14. 
458 Ai, ibid., 14. 
459 Ai, ibid., 14. 
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breadwinner’ masculinity outside the front door. Until the husband was able to perform as a 
loving partner, he felt trapped, since if he fled to his parents he would be deemed 
irresponsible; he would not have lived up to his masculine responsibilities as head of the 
family. The psychologist here is the authoritative voice cajoling men into learning the 
emotional vocabulary, routines, and gestures of the tender, caring and sympathetic husband, 
played out in domestic spaces with particular arrangements of bodies and objects, such as the 
post-natal wife and mother at the window, or on the bed, waiting for her husband to come 
home. The disciplining voice of the psychologist promotes bodily and intellectual techniques 
which shape a new masculinity, very often discursively linked with the white-collar man. This, 
again, is the kind of change the white-collar man represents in China. Although ‘real’ life may 
not ever measure up to this discursive ideal, it signifies a new way of understanding the self 
for those men who are or aspire to be affluent, urban, sophisticated subjects, which is infolded 
with the many other subject positions that these men feel obligated or choose to take up and 
perform.    
 Given this demanding discursive climate, it is perhaps not surprising that many women 
(though not all) are not keen to take on the role of major breadwinner, as Jiping Zuo 
discovered in her survey of married couples: 
Men’s ideal to provide was widely agreed on by their wives in the sample. The 
majority of wives (29 out of 39) went even further as to believe that the man should be 
the main breadwinner, although they said that they would be happy to share the 
financial burden. Their rationale was that women already shouldered a double 
burden—work and the family—and therefore had no energy left to carry on the 
breadwinning role. Several wives expressed their wish of not having to juggle work 
and household responsibilities. They would rather take on more housework and child 
care and be supportive of their husbands’ career pursuits. 
 
 Zuo found that wives reported being praised for putting their husband’s career first: ‘The 
wives who put their husbands’ career ahead of theirs tended to be praised by society. The wife 
of a prominent social scientist said proudly, ‘When people learn about my husband’s new 
academic achievements, they would praise me dearly for my support of his work.’’460 
However, Zuo also found that ‘a career woman would get admired only if she could 
successfully combine her career with family work’, otherwise she would be seen as selfish.461 
Men were unable to escape from the burden of being the primary breadwinner, according to 
Zuo, because a man with a more successful wife was seen as unmasculine: 
                                                 
460 Jiping Zuo, op. cit., 332. 
461 Zuo, ibid., 332. 
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[…] it was not quite acceptable for a husband to put his wife’s career ahead of his. They 
would be seen as the ones who are unmasculine, not ambitious, and incapable. The men 
of ‘failed aspirations’ could not easily compensate for their failure with greater sharing 
of household responsibility. In the present study, when men’s job/career achievements 
fell short of their wives’ expectations, few were able to use an increased involvement in 
domestic tasks as a substitute for their career loss. This was because they breached the 
breadwinning boundary.462 
 
For this reason, many ambitious white-collar men try their utmost to avoid becoming a man of 
‘failed aspirations’, not measuring up to the ideal, as their very masculinity is at stake.  
The expectation that middle-class husbands should earn more than their wives compels 
those men who do have high-achieving wives to defend their situation. In their survey of 
China’s middle classes, Chen Guanren and Yi Yang report the story of Mr Dong, a white-
collar man, who, although earning much less than his wife, had found a way to salvage his 
dignity through demonstrating that his public sector job brought many extra benefits that his 
wife’s private sector job did not offer. His wife, in her mid-thirties, earned about 10,000 yuan 
a month working as a department manager for a foreign insurance company, whereas he 
earned around 3000 yuan at a large state-owned commercial company, likewise as a 
department manager.463 According to Chen and Yi, a reporter ‘asked Mr Dong with a laugh’ 
(xiao wen […] Dong xiansheng) when Dong was standing at his wife’s side, whether he 
thought his salary was ‘much too below’ (shaode tai duo) his wife’s.464 The reporter was 
perhaps trying to needle any sense of masculine dignity that Mr Dong may have had; however, 
Mr. Dong claimed his jobs non-monetary benefits compensated for his relatively low salary: 
You can’t calculate it like that (buneng zheyang suan). My company provides housing, 
hers doesn’t; mine has company cars, hers doesn’t. If you came to my company to do the 
interview I could take you out for a meal in a restaurant on expenses, she couldn’t. My 
monthly salary is about three thousand, and if you add in these sundry things, then 
there’s not much of a difference (ruguo zai ba zhexie qiqi-baba de jia jinqu, women 
chade ye bu suan hen duo). Besides, you don’t know how hard they have to work: the 
work she alone currently does would be done by three people in a state-owned enterprise 
(ta xianzai yige ren gan de huo’er zai guoying qiye gai shi sange ren gan de).’465 
 
Mr Dong maintains his sense of self-worth vis-à-vis his wife by listing the extra benefits a 
state-employed employee gets. One major benefit of working for a state-owned organisation 
that Mr Dong does not mention, is the larger guanxi network available to those in the state 
                                                 
462 Zuo, ibid., 333. 
463 Chen and Yi, op. cit., 62. 
464 Chen and Yi, ibid., 62. 
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sector, which Henry, one of my students with experience of working in both private and state 
sectors, had told me about. 
 
 
To conclude, the idealization of a harmonious, companionate ideal of heterosexual conjugality 
in the white-collar household belies the real anxieties amongst contemporary white-collar men 
about their conjugal relationships. The responses from both men and women can be 
understood as entrenched grasping for what feels safe in an ideological and cultural context in 
which little urges them to think of gender in different ways, but in which especially women’s 
roles and positions, and family structures are radically changing. White-collar men’s 
relationships with their wives or girlfriends manifest a complex mix of practices reflecting 
deeply embedded cultural discourses in China, as well as those more recently emerging global 
ones. In the reform era, the ‘traditional’ discourse of nan zhu wai nü zhu nei has coalesced 
with the scientific ‘biologising’ discourse, which naturalises women’s emotional and care-
giving capabilities, to justify the continued overburdening of women with domestic duties in 
the white-collar household. Likewise, men are associated with mastery of the public sphere in 
both discourses, which justifies their continued position as expected main breadwinner in the 
family, although this puts them under more pressure than women to be successful in their 
careers; their status and self-respect depend on it.  
Yunxiang Yan’s injunction that the ‘managerial elites’ are relatively ‘traditional’ in 
their gender relationships is borne out by the evidence presented in this chapter. This reliance 
on familiar gender roles partly reflects heavier societal pressure on men to be breadwinners 
than women; at the same time it contributes to pressure on women to fulfil their domestic 
duties and to support their husband in his career. And although media articles and comments 
from my informants also indicate that wives have generally gained status and power within the 
family throughout the reform period, white-collar husbands mostly retain decision-making 
power over major issues. Indeed, while white-collar men often feel threatened by their 
increasingly better-educated wives, and complain of being henpecked, they often try to limit 
their wives’ power in the family and maintain what they see as their rightfully dominant status. 
This puts increasing pressure on them to provide for their families. Consequently, widespread 
impetus and weight has been given to the idea that being a middle-class man in China is a 
heavier ‘burden’ than being a woman, because career success is vital to the social status of the 
aspiring white-collar man, and is even a crucial element in attracting a partner. To keep his 
wife happy, according to this discourse, the white-collar husband must learn to be attentive to 
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his way of caring for her; he must be loving, tender and patient of her emotional needs. 
Moreover, he must also be able to develop a ‘corporate warrior’ mentality so that he can 
achieve career success, and bring home enough money for the consumption requirements of 
their family unit, and the educational requirements of offspring, enabling them to build and 
maintain appropriate status in the social hierarchy. If he is unable to earn more than his wife, 
the white-collar man is at risk of becoming a figure of failure, unless he is able to justify it to 
others and himself.  
In this chapter I have dealt with the emergence of the subjectivity of the anxious 
husband, fashioned through an assemblage of media and cultural discourses of the anxious 
male, some of which draw on and rework historical ideas; relationships and practices between 
men and women in their daily conjugal lives in the domestic environment, and the increasing 
gendered social and economic inequalities that have emerged on a national scale in the reform 
period.  My informants offer little evidence to indicate a departure from conventional gender 
configurations in this regard. On the contrary, despite rhetoric about respecting the equal 
rights of women to careers and general self-fulfilment, their desires to reaffirm a masculine 
authority through concerns about their wife’s or partner’s potential challenge to their status 
have led to increased depictions of women as best suited to concentrating on domestic duties 
as wives and mothers, deferring to the career plans of their husbands. However, if these 
images and narratives about the cosmopolitan urban male confirm a fundamentally 
hierarchical view of binary gender relationships, others concerning potentially transgressive 
masculine subject positions suggest otherwise, as I go on to discuss in the next chapter.  
 175
Chapter Seven 
The sexual ambiguities of white-collar masculinity  
 
 
 
While the previous chapter suggests a partial retrenchment of conventional gender positions, 
some of the white-collar image’s associations, whether in my informants’ or media accounts, 
might suggest otherwise. The new ‘man-enough’ office worker discussed in chapter three, and 
Jianguomen man in chapter four are the main models of white-collar masculinity in 
contemporary Chinese discourse. The new century man who also appeared in chapter three, 
suggests an ambiguity in the gender meanings of his body; a suspicion of femininity hovers 
over his post-millennial attention to beautiful skin and beautiful brands. However, both my 
informants and media discussion explicitly refute this suspicion, while at the same time 
accepting the descriptor of ‘slightly androgynous’ as appropriate to the white-collar man.  
This chapter analyses the gender implications of the white-collar man as sexual 
subject, examining the visual images, the accompanying texts and settings, and how my 
informants see themselves as sexual subjects. The media has characterized this sexual subject 
as the ‘metrosexual’—sometimes translated as ‘metropolitan jade man’ (dushi yu’nan) or 
‘metropolitan beautiful man’ (dushi meinan)—and the ‘androgynous’ (zhongxing, lit. ‘middle 
sex man’) man. Both these terms are widely associated with white-collar status.466 For some, 
including my informants, these categories are positive signs of China’s ‘sexual revolution;’ 
they denote the new gender attributes (and spending power) of the ‘new century man’ I 
discussed in chapter three. To others, they threaten the masculine boundaries of the moral 
order, particularly when associated with the extreme examples of transgressive ‘androgyny’ of 
media pop idols.467   
                                                 
466 Not all white-collar men are metrosexual, and not all metrosexuals are white-collar; but most of them are, 
according to an article in China News Week, which describes the ‘mainstay’ (zhongjian liliang) of ‘metrosexuals’ 
(dushi linan) as ‘white-collar metrosexuals’ (bailing linan). Sun Ran and Liu Lili, ‘Bailing linan’ (White-collar 
metrosexuals), Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan (China news week) no. 34 (2005): 57. The article explains the 
provenance and meaning of the English word ‘metrosexual’, offering dushi linan (literally ‘metropolitan beautiful 
men’) as a suitable Chinese translation: ibid., 58. ‘Bailing linan’ can also be more literally translated as ‘white-
collar male beauty’, as I discussed in chapter three. China News Week has a circulation of 220,000, and is 
‘China’s most authoritative news weekly’ (Zhongguo zui ju quanwei de xinwen zhoukan): ‘Zhongguo xinwen 
zhoukan (China News Week)’, Liulan wang (gotoread.com), http://12297.gotoread.com/mag/80/ (accessed 
September 15, 2008). 
467 These pop idols might be seen as examples of the queering of contemporary sexualities and gender 
boundaries in China. However, my research shows that these figures are not interested in transgressing the moral 
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 My discussion in previous chapters has largely focused on analyzing the components 
of hegemonic white-collar masculinity. This chapter turns to contestations within that 
hegemonic model with particular reference to the new sexual subjectivities inscribed in the 
images of the metrosexual, the androgynous and the gay man. This chapter argues that the new 
sexual subjectivities of white-collar men cannot be separated from the wider discourses and 
assemblages of social trends and practices, including those concerning the market’s 
legitimation of consumer individualism. The newly emerging discourse producing the 
sexualized male subject of desire is simultaneously a discourse of consumer desire, productive 
of a sexualized male subjectivity attainable through cultivation of the body and style through 
consumer activities. The image of the metrosexual and androgynous white-collar man is 
produced right at the nexus of these discourses: in TV shows and in individual accounts, he is 
discursively chiefly defined through a consumer driven desire for success. Moreover, while 
the image of this figure blurs the standard look associated with manly behaviour, the words 
describing it reaffirm familiar masculine, heteronormative values. Both my informants and 
media debates disassociate the androgynous look from standard expectations of what it means 
to be a man.468 
‘Sexuality is one of the sites in the discourse of desire that characterises ‘China’s 
reconfiguration of its relationship to a postsocialist world’;469 the often vociferous media 
debates around sex and sexuality in contemporary China are an aspect of China’s negotiation 
with global modernity. As part of today’s ‘modernising’ ideology, these debates converge in 
the idea that personal fulfillment and happiness come through individual efforts and 
achievements. The allegory of modernity in reform China, as Lisa Rofel puts it, ‘hold[s] out 
the promise that people can unshackle their innate gendered and sexual selves by freeing 
themselves from the socialist state.’470 Satisfaction of personal sexual desire, then, according 
to such an ideology, is similarly a component of individual achievement. Indeed, the sexy 
images of prosperous white-collar men in the men’s magazines appear to bestow a status on 
the fulfilment of personal desire that would merit talk of white-collar men’s sexual capital. 
                                                                                                                                                         
values of gender expectations; their performance of ‘androgyny’ is driven largely by consumer and aesthetic 
interests.  
468 On an anecdotal note, Western characterisations of ‘oriental’ masculinity as feminine in contemporary and 
historical eras are grounded in a failure to distinguish aesthetic values from other values of normative masculine 
behaviour in Chinese society. 
469 Rofel, op.cit., 2. The idea that ‘talking about sex is modern’ now has a long trajectory in writings on China. 
See, for example, Gail Hershatter, ‘Sexing Modern China’, in Remapping China: Fissures in Historical Terrain, 
ed. Gail Hershatter, Emily Honig, Jonathan N. Lipman and Randall Stross (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1996), 93 
470 Rofel, ibid., 13. 
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Seen in this light, the increased diversity of sexual expression and practice in China, 
which many have described as a ‘sexual revolution’,471 has drawn attention away from the 
ongoing, and many would argue increasing gender inequity between men and women.472 As 
this chapter shows, the gendered terms used to describe the figures of the metrosexual or the 
androgynous man, for example, frequently evoke the highly conservative assumptions about 
gender which underlying this inequality, and reaffirm the largely unproblematised 
conceptualization of masculinity and femininity that continues to inform mainstream 
understandings of gender. As Harriet Evans argues in a recent article: ‘[…] while the 
articulation of sexuality in popular spaces has moved from a set of closed and rigid subjective 
possibilities to ones that are more flexible, exploratory, and open-ended, the articulation of 
gender as a concept that refers to the social and cultural meanings of femininity and 
masculinity has not moved in the same direction.’473  
 
Mediating the metrosexual 
The term metrosexual is first and foremost a media term, and originated with the British 
journalist Mark Simpson who wrote that  ‘[the metrosexual] might be officially gay, straight 
or bisexual, but this is utterly immaterial because he has clearly taken himself as his own love 
object and pleasure as his sexual preference.’474 An editorial in the gay magazine Menbox 
(Shishang junzi),475 used the term ‘chengshi xin nanren’ (literally, ‘urban new male’) as a 
translation for ‘metrosexual’, emphasizing the ‘newness’ rather than the sexuality of the 
                                                 
471 That this idea is now widespread is also a common theme in journalistic writing. Duncan Hewitt for example, 
also warns, however, that the ‘sexual revolution’ has been ‘uneven’ and brings ‘new challenges’: Hewitt, op. cit., 
257. 
472 This is manifested in stark material and economic terms: for example, unemployment rates for women are 
higher than for men, and women, especially in rural areas, receive less education than men. A report for the Asian 
Development Bank stated: ‘Women workers in the PRC are likely to be the first laid off and have restricted 
access to the more secure State-sector jobs. By 1993, women accounted for approximately 60 percent of the 
officially unemployed. Rural households now pay for many services that were once the responsibility of the 
collective, in particular education and childcare. This tends to have a more negative impact on women, 
particularly in poorer families. About 80 percent of the two million ‘new illiterates’ each year are women. 
Women represent approximately 70 percent of all illiterates in the PRC.’ Kathleen M. Moktan and Ramesh 
Subramaniam, Women in the People's Republic of China: Country Briefing Paper (Manila: Asian Development 
Bank, December 1998), vi. 
473 Evans, ‘Sexed Bodies’, ibid., 363.  
474 Mark Simpson, op. cit. 
475 Shishang junzi literally means ‘fashionable gentleman’. Menbox is widely available from magazine vendors 
in Beijing, Shanghai and other major cities, and in common with many other men’s magazines, it carries articles 
on fashion, skincare and other aspects of a young, relatively affluent, urban male consumer lifestyle. Unlike most 
other men’s magazines, it also carries lots of highly sexualised pictures of young men, as well as some articles on 
gay topics. It has been described as ‘China’s first real gay magazine’, although it does not advertise itself as such: 
Jeremy Goldkorn, ‘Menbox: China's First Real Gay Magazine’, Danwei, 
http://www.danwei.org/magazines/menbox_chinas_first_real_gay_m.php (accessed September 16, 2008).  
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metrosexual phenomenon. It is a term that white collar men such as Johnny and Colin have no 
difficult in identifying with, since it seems to encapsulate the most prominent features to 
which the middle-class urban man aspires: the pleasures of consumer capacity and the appeal 
of emotional sensitivity. The notion of the metrosexual in this sense is a point of convergence 
of the dominant characteristics of the China’s new individualistic self. He is the ‘purist’ 
example of the consumerist achievement and physical and affective qualities of the white-
collar man. As my discussion in chapter six showed, he is in this sense ‘what all women want,’ 
as long as he does not cross the boundaries of normative masculinity as a boyfriend or 
husband.  
The China News Week article mentioned above defines the metrosexual as 
‘fashionable’ (shishang), ‘extremely narcissistic’ (jidu zilian) and ‘a bit androgynous’ (po ju 
zhongxing qingxiang) (see figure 8).476 In the context of the extreme individualism cultivated 
among China’s urban youth, the term ‘narcissism’ is not a pejorative one. Describing the 
metrosexual as a ‘bit androgynous’ suggests that his appearance and attention to bodily 
hygiene for example shares some of the supposedly ‘feminine’ characteristics attributed to the 
androgynous man, but refuted by metrosexuals themselves. ‘I’m not feminine’, said Jason on 
one occasion in a conversation these issues, even though to many observers his clean looks 
would easily fit into the category of the ‘unmasculine.’ The Menbox editorial, using similar 
language, describes metrosexuals as ‘devoted to fashion’ (re’ai shishang) and ‘narcissistic’ 
(zilian).477 The metrosexual is a product of ‘consumer capitalism’, someone who is ‘less 
certain of his identity [than the old-style male] and much more interested in his image -- that's 
to say, one who was much more interested in being looked at […]. A man, in other words, 
who is an advertiser's walking wet dream.’478  
                                                 
476 Sun and Liu, ibid., 58. 
477 ‘Miaozhun chengshi xin nanren’ (Taking Aim at the New Urban Male), Shishang junzi (Menbox) no. 171 
(October 2004), 8. 
478 Mark Simpson, ‘Meet the Metrosexual’, salon.com, 
http://dir.salon.com/story/ent/feature/2002/07/22/metrosexual/index.html (accessed February 1, 2007). 
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Figure 8 A ‘metrosexual’ at home with some of his fashionable clothes and shoes. Sun 
Ran and Liu Lili, op. cit., 57. 
 
With mid-level posts and salaries of around six thousand yuan after five years’ work, China 
News Week estimates, white-collar metrosexuals spend about sixty percent of their daily 
expenditure on clothing, ‘international brands’ (guoji mingpai) in particular.479 A substantial 
part of the urban male workforce is already metrosexual: around thirty percent in Shanghai, 
China News Week claims, referring to Shanghai’s history as a ‘commercial city’ (shangye 
chengshi) where metrosexuals ‘dress for success’ (weile chenggong er daban)480 and embrace 
a ‘hedonist’ (xianglezhuyi) lifestyle481 of big city eating, drinking, bars and beauty salons, 
beautiful women and cars.482 As I made clear in chapter five, white-collar men are renowned 
for their pursuit of a vigorous leisure life, and it is this combined emphasis on appearance and 
hedonism, in the view of China News Week, that has led to the creation of the figure of the 
white-collar metrosexual and metrosexuals in general.483 
                                                 
479 Sun and Liu, ibid., 57. 
480 ‘Dress for success’ is printed in English in the article, followed by the Chinese translation. 
481 Sun Ran and Liu Lili, op. cit., 57. 
482 ‘Miaozhun chengshi xin nanren’ (Taking aim at the new urban male), op. cit., 8. 
483 Sun Ran and Liu Lili, op. cit., 57. 
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Johnny and Colin were the most ‘metrosexual’ of my informants. Although Johnny 
could afford to buy more expensive clothing, cologne and haircuts; Colin made up for his 
relative lack of purchasing power by dressing more colourfully, and established his 
metrosexual status through his ubiquitous appearance at parties and nightclubs, where I saw 
him greeted by many foreign and local friends. When dressed up and ready to go out, both 
looked trendy and alluring. As a mutual American friend commentated, he thought they were 
members of a boy band, since Johnny and Colin had the well-groomed, smooth-skinned 
appearance often projected by young pop stars. Neither of them made a noticeable effort to 
look, talk or move in conventional ‘manly’ ways; indeed, Colin expressly told me he did not 
feel masculine at all, because he ‘doesn’t drink’ (bu he jiu), ‘doesn’t smoke’ (bu chou yan), 
‘doesn’t have a beard’ (bu liu huzi) and ‘isn’t muscular’ (meiyou jirou). In many ways, 
however, this is the metrosexual/white-collar image that is most prominent in the media. 
Taking up a metrosexual subject position, then, as is already clear from this brief account, 
involves a consumerist assemblage which connects toned bodies with particular hairstyles, 
items of clothing, grooming tools, displays of soft skin, ‘gentle’ ways of moving, and places 
them in exclusive, sexualized locales of music, dancing and chatting, filled with other similar 
bodies. 
The defining characteristic of the metrosexual, namely, his fastidious concern with 
personal appearance, does not itself associate his figure with any single sexual subject or 
gender position. The Chinese translation of the term makes this clear; the metrosexual is just 
as much an aesthetic as a sexualized term. However, he is often attributed with characteristics 
which are commonly deemed to be ‘feminine’, both by my informants and in popular media. 
Metrosexuals are depicted as giving fuller expression to their feelings which potentially marks 
them as more ‘feminine’ and ‘wen’ than mainstream men. The metrosexual is allowed to cry, 
for example, and his moods mark him apart from conventional masculine behaviour. On pop 
idol-type shows on Chinese television, the young, androgynous metrosexuals taking part are 
frequently seen in tears, particularly in the drawn-out, dramatic moments when they are voted 
off the show. News Week and Menbox both call them ‘sensitive’ (mingan), and sometimes 
‘despondent’ (yiyu).484 Given, however, that such figures are reportedly enormously attractive 
to young women, the metrosexual’s emotional displays could also be interpreted as a means of 
persuasion to men to acquire the expressive capacity that women apparently value. In this 
way, his emotional characteristics correspond not with feminine values but with the 
                                                 
484 Sun and Liu, ibid., 58; ‘Miaozhun chengshi xin nanren’ (Taking aim at the new urban male), op. cit., 8. 
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emergence of the expressive masculine subject as a key figure of the individualization of 
Chinese society. 485 
The pursuit of metrosexuality belongs to a global discourse which has come to 
prominence in China at a particular historical juncture. The figure of the metrosexual is the 
apogee of affluent, hedonistic consumerist success, and represents the pinnacle of white-collar 
achievement in the boom atmosphere of China’s post-millennial metropoles. The metrosexual 
is a particular, and highly desirable instance of white-collar masculinity in China. 
Consequently, my informants who brought their appearance and pursuits most in line with the 
image of the young white-collar man – such as Johnny, Colin and Jason – all fulfilled the 
criteria of the metrosexual man. In this sense, and in contrast to his role elsewhere, the 
metrosexual serves to confirm the dominant ideology of consumerist individualism.486 As a 
masculine subject, therefore, the self-identifications and media representations of the 
metrosexual are firmly positioned within the globalised discourses of China’s ‘postsocialist’ 
era. However, associated with the figure of the androgynous man, as the next section shows, 
the metrosexual subject is intersected with other subject positions that at first glance seem to 
queer gender boundaries. 
 
The androgynous spectrum 
Online and print media discussions suggest an obvious overlapping in descriptions of the 
white-collar man, the metrosexual and the androgynous man.487 All three terms appear in the 
media to transgress the standard values of the ‘ordinary’ man who pays little attention to his 
appearance, and contains his emotions. ‘[Androgynous men] are one of the subgroups of 
white-collar [men]’ (tamen shi bailing yizu)’, according to the People’s Net article, because 
they cultivate a neat and clean appearance, are slim and delicate, and soft spoken.488 However, 
the term androgyny covers a spectrum of gender meanings and practices, ranging from the ‘a 
                                                 
485 Yan, 2003, op. cit., 83 
486 Compare, for instance, Japan, where the look and behaviour of young metrosexuals are depicted as rebellions 
against the conservative values of the ‘salaryman’, the archetypal Japanese white-collar man. Yumiko Iida 
‘Beyond the ‘feminization of Masculinity’: Transforming Patriarchy with the ‘feminine’in Contemporary 
Japanese Youth Culture’, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 6, no. 1 (2005): 56-74. 
487 Such as in ‘Zhongxing Nanren’ (Androgynous men), Renmin wang (People's net), 
www.people.com.cn/Gbshenghuo/79/110/20010314/416938.html (accessed February 3, 2007); and ‘Na lei 
nanren zui yi ‘zhongxinghua’’ (Which type of men most easily become androgynous), Zhongguo guoji guangbo 
diantai (China Radio International). 
488 ‘Zhongxing Nanren’ (Androgynous men), op. cit.  
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slightly androgynous’ (you yidian zhongxing) to the self-conscious blurring of gender 
boundaries in the appearance and behaviour of TV pop idols.489  
I put the question of the conflation of the images of the white-collar man and the 
androgynous man to Mark, the computer company owner I discussed in chapter six.490 He said 
he did not think that they were one and the same, but that being a white-collar man put one in 
an environment conducive to developing androgynous characteristics. In his view, the 
attention to appearance emphasized in office environments encourages some men to develop a 
strong interest in looking after their skin and hair in a way that has traditionally been thought 
of as feminine. However, he said there are many white-collar men who are not androgynous at 
all, according to his understanding of the term; wearing a suit was after all a very 
conventionally masculine thing to do, in his view. In one of a series of articles on its website 
explaining the ‘androgyny’ (zhongxing) phenomenon, China Radio International addressed 
Mark’s point that white-collar men operate in circumstances conducive to developing so-
called androgynous habits. Entitled ‘Which type of men most easily become ‘androgynous’?’), 
it claims that all men have the right and the possibility to be androgynous men, but the men 
who most easily become androgynous are ‘expert businessmen’ (shangwu tong) and ‘high-
level suits’ (gaoji hui) because of the nature of their work.491 This idea that white-collar men 
‘become androgynous’ (although perhaps a relatively muted androgyny, suggestive more of 
improved hygiene practices and careful grooming than ‘flamboyant’ displays of un-masculine 
behaviour) is also supported by the popular appearance of the young corporate male; his 
lotions, hairsprays and colognes, the decorum, professionalism and civility which are 
supposed to prevail in office environments, his gentle bodily behaviour towards women.492  
Other aspects of the androgynous white-collar man’s character addressed in media 
discussions are his personal habits and refined demeanour. The androgynous man is a non-
smoker - demonstrating his care for his health – and a moderate drinker of red wine, which 
demonstrates care for his health as well as specialist knowledge of Western drinking habits, 
                                                 
489 This apparent ‘queering’ of the gendered norms of appearance does not extend to normative assumptions 
about, for example, heterosexual desire and the gendered characteristics of men and women. The way TV pop 
idols talk about themselves and their relationships with women (e.g. girlfriends, mothers) on the TV shows 
reaffirms mainstream, conventional, heteronormative understandings and expectations about gender and 
sexuality. 
490 The androgynous look is partly inspired by Japanese anime and manga characters, according to Mark. 
491 ‘Na lei nanren zui yi ‘zhongxinghua’’, op. cit. This article was originally published in Beijing Qingnian Bao 
(Beijing Youth) according to the CRI website. 
492 There may be historical notions intertwined in these practices, as there are in discussions of male beauty 
which I document below. Keith McMahon discusses historical precedents of men who powdered and preened 
themselves, in heterosexual or homosexual contexts, in his Misers, Shrews, and Polygamists: Sexuality and Male-
Female Relations in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Fiction. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995, 187-8. 
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positioning him as sophisticated and a cut above those who drink local spirits; ‘stylish’ 
(gediao), ‘elegant’ (youya) and ‘leisurely and carefree’ (xianqing yizhi), as the People’s Net 
depiction puts it, claiming that the ‘outstanding’ (youxiu) androgynous men can recite all one 
needs to know about red wine from memory.493 ‘Urbane’ (binbin you li), is the word of choice 
of the CRI article, which describes a cultivated manner.494 A spirit of equality and peace 
pervades the androgynous man’s marriage, it is said, in the same vein that the white-collar 
man’s relationships are ideally respectful and gentle, as I discussed in the previous chapter. 
CRI reports he is very mild-tempered at home, willing to divide his possessions equally 
between himself and his wife, and happy to sign an equitable pre-nuptial agreement; the 
People’s Net contends he ‘cherishes’ (aihu) his wife and is ‘modest’ (qianrang) towards her. 
Interestingly, despite the normative assumption that such a man will marry, there is no 
mention of his relationships with children or parents, which perhaps is due to the prevalence of 
the romanticized idea of genuine love between husband and wife.  
Finally, the androgynous man is depicted as educated and successful at work in terms 
similar to those attributed to the white-collar man. CRI describes him as ‘very talented and 
learned’ (manfu jinglun), with a ‘successful career’ (shiye you cheng), and the People’s Net 
mentions his ‘developed mind’ (tounao fada).495 Accordingly, the white-collar man would 
appear to be fully androgynous. Of course, in ‘real life’ many white-collar men do not see 
themselves as androgynous, variously resisting, modifying, or ignoring the androgyny 
discourse, and I examine this further below. However, the popular labeling of them as 
androgynous may be partly a result of their using their brains and not their hands to work: 
manual labour seems much more ‘masculine’ than sitting at a desk in an office. The great 
shibboleths of ‘traditional’ masculine behaviour – its physicality, messiness, dirtiness, 
domination of women – are all challenged by the apparent attributes of white-collar men. 
The extremes of the androgynous trend in recent years have been particularly visible 
on TV talent shows such as Dragon TV’s commercialized and very lucrative male talent show, 
launched in 2006, with the English title My Hero, and in Chinese called ‘Come on, good 
men!’ (jia you hao nan’er).496 This made the very androgynous-looking Xiang Ding a star, and 
                                                 
493 ‘Zhongxing Nanren’ (Androgynous men), op. cit. 
494 Ibid. 
495 Ibid. 
496 The 2007 series was predicted to exceed the over 100 million yuan in estimated revenue of its main 
competitor, Hunan TV’s Happy Voice Boy (Kuaile nansheng): Riki Hsu, ‘Happy Voice Boys Generating Over 
100M Yuan in Revenues.’ JLM Pacific Epoch, http://www.pacificepoch.com/newsstories?id=102385_0_5_0_M 
(accessed September 19, 2008). The ground-breaking model for My Hero was Hunan TV’s 2005 Supergirl 
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inspired large-scale debate about emotional expressiveness in men, such as crying.497 The 
programme makers encouraged and dramatised Xiang Ding’s tears during the voting off 
procedure through the presenter’s emotionally-charged speeches and camera close-ups, 
engaging the mostly young female audience in a tide of emotion. In this way, these young 
men’s emotional expressiveness, like their androgyny, is a commodified product of a 
commercial process promoted through commercial media; that is, these manufactured 
subjectivities are effects of a market discourse which propagates the construction of the model 
of the androgynous, emotional young man, precisely because this is an image with huge 
consumer appeal, especially amongst young women. As another example, one of the other 
very androgynous contestants, the Sichuanese Zhang Xu, was termed ‘Chongqing’s king of 
melancholy’ (Chongqing youyu wangzi), and has appeared in very sensuously posed half-
naked photographs, staring alluringly at the camera with wisps of hair framing his made-up 
face.498 Xiang, Zhang and their brethren achieved the status of pop stars.  
 However, the subjectivity associated with these figures is far from being universally 
welcomed or identified as a white-collar attribute, underlining its contested status in as a 
hegemonic white-collar model. My informant Wen, for example, explicitly identified as white-
collar, but was neither metrosexual nor androgynous, nor on the other hand was he gruff: his 
masculinity combined the ‘successful corporate manager’ with the ‘caring family man’, but 
not the creams, smooth skin and delicate gestures of the ‘slight’ androgyny of the typical white 
collar image. Claire, one of my colleagues at Johnson’s school whom I mentioned in chapter 
six, professed disinterest in the androgynous trend, but when pushed, recoiled from the 
prospect of having an androgynous boyfriend. I showed her a magazine with a picture of a 
man which she needed no bidding to describe as androgynous. Some men I knew called it 
feminisation (nüxinghua), I said, and asked her if she could accept this. ‘Accepting it or not 
doesn’t matter because it has nothing much to do with me (jie bu jieshou dou hai hao yinwei 
gen wo meiyou tai da de guanxi)’, she responded, but added ‘but if I had to choose this kind of 
boyfriend or whatever, I definitely wouldn’t like it! (danshi ruguo rang wo xuanze zheyang de 
nanpengyou huozhe shenme, wo kending buhui xihuan).’ To balance this assertion, perhaps, 
Claire then confirmed her attitude of tolerance to the trend in general: ‘As long as it doesn’t 
                                                                                                                                                         
(Chaoji nüsheng in Chinese, more literally ‘Super Voice Girl’) talent contest for young women, which launched 
the career of the very androgynous Li Yuchun, who has remained popular, particularly amongst young women. 
497 Zhen Xiaofei, ‘Dianshi guize xia de nanse xuanju’ (Voting for Male Charm Under Television Rules), 
Nanfang zhoumo (Southern Weekend) (October 8, 2006): D28. 
498 ‘‘Jia you, hao nan'er’ Zhang Xu: Chongqing youyu wangzi’ (‘Come on, good boy’ Zhang Xu: Chongqing's 
king of depression), Zhongguo guoji guangbo diantai (China Radio International), 
http://gb.cri.cn/9964/2006/06/09/114@1082562.htm (accessed September 20, 2008). 
 185
have too much to do with me, I think it’s okay (zhiyao gen wo meiyou tebie da de guanxi wo 
juede ‘okay’).’ She also had some reservations about androgynous (or ‘masculine’) women. 
When I asked what she thought of ‘masculine women’ (nanxinghua de nüren), she replied: ‘I 
don’t like them very much either (wo ye bushi hen xihuan).’ Consumerism is a driving force of 
the trend of androgynous fashion, in her view. I pointed out comments in the magazine that 
men were paying more attention to making themselves attractive by ‘dressing up’ (daban) in 
sexy clothing, which she attributed it to young people having money and wanting to spend it: 
‘It’s probably connected to the whole large-scale change (yinggai she gen zhengge de dahuan 
youguan): for example, I’ve started working, I’ve got money in my pocket, so I’ll naturally go 
and buy clothes and dress up (biru shuo, wo kaishi gongzuole, shenshang you qian, hui ziran 
qu mai yifu daban).’ She also subscribed to the view that the music industry has pushed 
androgynous pop stars to exploit the teenage market.  
Despite his conventionally masculine demeanour, Jason professed to be more 
accepting of white-collar androgyny, though his comments in a discussion we had about the 
topic quickly moved from androgyny to men’s ‘femininity.’ For him, although there were 
undoubtedly some men more ‘feminine’ (nüxinghua) than others, this was no reason to 
discriminate against them. He used the word ‘sissy’ (niangniang qiang) to refer to 
‘unmasculine’ men, and went on to comment that ‘in terms of their behaviour (xingwei), or for 
some people in terms of their physiology (shengli) and voices (shengyin), all have some 
feminine characteristics (nüxinghua tezheng).’ He clarified that he did not mean they were 
born like that, explaining that ‘it’s in terms of their personal behaviour, or tastes, that they are 
possibly a bit feminine (nüxinghua). I think there's no need to discriminate against them.’ 
However, he admitted feminine boys at school do receive ridicule from other boys, implying 
that this hostile treatment was inevitable because ‘society considers minorities as abnormal 
(shaoshuren ne, shehuishang jiu hui renwei shi buzhengchang de).’ He also linked 
contemporary male femininity with examples from the past, implying that it was nothing new 
in China. I think that he, and others, perhaps employ this argument to explain the presence of 
male femininity/androgyny in China, and claim it as their own through inventing a historical 
narrative for it, and to defend against an anticipated accusation that it is purely an import from 
the West. I discuss this in the following section. 
Some aspects of the attribution of ‘femininity’ to the androgynous white-collar man 
derive not so much from any particular bodily gesture or demeanour but from popular 
conventions about regional distinctions. Colin, for example, the most ‘androgynous’ looking 
of my informants was often characterised as a southern man. His appearance was explained 
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within a locally circulating discourse which posits men from the south of China as feminine, 
and men from the north as masculine. In particular, Shanghai men are positioned as 
henpecked, and Shanghai women as domineering. China News Week (Zhongguo xinwen 
zhoukan) reinforces this popular image through associating Shanghai with a ‘tradition of 
tending towards androgynisation (pian zhongxinghua de chuantong)’, but the ‘androgynistic’ 
characteristics with which the article depicts white-collar metrosexuals in Shanghai would 
apply equally to those in Beijing and elsewhere.499  
The greatest controversy surrounding the debate about androgyny has not, in fact, 
concerned its associations with white-collar man, but rather the popularity of androgynous 
fashions and practices amongst urban youth. The more overt and flamboyant displays of 
androgyny on TV shows have been subject to repeated reprimands and restrictions from the 
broadcasting authorities. While Xiang Ding’s adoring female fans voted him the winner of the 
contest, the national regulator for broadcasting, the ‘State Administration of Radio, Film and 
Television’ (Guojia guangbo dianying dianshì zongju) (SARFT) criticised the appearance and 
demeanour of the contestants, saying that they transgressed acceptable moral norms. They 
ordered the makers of TV talent contests to ensure that ‘hairstyles, clothes, fashion 
accessories, language and manners must be in line with mainstream values’, and to avoid 
‘gossip’ about the contestants, and ‘refrain from showing scenes of fans screaming and 
wailing, or vanquished contestants in tears.’500 SARFT showed here its instinctive 
understanding that gendered and sexualized subjectivities are constructed through the bringing 
together of an assemblage of bodies, objects, practices, routines, in this case performed (by 
contestants and audience) in the frenzied, tense, hormonal excitement of a packed TV studio, 
and mimicked, emulated, contested, resisted, altered, refused by viewers in myriad ways. As 
arbiters of the nation’s taste, SARFT demonstrated its determination and authority to police 
the boundaries of the sexualized subjectivities thrown up by the market, although at the same 
time, its participating in shaping zhongxing discourse marks a strategic acceptance of changing 
gender and sexual behaviour, particularly on the part of young people. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that what one might call the androgynous ‘turn’ in 
the formation of masculine subjectivities in contemporary China amounts to an awareness and 
care of the self as sexually desirable and an emotional expressivity which includes wearing 
                                                 
499 Sun and Liu, op. cit., 57. 
500 These quotations are from the 2008 China Media Yearbook, a publication of the Beijing consultancy China 
Media Monitor Intelligence. Excerpts from the Yearbook were posted on Danwei, a website covering Chinese 
media and advertising: see Jeremy Goldkorn, ‘Reality TV Woes and the 2008 China Media Yearbook’, Danwei, 
http://www.danwei.org/media_business/reality_tv_woes_and_the_2008_c.php (accessed September 20, 2008). 
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emotional pain, sadness and vulnerability on one’s sleeve. The delicate lines of the physical 
self are the corporeal as well as consumer expression of the sensitive qualities of emotional 
man. The androgynous white-collar man is presented as appealing and sexually desirable to 
young women; yet he does not challenge the boundaries of conventionally gendered behaviour 
in the way that some of the young ‘extremely’ androgynous TV idols do. And as the 
comments of my informants show, what is tolerated as a social phenomenon is not necessarily 
what young men and women wish for themselves, their intimate others and people around 
them to adopt in everyday life. The supposedly ‘androgynous’ qualities of the new white-
collar man definitely contribute to the new masculine subject positions which are emerging in 
China, yet, as Claire suggested, contribute mainly to sustaining the consumerist practices 
through which the contemporary individual is defined. 
 
Legitimating contemporary narratives  
The possibility of a transgressive sexual orientation/identity associated with the androgynous 
looks of white-collar man further recedes (despite his sexual practices, which may include 
same-sex desire and activities) when narratives about white-collar man invoke history. As I 
will show in this section, the androgynous looks of the white-collar man are claimed as the 
latest incarnation of male beauty in Chinese history, marking him off from foreign-inspired 
gay and queer identities, and positioning him as the contemporary manifestation of a ‘Chinese 
tradition’.  
The historical narrative of the ‘male beauty’ (nanse) in China is commonly used to 
describe the soft looks of the androgynous metrosexual white-collar man as the contemporary 
rendering of a long tradition of ‘wen’ masculinity.501 The term ‘male beauty’ (nanse) refers to 
the sexual allure of young men because of its resonance with the more common phrase 
‘female beauty’ (nüse), also translated as ‘feminine charms’. The four members of the 
Taiwanese boyband F4 (‘F’ for ‘Flower’) are often cited as examples of contemporary male 
beauties, who emerged with great success and some controversy in the 1990s.502 I wanted to 
hear what an ‘ordinary’ white-collar man might think about F4, so I asked Bruce, the manager 
of the Sanyuanqiao language school, for his thoughts. He described F4 as ‘little white faces’ 
(xiaobailian), which he explained was a term used for young men who ‘look relatively pretty’ 
(zhangde bijiao piaoliang), with ‘quite distinct features’ (wuguan bijao fenming), and who are 
                                                 
501 Such as Keith McMahon describes in Misers, Shrews, and Polygamists: Sexuality and Male-Female 
Relations in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Fiction, op. cit. 
502 Zhang Ying. ‘Zhongguo nanse pu’ (A chronology of Chinese male beauty), Mingpai shijie le Beijing 
(TimeOut Beijing) no. 61 (March 2005): 10. 
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‘generally provided for by women’ (yiban shi nüde yangde). In using the term ‘little white 
face’, Bruce positioned F4 and their androgynous brethren within a historical Chinese tradition 
of good-looking young heterosexual men with wealthy female patrons, sometimes derided, 
sometimes joked about, and a common feature of Chinese culture.503 However, Bruce did not 
consider the famously androgynous TV star and beauty parlour entrepreneur Jimi a ‘little 
white face’ and begrudged him a place in his imagined cultural history of China, saying that 
‘in the past there were very few people like this in China’. I asked him what the difference was 
between Jimi and little white faces. ‘Women like little white faces’, he explained, alluding to 
their supposed heterosexuality, but ‘[Jimi] seems a bit like these foreign gays’ (waiguo ‘gay’). 
Little white faces like women, they don’t like men: they dress up very prettily (daban de hen 
piaoliang) to attract women, not men.’  
Whereas men with an androgynous look and even behaviour can be ‘filed under’ 
existing historical concepts such as ‘little white faces’, thereby affirming their 
heterosexualities, explicit gay identity is more difficult to appropriate because there is no 
obvious historical antecedent. There is certainly a recognized history of male same sex sexual 
activity, but the gay identity goes much further than same sex sexual behaviour: firstly, it 
suggests something of core importance to an individual’s sexuality, and secondly, it disrupts 
assumptions about marriage and procreation. In this way, it is potentially deeply threatening to 
mainstream mores concerning these issues. Indeed, if simply not getting married or not having 
children are viewed as daring and transgressive, then assuming a gay identity poses much 
more of a challenge to some. Bruce mused that there seemed to be more and more gays in 
recent times, which displeased him. He associated gay men with Western culture. He told me 
that he had inadvertently attended a gay party some time before, invited by one of the Western 
teachers at the school. The party had been organised by foreigners, he said, and many of the 
party-goers were foreign, as well from Hong Kong and mainland Chinese. He was shocked, so 
he said, that they were all gay.  Bruce conflated being gay with femininity. He argued that ‘in 
Chinese culture, most people can accept women who look like men, for example those women 
who are like men, those 'strong women' (nü qiangren). But men who are like women, that's 
not right (nanren xiang nüde, na jiu bu dui).’ He said they made him feel ‘uncomfortable’ 
(bushufu), and believed it went against the idea that men should be ‘decisive’ (guoduan), 
                                                 
503 The xiaobailian can be viewed in the context of the tradition of wen masculinity that I discussed in chapter 
two. He shares some similarities with the ‘feminine’ young male lover (xiaosheng) in Chinese opera, who in turn, 
is the stage representation of the delicate and pretty ‘fragile scholar’. As I point out in chapter two, the 
xiaosheng’s name reappears in the description of androgynous-looking pop stars as naiyou xiaosheng (‘creamy 
boys’). See Song Geng, op. cit., vii-viii. 
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‘magnanimous’ (te dadu), and ‘do things on a large scale’ (zuo shi hen daxing), adding that he 
did not like their ‘disposition’ (xingqing).  
When discussing family and relationships with Peter, I asked how he felt about gays. 
His starting point was an imagined millennia-old Chinese history, which as far as he was 
concerned had no place for gays. A gay identity was not commensurate with the Chinese 
tradition, in other words, with Chinese people’s understanding of what it means to be Chinese. 
He argued: 
I feel that in China, taking homosexuals for example, it won’t change in one or two 
hundred years (xiang tongxinglian zheyang, yi, liang bai nian bu hui gaibian)! Because 
this tradition has already got a history of more than 5000 years (wuqian duo nian lishi). 
Do you think that 5000 years of tradition can be brought to an end, changed, in a year 
or two, ten or so years or a hundred years (yi, liang nian huozhe shiji nian yibai nian, 
dazhi wuqian nian de chuantong, gaibian)? That's impossible (bu keneng de shi)! 
 
What about gay cohabitation, I asked Peter, suggesting that it was already happening. He gave 
a blunt response: ‘If the family members find out they will immediately stop it’ (jiaren zhidao 
de hua tamen hui mashang zuzhi). Peter and Bruce, both young white-collar men, were aware 
of the increasing presence and activities of gay people in metropolitan China, but could not 
reconcile this with their own ideas of what being Chinese meant.  
The appropriation and legitimation of the metrosexual is evident in a cover feature in 
TimeOut Beijing (Mingpai shijie le Bejing), which constructs a historical link between 
historical male beauties from the Spring and Autumn period and the pop stars of China, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan today.504 The front cover bears just the two words ‘Nanse•zhongxing’ (Male 
beauty•androgyny) in large characters, behind which is a full-page stylized representation of a 
naked and headless male torso, which seemed to be hanging on a clothes hanger. The bottom 
half of the torso is decorated with an old-style Chinese floral print in red and white, and there 
is a white business shirt also on the hanger, just behind the torso, and a sober business tie is 
draped across the torso’s shoulder. The graphic suggests a link between aesthetic traditions 
relating to men established long ago in China’s past (the floral print) and the much more 
recent emergence of the aesthetics of the white-collar man (the white shirt and tie on a clothes 
hanger). It also suggests that behind the smart-looking Western-style shirt and tie of the 
contemporary white-collar Chinese man lies a sensibility founded in a conception of male 
beauty which has its own distinctive history, and which still informs the appreciation of male 
beauty in China today.  
                                                 
504 Zhang, ibid., 10-17. 
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The two words on the front cover refer to two articles in the magazine: one article is 
titled ‘A chronology of Chinese male beauty’ (Zhongguo nanse pu), referring to ‘77 beautiful 
men from pre-Qin China to the 21st century’; the other is titled ‘Androgyny’ (zhongxing), and 
is an interview with Jimi, the celebrity beautician whom Bruce had associated with gays. The 
chronology of Chinese male beauty is prefaced by an introduction which discusses the 
emergence of the term ‘metrosexual’, and considers how to translate it into Chinese, before 
finally settling on ‘male beauty’ (nanse) as the best option,505 since it encompasses the long-
standing appreciation of beautiful young men in China.506 In this way, the concept of the 
metrosexual becomes a subset of this larger tradition. As Zhang Ying, the author, explained, 
‘in fact several thousand years before the emergence of the ‘metrosexual’, China had its own 
fine tradition (youliang chuantong) of enjoying and recording pretty young men (xinshang 
bing jizai piaoliang nanhai).’507 As for Jimi’s opinions, in contrast to Bruce’s attempt to place 
the ‘male beauty trend’ within a Chinese historical narrative, he argued that it is more 
associated with ‘Western’ influences, ascribing it to the influence of boybands from America 
and Europe, and then to popular attention in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, and Korea to ‘made-
up and dressed-up male stars’ (xiushi nanxing). In his opinion China is playing a rather belated 
game of catch-up.508  
Despite the more ‘open’ stance of Jimi, the appropriation of the 
metrosexual/androgynous man is generally discussed in heteronormative terms. Indeed, 
heterosexist assumptions underlie most mainstream discussions about sex, relationships and 
romance. And it is to the romantic ideal that I now turn, because of its salient position in 
white-collar images and subjectivities. 
 
The romantic white-collar ideal 
In line with depictions of the white-collar man as caring and attentive, and echoing the tender 
wen lover of classical literature, the relatively androgynous white-collar metrosexual as sexual 
subject is idealised as a romantic young lover, an amorous and gentle beau who knows how to 
treat his girlfriend well, in contrast to the less romantic overtones associated with conventional 
masculinity. Yunxiang Yan puts this down to the one of the effects of the ‘trend of 
                                                 
505 Among the other translations the author considered were ‘metropolitan jade man’ (dushi yu’nan), ‘post-
yuppie’ (hou yapi) and ‘metropolitan androgynous man’ dushi zhongxing nan. 
506 Zhang, ibid., 10. 
507 Zhang, ibid., 10. 
508 Cha Jianying, ‘Zhongxing: wusuo weiju, wusuo buneng de Jimi’ (Androgynous: fearless and all-capable 
Jimi), Mingpai shijie le Beijing (TimeOut Beijing) no. 61 (March 2005): 21. 
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westernization’ in reform China as ‘exhibited in changes of everyday life’ which he argues 
include ‘rising demands for romantic love and sexual freedom, the escalating divorce rate and 
the emergence of single-parent families, the triumph of consumerism and commodity 
fetishism, the fever for MBA degrees and the English language, the popularity of American 
fast food chains, and the competition among urban youth to be ‘cool’.’509 From Yan’s list, I 
am most concerned in this section with ‘demands for romantic love’, but it is useful to bear in 
mind that it is part of a much larger change in intimate relationships (and beyond): the first 
few items on Yan’s list of topics, covering romantic love, sexual freedom, divorce and single-
parent families, indicate some of the large-scale changes in private life occurring in 
contemporary China. 
As previous discussion has shown, the newly constructed self of the white-collar man 
is firmly embedded within a normative and naturalised heteronormative gender and sexual 
framework, despite the potentially transgressive attributes associated with his ambiguous 
sexual image. Moreover, as we have also seen, the heteronormative attributes of the white-
collar man are widely inflected with consumerist aspirations and capacities.510 Romance and 
the romantic ideal currently appear in the popular media as major vehicles for the production 
of white-collar heterosexual identities, and reiterate the consumerist components of white-
collar masculinity in contemporary China.  St. Valentine’s Day, for example, has become a 
major commercial event in China in recent years. It is framed in overwhelmingly 
heteronormative terms in the media and retail outlets, which encourage relatively affluent 
young urban men to demonstrate their love for their girlfriend/wife by buying her flowers, 
chocolates, and meals in Western restaurants. My white-collar students at the Zhongguancun 
school were very interested in marking St. Valentine’s Day: many of the men said they would 
take their girlfriends or wives out for a meal, or would buy give them a small present; the 
women confirmed that this was what they expected. This heterosexual, romantic subjectivity is 
constructed through an assemblage of specified consumer objects (flowers, chocolates), softly-
lit, quiet, ‘Western’ spaces, romanticized vocabularies, ‘chivalrous’ routines, mythologised 
narratives and so on. Through this commodified ‘romanticism’, the white-collar man marks 
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himself off as a new kind of man, a globally-informed sophisticated economically powerful 
consumer, within a heteronormative framework that attributes status to those men who engage 
in exactly this kind of conspicuously cool consumption. 
 ‘Romance’ is a very effective tool with which young men distinguish themselves from 
other men, as Peter Redman has argued in his research on the concept of heterosexual romance 
amongst a group of high school boys in England: 
[…] romance provided the boys in the study with a means of locating themselves (and 
thereby constructing a heterosexual masculine identity) in relation to a cast of 
hierarchically arranged social others. More particularly, I argue that this process had a 
disciplinary function. Romance, I will suggest, was one way in which the boundaries 
of gender, class, ethnicity, and sexuality were policed within the pupils’ culture. It 
served to assert and validate a particular and socially powerful kind of masculinity—
white, heteronormative, and professional or middle class—that simultaneously 
contested (and in some cases, punished) those forms of masculinity and femininity that 
failed to complement it.511  
 
Redman argued that romance ‘provided a cultural repertoire – that is, a narrative resource or 
set of discursive practices – through which the boys performatively enacted a particular 
version of heterosexual masculinity’,512 and that it also ‘may be seen as a resource through 
which the boys worked themselves into the dispositions of a middle-class or professional 
habitus.’513 Redman’s realization that repeated performative enactment leads to the 
development of a habitus is precisely the insight that led to Noble and Watkin’s concept of 
habituation. Young Chinese white-collar men respond to media exhortations to buy their 
partners little presents from time to time,514 and take them out for candlelit dinners and so on 
because these are performative practices that help construct a white-collar identity. This 
identity is conspicuously heterosexual: each consumer action of boy buying for girl produces 
the ‘effect’ of heterosexuality, thereby reinforcing the heteronormative social framework: it is 
a playing out, or taking up of the ‘romantic heterosexual’ subject position.  Simultaneously, it 
connotes heterosexual white-collar men with the conventionally ‘masculine’ attributes of 
power, choice, decisiveness and generosity that I have identified earlier. Over and over again, 
their behaviour shaped though discursive techniques, their sense of a result of the infolding of 
this and multiple other subject positions, young men learn to act and conceive of themselves as 
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a new breed of men, marked out, for example, from coarse manual workers, and blunt, 
unpolished entrepreneurs; through conscious ‘care of the self’, careful mimicry, attention to 
gestures, actions, emotional performance, displays of romantic attention, solicitous concern, 
they learn bodily and mental habits which become ‘naturalised’, justifiable as part of a caring, 
romantic, sophisticated, urbane masculinity, closely linked to and sometimes overlapping with 
the subject position of the ‘tender husband’ – this is another aspect of the change in masculine 
performances pre-eminently signified by notions about white-collar men. 
 
 
 
The hidden homosexual 
The qualities associated with the image of the desirable, heterosexual white-collar man are 
similarly revered when the white-collar man is imagined as an object of same-sex desire. 
Furthermore, the sexual ambiguities of the image of the white-collar man render it able to 
incorporate gay subjectivity when it is not situated within assemblages of elements that 
include texts or settings with heteronormative characteristics or assumptions.  The gay white-
collar subject has emerged, but its performance is restricted to very few and specific real (e.g. 
gay clubs) and virtual (e.g. gay personals and community websites) venues.  
As I have discussed above, magazines oriented towards gay readerships such as 
Menbox (and its sister publication Shijue zhinan ‘Visual man’) eulogise the metrosexual, 
especially his consumer-related aspects, thereby ‘interpellating’ the possible identity of the 
gay white-collar metrosexual, and creating possibilities for the performative emergence of gay 
white-collar subjectivities. They carry adverts and features about brand name clothing, 
cologne, skincare and other such products, which are depicted as ‘must-haves’ for cool young 
metrosexual men. Additionally, they provide social information of interest to educated urban 
men negotiating gay lives, on health and hygiene topics, gay social support groups, gay-
themed movies, foreign gay news and so on. All in all, they offer a rendering of an 
unpoliticised consumer-oriented gay lifestyle, placing centrestage the figure of the 
androgynous metrosexual male, thereby catering to the needs of a readership which is likely to 
aspire to an imagined transnational gay identity, while simultaneously dealing with the very 
real and tricky everyday issues of family, work, health and so on. 
Through my many conversations with young, relatively affluent, gay men in Beijing I 
gained the impression that the ideal man – the object of desire – for many gay men is someone 
with a good job, a good body, dressed in fashionable attire. In other words, it is the gym-fit 
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and fashionable young white-collar man, whose image corresponds with the descriptions I 
have set out in previous chapters. This desire for white-collar men is not limited to mainland 
China. Travis Kong found that in Hong Kong his gay respondents were attracted to 
characteristics often associated with the white-collar man: 
Most of my respondents preferred a man who is smart, bright, well-built, manly, 
straight-acting, macho, career-minded and emotionally in control. These attributes are 
all very typical cultural definitions of being a man. That is why nearly all of my 
respondents have all had the experience of being in love with a straight man.515 
 
It is perhaps understandable that gay men, subject to the same discursive portrayals of white-
collar men as sexually desirable, should profess desire for them, as one of my informants, 
himself a white-collar man suggested. 
I found out on our first meeting that Johnny was gay. Apparently heterosexual to his 
family, work colleagues and ex-classmates, he simultaneously moved in gay circles, had 
networks of gay friends, local and foreign, went to gay bars, and consumed gay-interest media 
products (magazines, movies, TV series and so on).516 Afraid to ‘come out’ in certain areas of 
his life, for reasons which I will discuss below, he revealed his sexuality to me since he 
already knew I too was gay and was in any case not in a position where I could use it against 
him. 
To anyone who did not know about his sexual orientation, Johnny led the typical life of 
a young, single ambitious white-collar man from the provinces on his way up the career ladder 
in Beijing. Moreover, his white-collar subjectivity enabled him to participate in both straight 
and gay elite spaces. Good-looking, impeccably dressed, often accompanied by his matching 
‘girlfriend’ on company social occasions, to the casual observer there was nothing to mark 
him out from any of the many other ‘androgynous’ ‘metrosexual’ white-collar men in 
Beijing’s business districts. He was softly spoken, moved gracefully and clearly took care over 
his hair, skin and clothing, and he did nothing to dissuade his family colleagues and many 
friends from assuming he was attracted to women. But he had sex with other men, and 
exploited the opportunities that his global network of gay friends offered him.  
 Johnny liked to socialise with gay friends, local and foreign, occasionally visiting 
venues such as Beijing’s most cosmopolitan gay bar, but he still worried about his sexual 
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orientation coming to the knowledge of family and colleagues. He did not want his Beijing 
colleagues to find out he was gay because of the possibly negative repercussions for his career. 
This was a view I heard often, including from Rob, a gay American working for a large 
Chinese Internet company. Rob was afraid that due to the factional struggles within his 
company, based on rival guanxi networks, his boss’s ‘enemies’ would use his sexuality, if 
known, against his boss. Arbitrary forms of discrimination again gays, including arbitrary 
administrative sanctions that have no legal foundation are commonplace in China. Li Yinhe 
has described how some work units, on finding out that a worker is gay, may take various 
actions such as withholding wages or lowering wages, reconsidering promotions, housing 
allocations and bonuses; and even transferring or sacking the employee.517  
Perhaps as a kind of strategy for dealing with ‘real life’ constraints and discrimination, 
Johnny spent considerable time using the Internet in the privacy of his own home, engaging in 
virtual socialising with gay contacts throughout China and the world. He was developing a 
large network of online gay friends spanning the globe while I was in Beijing. Although 
initially worried about creating ‘profiles’ on gay websites, he soon realised the benefit of 
knowing people around the world to his long-term plan to leave China to live in a Western 
country. He was fortunate in that the U.S. based transnational company he worked for had a 
strong record of pro-gay action. It had promoted an internal network of gay employees, which 
Johnny used assiduously to cultivate friends and contacts, without having to reveal his sexual 
orientation to any of his immediate colleagues in Beijing. Sometimes these overseas gay 
colleagues would come to Beijing on business trips, which gave Johnny the opportunity to 
take them out for dinner and establish a closer acquaintanceship. In this way, Johnny was 
using his white-collar connections to help him achieve his ambition, as well as his white-collar 
access to online technology. Johnny’s taking up of a gay ‘subject position’, in particular 
assemblages of locales, technologies, relationships, sometimes gelled with but often conflicted 
with the multiple masculinities he performed in other contexts, demonstrating the non-unitary 
composition of his ‘self’. His well-manicured neatly groomed look – the ‘fashionable 
consumer’ subject position – transferred smoothly and successfully between office buildings 
and gay nightclubs, and his performance of a generous dafang masculinity worked with gay 
and straight friends, but his online identification as gay and nightclub performances of a gay 
subjectivity jarred with powerful mainstream discursive formulations of the naturally 
heterosexual male, romantic, anxious, tender, gruff or otherwise, and Johnny felt he could not 
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extend them into all spheres of his life. But Johnny, as with other gay men, conformed to and 
yet simultaneously resisted, got round, and dealt with the heteronormatising disciplinary 
techniques, in ways that did not compromise his sense of self-integrity. In other words, Johnny 
learnt to perform, or take up an overtly heterosexual masculinity in those situations which he 
deemed it advantageous to his various goals (such as career advancement, family harmony), 
such as when working at the office and in his public ‘love life’, as I turn to look at now. 
 Although Johnny’s actions suggest a significant investment in the transnational 
practices of white-collar gay men, he also had to negotiate expectations embedded in local 
discourses and practices. One such expectation was marriage. Johnny did not return to his 
parents’ home in south China for the Spring Festival when I was in Beijing. He told me he did 
not want to face questions from his parents, extended family, neighbours and friends about 
marriage. He did not want to get married, and had an agreement with a white-collar lesbian of 
the same age that they would present themselves as boyfriend and girlfriend at office social 
occasions in Beijing. Pretend relationships between gay men and lesbian are not uncommon, 
even extending to formal marriage and living together. The motivations for this cannot be 
reduced to any single formula, such as ‘external’ pressure from parents: they may include the 
participants’ own ideas about the propriety of marriage and desire for career advancement as 
well as satisfying familial and social hopes and expectations. One of Johnny’s gay friends told 
me that he wanted to get married and have a child because his mother was very anxious to 
have a grandchild. For Johnny, presenting a ‘girlfriend’ at some office socials was partly to 
prevent any damage to his career prospects, but also involved maintaining his relationships 
with co-workers and the image he wanted to present to mainstream society. In her study of 
‘lala’ (lesbian) women in Beijing, Elisabeth Engebretsen relates that a middle-class gay man 
who entered into a gay-lesbian ‘contract’ marriage with one of her lesbian informants, 
admitted to marrying her not only to end his ‘parents’ nagging’, but also because ‘[h]e was 
then in the process of applying to work abroad, in North America, and he knew that his visa 
application was more likely to be approved if he could prove close familial ties in China.’518  
Johnny’s love life manifested a complex mix of desire on global and local levels. 
Johnny told me that he had previously had local boyfriends, and that he still had brief flings 
with local men; indeed, his sexual interest was predominantly youthful, good-looking (and 
apparently all professional) Chinese men with athletic physiques. However, his sexual 
dalliances with Caucasian men (also apparently all professional) revealed wider-ranging ages 
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and physical types. His motivation for sleeping with them, I suspect, may also have been to 
help his ambition to leave China (a not uncommon strategy amongst Chinese gay men wishing 
to emigrate, in my experience). Johnny had a particularly romanticized notion of German 
culture, and so he specifically sought out German men. Yet something prevented him from 
cohabiting with any foreign men living in Beijing. He had two unsuccessful relationships with 
local men while I was living in Beijing. Both his partners were white-collar men, and they 
cohabited for part of the relationships. After splitting up with his most recent local boyfriend, I 
heard that he was now committed to finding a Caucasian partner.  
For gay white-collar men who believe they have a responsibility to get married and 
have children, but who also want to sleep with men, one possibility is to buy an apartment and 
install a gay lover there. After all, this is exactly what some well-off married men do with their 
mistresses. In research on gay men in Chengdu, Wei Wei, a sociologist, tells the story of a 
successful career man who ‘managed a five-year relationship with his 20-year younger 
boyfriend outside his heterosexual marriage.’519 The man explained to Wei how he did this: 
‘The three persons in my family live far away from each other – my wife is running her own 
business on the east coast, my son goes to college in Britain, and I am in Chengdu. People 
may think it is a broken family. They don’t understand. All of us are working towards self-
actualization. I think we are living in a happy family.’520 The man tries to justify his choices 
by employing the notion of individual self-fulfilment. Yet the reason he has not divorced is 
because he believes he has certain familial and social duties: ‘Living in the society a man has 
many responsibilities – as a husband, as a son, as a father, how could I take one responsibility 
and give up others?’521 His behaviour is an attempt to reconcile his need to perform locally 
embedded practices, with his desire to carve out a life of individual achievement. 
 Although some gay men, like Johnny, or married men who sleep with men as in the 
above example, do not wish or see no need to ‘come out’, others do, and there are emerging 
media models of ‘out’ men for them to emulate, although notably extremely few from 
mainland China, where being an ‘out’ homosexual is generally seen as the kiss of death to 
career success. Although the white-collar sexual image is ambiguous, it is almost 
unremittingly framed in heteronormative terms in the mainstream media, as I have discussed 
above. However, one very well known out gay man in China from a Chinese cultural 
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background is the Taiwan-born TV presenter Cai Kangyong, a middle-class, foreign-educated 
success story, host of the popular Taiwanese youth TV show ‘Kangxi laile’ (Kangxi has 
arrived) which many young Chinese people watch on the Internet. He discussed his 
homosexuality in a fairly matter of fact, non-judgmental manner in a sympathetic cover 
feature in the mainstream men’s magazine, Shishang xiansheng (Esquire), a magazine targeted 
at white-collar men.  
The front cover sports a large upbeat, dynamic image of Cai in a velvet dinner jacket, 
white wing collar and thickly knotted tie, with a black bird perched curiously on his shoulder, 
giving the impression of an eccentric or slightly maverick white-collar man. The feature 
engages at length with Cai’s background, career, and love life.  However, at times the author 
perhaps unwittingly reinforces certain stereotypes about gay men, such as describing Cai as an 
‘open homosexual’ (gongkai tongxinglianzhe) who ‘scarcely covers up his sissiness’ 
(niangniangqiang hao bu yanshi).522 Reflecting some of the tensions between coming out as 
gay and family and societal expectations and demands, the author depicts Cai as: ‘a penniless 
prince who brought honour to his family but received no applause’ (yige guangyaole menting 
dan mei tingdao zhangsheng de meilao gongzi) and ‘a homosexual who bears a rebel flag but 
has signed enough mainstream society cheques’ (yige jiankang panni qizhi dan qiangoule 
zhuliu shehui zhipiao de tongxinglianzhe).523 Perhaps significantly, Cai only came out 
publically (on a television programme) after both his parents had died.524 The author casts Cai 
as someone who refreshingly challenges convention on youth TV programmes, where he 
discusses such ‘taboo topics’ (jinji huati) as ‘kept mistresses’ (baoyang) and ‘running away 
from home’ (lijia chuzou).525  
The article reports that Cai, a star student in Taiwan and the United States before 
becoming a television presenter, was even asked to give a speech at Peking University. In 
keeping with his image as an individual who dares to challenge the status quo and follow his 
own path, and perhaps also capturing the mood of the age, Cai’s speech was entitled ‘Free 
Spirits and Roving Quests’ (ziyou jingshen yu liulang de tanxun). Cai has somehow captured 
the spirit of reform era youth, by being an example of someone who has dared to do things his 
own way but has still achieved mainstream success. He speaks to the aspirational side of 
contemporary urban youth, and, significantly, this is the aspect that Shishang xiansheng 
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emphasizes. Although a Cai Kangyong could not emerge in the more restricted broadcast 
media climate of contemporary China, the article’s relatively even-handed treatment of his 
homosexuality signifies the shifting discursive portrayals of gay men, towards a more tolerant, 
understanding stance in some, perhaps very limited, regards, at least it indicates an acceptance 
of gay TV entertainers who themselves reinforce the dominant consumerist, aspirational 
discourses, and thereby provides a new subject position – the popular, successful, lauded, 
fashionable, metrosexual gay star.  
 White-collar men adopt various strategies to negotiate the different demands of a society 
which promotes desire and self-fulfilment, yet at the same time has requirements about the 
performance of an assumed heterosexuality. Homosexuality in the white-collar world reflects 
many of that world’s defining characteristics: desire, desire to be desired, consumerisation, 
depoliticisation, and a mixing of global and local influences. The accounts I have outlined 
above, in Lisa Rofel’s words, manifest some of the connections between ‘Chinese gay men’s 
desires for cultural belonging in China and transcultural gay identifications’.526  
 
 
In conclusion, the sexual and gender subject positions inscribed in the image of the white-
collar man are associated with the diversification of contemporary Chinese society and with 
the ideological emphasis on individual aspiration and fulfilment through consumer activities 
focused on the beautification of the self.  As metrosexual or androgynous, the white-collar 
man is represented as reshaping existing notions of masculinity. The overlap between the 
androgynous, metrosexual and white-collar subjectivities converges in an emphasis on 
attention to personal appearance and emotional expressivity that challenge conventional 
notions of masculine looks and behaviour. Conservative reaction in labelling the 
androgynous/metrosexual man as feminine is yet another attempt to reaffirm conventional 
notions of masculinity through a subjectified feminine ‘Other’, driven by feelings of fear and 
anxiety about feminizing trends in society undermining men’s status and authority. Yet he is 
also understood, by some people, as a continuation of a long-running historical trajectory of 
attention to male beauty, which legitimates the notion of the metrosexual and situates him 
within an imagined Chinese tradition.  In this light, the ambiguous sexual ‘looks’ of white-
collar man incorporate both heterosexual and gay identities, allowing space for white-collar 
men’s performance of different sexual subjectivities, although these are contested when 
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deemed to cross normative gender boundaries. Whether depicted as blurring conventional 
demarcations, or as part of an established cultural narrative, in mainstream media he is 
overwhelmingly depicted in line with heteronormative assumptions. A prominent vehicle for 
this heterosexist conceptual framework is the ideal of the tender, thoughtful middle-class 
romantic husband or boyfriend, whose romantic behaviour sets him apart from other, less 
cultivated men.  
 The hegemonic model of the white-collar sexual subject is depicted almost exclusively 
in heteronormative terms, notwithstanding its incorporation of different sexual subjectivities. 
The pressure to perform heterosexual romance is such that some gay men construct ‘fake’ 
heterosexual relationships to ensure smooth relations with their family and at work, while 
simultaneously enjoying a parallel but discreet world of gay friendships, relationships and 
activities. Whether gay or straight, the vast majority of white-collar men eventually conform 
to heteronormative requirements to get married and have children. Explicit gay identities are 
controversial, and unacceptable to many, as they cannot easily be reconciled with conventional 
notions of Chineseness, although there appears to be some tolerance and interest among white-
collar men for information about homosexuality. 
 Overall, both my interviewees and media narratives suggest that shifting practices and 
performances have undeniably disturbed the conventional distinction between oppositional 
gender identities. The dominant image of the white-collar man as sexual subject is ambiguous, 
encapsulating multiple sexual subjectivities. However, the potentially exploratory – even 
transgressive in the Chinese context – gender possibilities of these new sexual identifications 
are contested, and repeatedly limited by pervasive attachments to notions of naturalized 
gender difference. Fundamentally, patriarchal assumptions about natural gender difference 
still underpin the mainstream conceptions of even these emerging possibilities for white-collar 
men. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
The image of the white-collar man pervades contemporary Chinese media and comes to life in 
metropolitan business districts. He is the symbol of middle-class success in the reform era, and 
a spectacular symbol of China’s post-millenial modernity. Within the framework of my 
discussion in this thesis, his presence and appearance suggest a range of meanings and 
formulations of gender, such that the new middle class, and the white-collar sector in 
particular, signify changing conceptualizations and practices of masculinity. The 
contemporary gendering of the male middle class and especially of ‘white-collar man’ is, 
moreover, highly influential. Encompassing global imagery, the contemporary image of the 
white-collar man is highly appealing to young urban men. Inscribed with the notions of 
masculinity I have discussed in the foregoing chapters, white-collar status becomes an 
inseparable component of contemporary identifications of and with masculinity.  
White-collar subject positions are produced through discursive regimes, which are 
embedded in everyday practices, institutions and relationships in particular sites, forming 
‘assemblages’. All the elements within these assemblages play a part in constituting white-
collar subjectivities and in how white-collar men conceive of themselves. In a spatial and 
corporeal process which I analyse through the concept of habituation, white-collar men – 
inspired by media guides – self-reflexively ‘bring themselves into discourse’ through the 
inculcation of bodily routines which become part of a ‘natural’ performance of white-collar 
masculinity. A hegemonic modality of white-collar masculinity has emerged through these 
processes, associated with the look and values of an imagined transnational business 
masculinity, but the multiplicity of white-collar masculinities which have emerged in 
contemporary China are testimony to the varied ways in which the hegemonic model interacts 
with other notions and practices of diverse historic and geographical origins. White-collar 
masculinity, then, is not a single, coherent, stable, ‘essential’ identity that is clearly understood 
from media depictions. Instead, white-collar masculinities cover a range of diverse subject 
positions that are multiple, fluid, non-unitary, incoherent and conflicting, and that have 
emerged in the specific historical and cultural conditions of contemporary China.  
This work has demonstrated that the rise of the middle class is often explained through 
the figure of the white-collar man, and has explored the representations and concepts through 
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which white-collar masculinity is rendered, with particular emphasis on the ideas, aspirations 
and desire men associate with it. In doing so, it has suggested new angles to understandings of 
gender and class formation in the reform era, which position the gendered white-collar man 
centre stage in the processes of contemporary social change. In contrast to the general use of 
the ‘white-collar’ label in the United States to denote a transcending of social class 
boundaries, Chinese media and academic discourse point to a specifically Chinese corporate 
white-collar sector, working for large transnational companies. Global corporate masculine 
characteristics in discourse intermingle with popular ideas of Chinese masculinities from 
history to construct an alluring image of manhood for aspiring young urban men. Throughout 
this work, I have examined the connections between hegemonic images in the media discourse 
of white-collar masculinity and the gendered practices and understandings of men who aspire 
to them. The notion of habituation illuminates the bodily and social processes these men adopt 
on their quest to perform a fluent and effortless white-collar masculinity. However, the non-
unitary and contradictory subjectivities that my white-collar informants demonstrate show that 
their performances of masculinity are ‘interpellated’ through multiple discourses, a situation 
which produces progressive, transformative possibilities, as Butler emphasizes. But, at the 
same time, this process produces the possibility of habituation to aspects of older, 
conservative, chauvinistic models of masculinity, which is a core argument of this thesis.  
In mainstream media discourse, the white-collar man, in his role as most prominent 
emblem of middle-class prosperity, is glamorously portrayed as someone who wears designer 
clothing, drives an expensive car, lives in a newly built condominium complex, and pursues a 
cosmopolitan lifestyle of exclusive gyms, fine-dining and overseas holidays. Depicted as an 
ideal spouse, caring and financially well off, he apparently offers a happy and stylish home to 
his prospective wife. In this way, white-collar masculinity symbolizes the sophisticated way of 
life of a prosperous professional class which has emerged through the spread of global capital 
and underscores the death of socialism as a meaningful alternative modernity.  
 Although often placed in this global perspective, the professional Chinese man must 
necessarily engage with a contemporary Chinese society that exhibits elements of historical 
culture, socialism and capitalism. His quest for individual self-improvement and career 
development involves not only the high status material trappings and sophisticated living and 
working spaces associated with the global professional class, but also engagement in activities 
associated with locally-embedded notions of masculinity, including business entertaining and 
relationship building. To this end, he is sometimes linked with popular ideas of historical 
masculinity; his gendered identity is both an effect of his engagement with the new global 
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world, but is also grounded in China’s cultural and national specificity. 
 Popular and academic discourse suggests that the key definers of middle-class man are 
global consumer items. He is frequently described as being at the forefront of consumer 
behaviour. Indeed, consumption is inseparably intertwined with media depictions of his work 
and family success. Underlying these images is the conception of the desiring subject, the 
seeker of individual achievement who, according to the widely-circulating ‘narrative’ of 
desire, is merely acting on his natural human instincts, which he was unable to express during 
the collective-oriented Mao era prior to the reforms starting in 1978. The white-collar man is 
the epitome of the desiring subject: his identity is built on consumption and its display. 
For some, the reemergence of the middle class is part of a linear process of China’s 
modernization promoting progressively more individual freedom and democracy. This 
viewpoint sees the practice of consumerism as opening up public spaces removed from the 
direct controls of the state, where people – especially the strongly-consuming middle classes – 
are freer to interact in more creative ways. However, this thesis rejects this as an imagined 
teleology which discards the ‘socialist’ alternatives as yesterday’s choices and precludes open 
political discussion about the meaning of modernization, arguing that increasing consumption 
is not synonymous with more personal freedom. China’s consumer culture gives the white-
collar man, alongside other social sectors, new – though circumscribed – spaces for the 
exercise of individual choice, experimentation and expression. However, a focus on 
consumerism and away from politics, simultaneously serves the interests of the CCP as it 
contributes to political stability and provides the Party with legitimacy. 
Gender inequalities have widened throughout the reform period, but their discussion is 
positioned at the margins of mainstream debate, which is primarily preoccupied with issues 
concerning economic development. The gendering of the middle class and white-collar man 
attract only minimal attention from the media and academia. Unless there is critical 
interrogation of the gendered practices, representations and assumptions that both contribute to 
and are produced by ongoing social change — including the gendering of contemporary 
society’s white-collar flag-bearer — then gender inequities and injustices will continue to be 
seen as the ‘naturalised’ effect of socio-economic processes. This work has attempted to 
identify the deep-seated gendered presumptions about the white-collar man which contribute 
to social gender inequities.  
Without doubt, however, there are also liberating and transgressive aspects to new 
post-Mao era gender formulations and subjectivities, and this thesis has investigated many 
prominent features of changing gender practices and relationships. It has done this through 
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focusing in particular on the connections between discourse and practice in relation to white-
collar men; not through adopting the teleological perspective of modernization theory, nor 
through a chronological account of masculinities, but through the analysis of contemporary 
notions of the white-collar man from a variety of sources. Despite those aspects of his current 
identity that might challenge naturalized understandings of heterosexual masculinity – such as 
his apparently soft, somewhat androgynous appearance – this work has shown how the media 
continues to depict the young white-collar man in profoundly heteronormative terms. As such, 
his version of masculinity represents only a cosmetic departure from those associated with the 
masculine figures of the Mao era. 
Moreover, as I have shown in chapter three, this discussion has highlighted how at his 
core, white-collar man is defined by a certain kind of body work that inscribes appearances as 
well as ways of moving and behaving in everyday activities. This integration of the young 
male body into white-collar body culture is achieved through a process of ‘learning to 
perform’ as a white-collar man, requiring the guidance of detailed discursive expositions, as in 
the texts I have analysed. As with other aspects of life, sculpting the young male body with the 
goal of acquiring white-collar cultural status relies on the ability to consume, as I have shown 
with my accounts of white-collar men I knew in Beijing discussing their suits and toiletries. 
The corporate suit in particular encapsulates a sense of reliability on a moral level. Throughout 
the media features on such issues, the corporate man’s assumed heterosexuality is never 
questioned.  
 As I pointed out in chapter four, a central theatre for the performance of white-collar 
masculinity is the corporate office, usually within one of the shiny skyscrapers which provide 
the urban architecture symbolic of China’s aspirations to be a major player in global 
capitalism. Herein, corporate man pursues his desires; his performance of a modern 
masculinity is inseparable from the spaces framing it. Within this iconic globalised setting, 
local realities such as personal network building amongst colleagues and homosocial business 
entertaining occupy his time. Business media, through detailed prescriptions of standards of 
bodily appearance and intellectual attainment, urge young corporate recruits to follow the 
pluralistic values associated with global business methods, and to forgo local historical 
tendencies. The young white-collar male, fresh out of intensive education, moves straight into 
a strongly competitive job market in a narrative of burden and heavy pressure. To be 
successful, he must learn to negotiate all aspects of his job, global and local. 
The leisure pursuits of professional men, which I explored in chapter five, are again 
dependent on their consumer capacity, and which they take part in not only for recreational 
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purposes but also for the status cachet of global sophistication it brings them. Furthermore, 
these activities – to become proficient in some of which requires dedicated body work and 
learning – deliver opportunities to build homosocial relationships that enhance their interests 
as white-collar men. The narrative of the desiring subject suggests that the middle-class man is 
incomplete without participation in these mostly consumer-oriented activities. Even the 
religious practices of the middle class are often interwoven with a desire to cultivate status and 
certain moral values, and to display spending power, for example through financing the 
construction of new churches and temples. Women are often either excluded from or provide 
service in these homosocial activities, including sexual services in some of the pervasive 
business socialising sites where masculinity is tested and demonstrated. 
The idea of the middle-class man as the harbinger of democracy extends into private 
life, in which, as I demonstrated in chapter six, the media portrays the white-collar husband as 
cognisant of and sensitive to his wife’s needs, treating her as an equal. However, underlying 
these idealised relationships are gender roles inscribed with strongly naturalised conceptions 
of male and female attributes. Furthermore, male concern about a perceived lessening of 
influence has brought about determined efforts to sustain it. Conventional ascriptions of 
gender provide comfort for both sexes as they seek to negotiate the challenging and fluid 
social and economic times. Falling back on inherited notions of gender propriety, white-collar 
men fall back from the hegemonic media ideal on to more deeply embedded assumptions, 
including the declared desire to be the main breadwinner and a dislike of their working wives, 
which is justified through an appeal to women’s ‘natural’ propensity to look after her family. 
This new subjectivity is afraid of conjugal equality, not supportive of it. 
Although there are not many signs of transgressive gender formulations in conjugal 
relationships, as I discussed in chapter seven, the fashionable young white-collar male is 
associated with new sexual images. Prominent among these is the ‘slightly androgynous’ 
metrosexual white-collar man, but his potentially trangressive characteristics are driven mostly 
by his consumer capacity and are circumscribed by mainstream gender distinctions. This 
occludes any potential queering of moral expectations around gender. He is depicted as a 
romantic ideal, desired by women; he is also sexualized and objectified in men’s magazines. 
Although such images could be read as either straight or gay, they are for the most part termed 
androgynous, associated with a ‘feminine’ attention to body, fashion and appearance, and 
emotional expressivity and fragility, especially manifested through his willingness to cry. 
However, despite such potentially transgressive features, he is firmly placed within a 
heteronormative discourse, and supported with historical allusions to an imagined continuity 
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of beautiful Chinese men. The overwhelmingly heteronormative configuration of society 
discourages white-collar gay men from being open about their sexuality, and for many, 
marriage – whether real or ‘fake’ – is an unavoidable part of maintaining an appearance of 
middle-class respectability and protecting their career interests. Ultimately, the transgressive 
possibilities of new masculine subjectivities are consistently curtailed by the widespread 
privileging of naturalized and unequal heteronormative norms. 
 
 
The mainstream media discourse of the figure of the white-collar man accords him an 
emblematic role in the imagined teleological narrative of China’s modernization, at the 
vanguard of consumerism. Yet despite this, the gendered meanings ascribed to his character 
and figure, and the gendered performances of my informants in their daily activities at home, 
work and play, show that in many respects white-collar men continue to uphold familiar and 
conventional masculine roles, belying the surface appearance of hegemonic media images and 
confounding any mapping of him as society’s most progressive element. He is neither the 
beacon of enlightened gender awareness nor the confounder of sexual boundaries he is often 
made out to be. In the final analysis, he reveals himself in many regards as a rather forlorn 
figure – insecure, socially conservative, misogynistic and obsessively materialistic– far from 
the glossy model man his propagators depict him as. 
The subjectivities of white-collar men thus may not be what they appear to be from 
media images, particularly to the ‘Western’ eye. To many outside China, China appears to be, 
or is assumed to be becoming westernised. This is not to suggest that these images do not 
signify change; they do, but the important question is what kind of change they signify, a 
question that this thesis has sought to answer through its focus on ethnographic material. 
Change, which may be transgressive, does not require the teleology of the modernisation 
argument. Many men undoubtedly can explore a greater range of sexualities and gender 
positions than when in the ‘straitjacket’ of the Mao era, but this does not mean that the new 
gender images are more just or egalitarian. Investigation of men’s subjectivities through what 
they say and do, as I have done in this thesis, shows that what their performances mean to 
them can be very different from what the observer thinks. Any understanding of the 
performativity of white-collar masculinities thus must be located within the political, cultural 
and socio-economic environment of contemporary China, with the recognition that the 
transformative possibilities inherent in the reiterative process of performativity inevitably 
draw from locally embedded notions of masculinity as well as those circulating globally. In 
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this light, I have endeavoured to show that a culturally-specific situating of Butler’s theory of 
performativity is needed to analyse the political and social effects of the transformative 
possibilities of performativity.527  
In the final instance, the figure of the white-collar man is a further component of the 
‘impossibility of gender' as a critical category in contemporary China. Nowhere is gender 
thoroughly interrogated, not even in the academy. There are severe constraints, therefore, on 
how people conceptualise gender, and they very often fall back on routinely unjust and 
discriminatory stereotypes about men and women. The gay white-collar man is also caught in 
this apparently closed web of gender assumptions; he too is the subject of discrimination and 
injustice. And as this work demonstrates, in the absence of critical discussion about gender, 
change is interpreted and lived – reproduced – in mostly familiar ways. 
                                                 
527 This is a point perhaps often overshadowed or overlooked in the enthusiastic expectations of progressive 
change often elicited by Butler’s formulation, though Butler herself, perhaps aware of this, clearly disavows any 
teleological implication of her work. See, for example, her comment that ‘it would be a mistake to subscribe to a 
progressive notion of history in which various frameworks are understood to succeed and supplant one another’, 
in Judith Butler, Undoing Gender, (New York: Routledge, 2004), 4.  
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Select Character List 
 
 
 
bailing      白领 
bailing jieceng    白领阶层 
bailing jingyingmen    白领精英们 
bailing nanren     白领男人 
bailing neihan de Zhongguohua  白领内涵的中国化 
bailing shenfen, xingxiang ji shenghuo  白领身份,形象及生活方式 
   fangshi 
bailing xinshi     白领心事 
bailing zazhi     白领杂志 
bailing zhiye     白领职业 
beiying shi nanrenwei biaoxian fa  背影式男人味表现法 
biaomian     表面 
biaozhunde waiqi bailing jieceng  标准的外企白领阶层 
caizi      才子 
caizi-jiaren     才子佳人 
chenggong tongxinyuan   成功同心圆 
chengjiu dongji    成就动机 
chuanzhe jiangjiu, shenghuo xizhi  穿着讲究,生活细致 
dali ziji     打理自己 
diaosu ziji     雕塑自己 
dingke jiazu     丁克家族 
dushi linan     都市丽男 
dushi meinan     都市美男 
dushi meixing nan    都市美型男 
dushi yu’nan     都市玉男 
fucong      服从 
gaige kaifang     改革开放 
gao xiaofei pin    高消费品 
gaoji hui     高级灰 
gediao      格调 
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gemenr     哥们儿 
geren de qinfen nuli    个人的勤奋努力 
geren zai shehui zhong ziwo wanshan 个人在社会中自我完善 
geti gongshanghu    个体工商户 
getihu      个体户 
gongkai tongxinglianzhe   公开同性恋者 
gou nanren     够男人 
gou jian da bi waitao nafa   勾肩搭臂外套拿法 
guanxi      关系 
guitou-guinao de xiao hunhun  鬼头鬼脑的小混混 
Guoji zaixian     国际在线 
guoying qiye de zhigong   国营企业的职工 
haohan      好汉 
haoshuang     豪爽 
hexie      和谐 
houwei     后卫 
Hong gaoliang    红高粱 
Huanle yingxiong    欢乐英雄 
hua mingtian de qian, ban jintian de shi 花明天的钱,办今天的事 
huangjin liushuixian    黄金流水线 
huiyishi dadun ying fangxin fa  会议室打盹赢芳心法 
jiachuqu de nü'er, pochuqu de shui  嫁出去的女儿,泼出去的水 
jiankang     健康 
jiashang mimeng de shuangyan  加上迷蒙的双眼 
jiating funan     家庭妇男 
jiating lunli     家庭伦理 
jilei de wenhua ziben    积累的文化资本 
jingye jingshen    敬业精神 
kafeiting duanbei fa    咖啡厅端杯法 
laoban      老板 
lianghao jiaoyu    良好教育 
lei zhongchan jieceng    类中产阶层 
leisi bailing de putong ganbu he  类似白领的普通干部和知识分子 
   zhishifenzi 
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Meili xiansheng    魅力先生 
mendi      门第 
Mingpai     名牌 
mingpai huazhuang pin   名牌化妆品 
mingpai xiangshui    名牌香水  
mingwang     名望 
nan nü pingdeng    男女平等 
nan wei ji rong    男为己容 
nan zhu wai, nü zhu nei   男主外,女主内 
nanren bugai zhuzhong waibiao, ying 男人不该注重外表,应讲究内涵 
   jiangjiu neihan 
nanren de jingzhi shidai   男人的精致时代 
Nanren de yiban shi nüren   男人的一半是女人 
Nanren zhuang    男人装 
nanse      男色 
nanzi qigai     男子气概 
niangniang qiang de naiyou xiaosheng 娘娘腔的奶油小生 
nüxinghua     女性化 
pinwei      品味   
qianshedao haizi    牵涉到孩子 
qianwei     前卫 
Qingnian shejiao    青年社交 
quanfangwei de guanzhao   全方位的关照 
qundai      裙带 
rang yibufen ren xian fuqilai    让一部分人先富起来 
rou      柔 
ru      儒 
shangpin jingji qifen jiaowei nongzhong 商品经济气氛较为浓重 
shangwu tong     商务通 
shangye chengxin    商业诚信 
shehui wangluo    社会网络 
shejiao      社交 
shengbing boqu tongqing fa   生病博取同情法 
shendu jie na dianhua fa   深度接拿电话法 
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Shenjiang fuwu daobao   申江服务导报 
shibiaozhe     师表者 
shidai butongle, nan nü dou yiyang  时代不同了,男女都一样 
Shishang     时尚 
Shishang jiankang    时尚健康 
Shishang junzi     时尚君子 
Shishang xiansheng    时尚先生 
shishang xiaofei pin    时尚消费品 
shouchaoben     手抄本 
shouru shuiping zai zhongdeng yishang 收入水平在中等以上 
shuaiqi huxu lao    帅气胡须佬 
Shuihu zhuan     水浒传 
Shuo ru     说儒  
Shuowen jiezi     说文解字 
sixiang      思想 
siying qiyejia     私营企业家 
siyou siwu de huxi sheng   似有似无的呼吸声 
suizhe shehui de buduan jinbu  随着社会的不断进步 
suzhi      素质 
suzhi tisheng     素质提升  
timian er shouru jiao gao de bailing   体面而收入教高的白领工作 
   gongzuo 
tingcong     听从 
titie      体贴 
touji quqiao     投机取巧 
touji-zuanying de shengyiren    投机钻营的生意人 
waiqi      外企 
waiqi bailing     外企白领 
wangmin     网民 
wei shubuduo de nengguo jieshou jingying  为数不多的能够接受经营教育的人 
   jiaoyu de ren 
weiyi jinjin kao gongzi jishen zhongchan  惟一仅仅靠工资跻身中产之列的群体 
   zhi lie de qunti 
wen-wu     文武 
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wenhua pinwei    文化品味 
wu fengzu du bao fa    无风阻读报法 
wuchu buzai     无处不在 
wuxia      武侠 
xiancheng de shenfen zuobiao  现成的身份坐标 
xiangzhen qiyejia    乡镇企业家 
xiao shangfan     小商贩 
xiao yezhu     小业主 
xiaobailian     小白脸 
xiaofei jiqing      消费激情 
xiaofei lingyu      消费领域 
xiaofei qianwei     消费前卫 
xiaofei xingwei     消费行为 
xiaofei, xiaofei, zai xiaofei   消费,消费,再消费 
xiaofei zhongchan    消费中产  
xiaojie      小姐 
xiaosheng     小生 
xiaozi       小资   
xiayi xiaoshuo     侠义小说 
xibeifeng     西北风 
xin shiji de nanren    新世纪的男人 
xin shishen     新士绅 
Xinlang     新浪 
xinxihua     信息化 
Xixiang ji     西厢记    
xizhuang biting    西装笔挺 
xu      需 
xungen yundong    寻根运动 
Xunzhao nanzihan    寻找男子汉 
yanggang     阳刚 
yangzun-chuyou de gongzige   养尊处优的公子哥 
yanshen de duijie    眼神的对接 
yi      义 
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yin-yang     阴阳      
yingchou     应酬   
yinggxiong     英雄 
yingzaochu wenzhong de xingxiang  营造出稳重的形象 
yinrou      阴柔 
yinsheng yang shuai    阴盛阳衰 
yiqi      义气 
yishujia     艺术家 
yizhao xinqing shiyong   依照心情使用  
yongyong-lulu de gongwuyuan  庸庸碌碌的公务员 
yuchou-suanfu de ruo shusheng  迂臭酸腐的弱书生 
zhaojiu-wanwu de bailing   朝九晚五的白领 
zhengyi     正义 
zhenzheng de nanren    真正的男人 
zhiye daode     职业道德 
zhiye huangjing, shenfen gege-buru  职业环境,身份格格不入 
zhizhu      支柱 
zhongchan jieceng     中产阶层 
zhongchanzhe     中产者 
zhongdeng shouru de jieji huo  中等收入的阶级或中等收入阶层 
   zhongdeng shouru jieceng 
zhongjian jieceng     中间阶层 
zhongxing     中性 
zhongxing nanren    中性男人 
zhuguan rentong zhongchan   主观认同中产 
zhuzhai loupan    住宅楼盘 
ziben      资本 
zichan jieji daibiao renwu   资产阶级代表人物 
ziming-bufan de kongtan ke   自命不凡的空谈客 
zinü jiaoyu     子女教育 
ziwo fazhan de nengli    自我发展的能力 
ziwo shenxin jiankang   自我身心健康 
ziyou zhiyezhe    自由职业者 
zou ziben zhuyi luxian pai   走资本主义路线派 
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zuo zhen yemenr    做真爷们儿 
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